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Limity Rawlsovho prístupu k teórii spravodlivosti v koncepciách Evy F. Kittayovej a Marthy C. Nussbaumovej
Filozofia, 2019, vol. 74, No 7, pp. 543-555.
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RIS In this article, we will analyze the limits of rationalist contract theories, such as Rawl’s theory of justice. The understanding of autonomy and human dignity based on the idea of a rational and self-determining subject that is aware of his interests, rights and can cooperate rationally is not sufficient as a foundation for defining the social rights and specific rights of minorities (persons with disabilities, elderly citizens, or children). Ethics of care outlined by Eva F. Kittay and capability approach described by Martha C. Nussbaum offers a critical reflection on this conventional approach to justice. The focus of submitted reflections is the characterization of a shift from Kant´s idea of an autonomous person and a liberal idea of useful mutual reciprocity of individuals (J. Rawls) towards Aristotelian essentialism, which extends the concept of a subject concerning justice. This extension includes ill people, elderly citizens and people with disabilities (E. F. Kittay, M. C. Nussbaum).