Detail príspevku/publikácie

Inferentialism without Normativity

Organon F, 2018, vol. 25, No 2, pp. 174-195.
Súbor na stiahnutie: PDF
BibTex EndNote Tagged EndNote XML RIS
In this paper we argue that inferentialist approach to meaning does not, by itself, show that meaning is normative in a prescriptive sense, and that the constitutive rules argument is especially troubling for this position. To show that, we present the proto-inferentialist theory developed by Ajdukiewicz and claim that despite the differences between his theory and contemporary inferentialism rules of language in both theories function more like classificatory devices than prescriptions. Inferentialists can respond by claiming that in their theory meaning is essentially social and hence normative, but we claim that then semantic normativity becomes derivative of social normativity.

Kontakt

Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i.
Klemensova 19
811 09 Bratislava 1
Tel.: +4212 5292 1215
E-mail: sekretariat.fiu@savba.sk
Domovská stránka
IČO: 00166995
DIČ: 2020794149

Korešpondenčná adresa:

Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i.
P. O. Box 3364
813 64 Bratislava

Filozofia - redakcia

Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i.
Redakcia časopisu Filozofia
Klemensova 19
811 09 Bratislava 1
Tel.: +4212 5292 1215
E-mail: redakcia.filozofia@savba.sk
Domovská stránka

Korešpondenčná adresa:

Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i.
Redakcia časopisu Filozofia
P. O. Box 3364
813 64 Bratislava

Organon F - redakcia

Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i.
Redakcia časopisu Organon F
Klemensova 19
811 09 Bratislava 1
Tel.: +4212 5292 1215
E-mail: info@organonf.com
Domovská stránka

Korešpondenčná adresa:

Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i.
Redakcia časopisu Organon F
P. O. Box 3364
813 64 Bratislava