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K predpokladom a súvislostiam faktu v sociálnom poznaní
Filozofia, 2009, vol. 64, No 7, pp. 613-624.
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RIS The paper examines the nature of the social fact in social knowledge on the background of the differences between sciences and social sciences. The approach applied is historical (É. Durkheim, M. Weber, M. Mauss, J. Searle), as well as one based on differentiating between Humean conception of fact and the conceptions, in which facts are seen as determining the truth values of our propositions. Underlined are the intentionality and structure of social facts in terms of Searle’s construction of the social as well as the weakness of his conception. In conclusion it is asserted that the construction of facts in social sciences is impossible without psychological vocabulary and concepts, whose contents are conceived – contrary to Searle’s internalism – in terms of externalism.