V. Jankélévitch is one of the significant, even though not duly appreciated French philosophers of the 20th century. Among Slovak itellectuals his works are almost unknown. The aim of the paper is to examnine Jankélévich's ethical vision pre_sented in his work A Treatise on Virtues, to shed light on its essential issues, sources and the main arguments of its defence, particularly by means of Jankélévitch's understanding of the concepts of good and virtue. The main thesis of Jankélévitch's vision is implied by his rejection of substantialism: the good is not prior to the action of the moral subject. It is constituted in a flash of instant and it can not be capitalized. Thus to act in the name of the good is a continuous, personally determined obligation. On the other hand virtue as an accomplished good implies duration, a stable mode of being expressed in the qualitative disposition of man's character. How then can a man become a man of virtue? In this context the author examines the relationship between the discontinuity of the good and the continuity of virtues.