Article/Publication Details

Explanační monismus u nekauzálních vysvětlení

(Explanatory Monism in Non-causal Explanations)
Filozofia, 2022, vol. 77, No 8, pp. 590 - 607.
File to download: PDF
BibTex EndNote Tagged EndNote XML RIS
The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the mentioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of non-causal explanations.

Contact

Institute of Philosophy SAS, v.v.i.
Klemensova 19
811 09 Bratislava 1
Slovak Republic
Tel.: +4212 5292 1215
E-mail: sekretariat.fiu@savba.sk
Home page

Address for correspondence:

Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i.
P. O. Box 3364
813 64 Bratislava
Slovak Republic

Journal Filozofia

Institute of Philosophy SAS, v.v.i.
Filozofia Editorial Office
Klemensova 19
811 09 Bratislava 1
Slovak Republic
Tel.: +4212 5292 1215
E-mail: redakcia.filozofia@savba.sk
Home page

Address for correspondence:

Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i.
Filozofia Editorial Office
P. O. Box 3364
813 64 Bratislava
Slovak Republic

Journal Organon F

Institute of Philosophy SAS, v.v.i.
Organon F Editorial Office
Klemensova 19
811 09 Bratislava 1
Slovak Republic
Tel.: +4212 5292 1215
E-mail: organonf@gmail.com
Home page

Address for correspondence:

Filozofický ústav SAV, v. v. i.
Organon F Editorial Office
P. O. Box 3364
813 64 Bratislava
Slovak Republic