Article/Publication Details

Kopírovanie zabíja identitu osoby

(Copying: Killing Personal Identity)
Odorčák, Juraj
Filozofia, 2015, vol. 70, No 5, pp. 367-377.
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The paper sheds light on the idea of uploading persons. Transhumanists defend the possibility of uploading persons. However, this might lead to substantial dualism of a person and its substrate. Dualism contradicts other transhumanist philosophical presuppositions so, the transhumanist theory as a whole could be contradictory. The problem of dualism can be eliminated by introducing the concept of emulation. Thus the concept of emulation could resolve the aforementioned contradiction in the transhumanist theory. On the other hand, the drawback of the concept of emulation could be a threat to personal identity. Hence, the main task of transhumanism is not to tackle the problem of person but rather that of personal identity.

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