Detail príspevku/publikácie

Consciousness and Peripheral Self-Awareness

Organon F, 2013, roč. 20, č. 3, s. 323-340.
Jazyk: English
Súbor na stiahnutie: PDF*
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Abstrakt

It has been argued that consciousness is not possible without peripheral self-consciousness; i.e., without an implicit awareness of oneself as the subject of one’s mental state. My purpose is to undermine this view. I contend that a subject’s first-personal access to her conscious mental states and an awareness of them as hers, along with a particular approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things motivate the view that consciousness is not possible without self-consciousness. In order to undermine this view I argue that not all conscious states are accompanied by a sense of mineness. I also reject the reasons for endorsing an approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things. Then I critically examine Kriegel’s arguments for the dependence of consciousness on self-consciousness based on the first-personal access a subject has to her conscious mental states and discuss the difficulties involved.

Kľúčové slová

consciousness, higher-order theories of consciousness, peripheral self-awareness, self-consciousness

*Príspevok je chránený zákonom o autorskom práve a právach súvisiacich s autorským právom (autorský zákon).