Article/Publication Details

Consciousness and Peripheral Self-Awareness

(Original title: Consciousness and Peripheral Self-Awareness)
Organon F, 2013, vol. 20, No 3, pp. 323-340.
Language: English
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Abstract

It has been argued that consciousness is not possible without peripheral self-consciousness; i.e., without an implicit awareness of oneself as the subject of one’s mental state. My purpose is to undermine this view. I contend that a subject’s first-personal access to her conscious mental states and an awareness of them as hers, along with a particular approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things motivate the view that consciousness is not possible without self-consciousness. In order to undermine this view I argue that not all conscious states are accompanied by a sense of mineness. I also reject the reasons for endorsing an approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things. Then I critically examine Kriegel’s arguments for the dependence of consciousness on self-consciousness based on the first-personal access a subject has to her conscious mental states and discuss the difficulties involved.

Keywords

consciousness, higher-order theories of consciousness, peripheral self-awareness, self-consciousness

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