%0 Journal Article %J Organon F %D 2013 %T Consciousness and Peripheral Self-Awareness %A Hatipoğlu, Sinem Elkatip %K consciousness %K higher-order theories of consciousness %K peripheral self-awareness %K self-consciousness %X It has been argued that consciousness is not possible without peripheral self-consciousness; i.e., without an implicit awareness of oneself as the subject of one’s mental state. My purpose is to undermine this view. I contend that a subject’s first-personal access to her conscious mental states and an awareness of them as hers, along with a particular approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things motivate the view that consciousness is not possible without self-consciousness. In order to undermine this view I argue that not all conscious states are accompanied by a sense of mineness. I also reject the reasons for endorsing an approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things. Then I critically examine Kriegel’s arguments for the dependence of consciousness on self-consciousness based on the first-personal access a subject has to her conscious mental states and discuss the difficulties involved. %B Organon F %V 20 %P 323-340 %G English %U http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/3/323-340.pdf %9 State %2 Articles %3 323340