This paper surveys a new approach to interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – the resolute reading. The proponents of the resolute interpretation (especially Cora Diamond and James F. Conant) have argued that the central point of Tractatus is § 6.54. The reading of the section should be resolute, which means the sentences in Tractatus are simply nonsense (einfach Unsinn). Thus, the Tractatus’ aim is not a theory or doctrine of aspects of reality, language or their relation. On the other hand, the main point of the text should be elucidation of the reader’s points. The paper analyses two assumptions in the resolute reading and submits criticism of them. The basis of the criticism is to verify the validity of resolute reading’s assumptions by reference to Notebooks, Prototractatus, correspondence and some manuscripts and typescripts from the Tractatus period in Wittgenstein’s thinking.