The paper completes a “serial” of my contributions to the hot problems of current semantics, i.e. propositional / notional attitudes, de dicto / de re, synonymy, homonymy, equivalence, meaning, sense, denotation, reference. Two kinds of believing, knowing, etc. are distinguished, namely implicit believing of an ideal believer (logical / mathematical genius) and explicit believing of a logical / mathematical ignorant (idiot). A special case of a week, hidden homonymy is considered and we show that when claiming two expressions being synonymous we have to be careful, for a more fine-grained analysis may reveal that there is a semantic difference between them. The distinction between de dicto / de re supposition is defined and a special case of ‘existence’ being de dicto / de re is solved.
*Príspevok je chránený zákonom o autorskom práve a právach súvisiacich s autorským právom (autorský zákon).