In this paper, I try to argue that, from the methodological position of reflected equilibrium, it seems to be reasonable to build a theory of personal identity that enables a person to continue her existence after the biological death of her body. This conclusion is supported by the argument that our practice reflects that our identity-presupposing concerns reach beyond biological continuity. We have also good reasons to maintain such concerns and practices. As the best candidate to implement such concerns in a theoretical account of practical identity, I will identify the person-life view, where personal identity depends to a great extent on social conditions. I also show how this theory can implement the classical belief in the afterlife, and how it could conceptualize the difference of the afterlife from a physicalistic and a theistic point of view.
afterlife, Marya Schechtman, Pascal’s wager, person-life, personal identity, Radim Bělohrad, reflected equilibrium, Samuel Scheffler
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