The paper focuses on the relation of the so-called Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) and Aristotelian Essentialism. TIL is presented here as an antiessentialist system. I analyse the reasons of TIL´s anti-essentialism, and I see the main reasons in the very conception of possible worlds, which is preferred by TIL, as well as in the ontological status of properties and secondarily in the relation between individuals and properties, as TIL conceives it. I assert that even within the frame of TIL it is possible to formulate a certain version of the Aristotelian Essentialism and I point out the intuitions that are connected with the concept of essence and preserved by the formulated conception, contrary to TIL and other systems of modern logic.
*Príspevok je chránený zákonom o autorskom práve a právach súvisiacich s autorským právom (autorský zákon).