The article deals with the problem of consistency between metamethodology and naturalism in the philosophy of science. In the first part I clarify the concept of metamethodology in light of Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programs and his four theories of rationality. In the second part I analyze the naturalization of epistemology in Quine’s perspective and the question whether metamethodology is compatible with his non-normative sort of naturalism. The final part focuses on the Laudan’s version of naturalism which tries to retain normativity. I analyze Laudan’s program for justification and appraisal of methodological rules and his attempt to formulate a metamethodological rule, which would be acceptable for all concurrent methodologies. From the naturalistic point of view it seems unacceptable that the naturalistic program would admit inviolable rule. I find such an objection to the metamethodological rule mistaken, but I formulate another objection as to why Laudan’s rule is unacceptable. I propose my own version of metamethodological rules, which are inviolable but methodologically empty and trivial, and I try to show that the existence of such rules represent a worry for normative naturalism, but not a fatal flaw.
metamethodology, methodological rules, naturalism, philosophy of science