

# Responsibility, rights and rules

*(workshop)*


**25 May 2023 | 13:00**

**The study room of the Central Library of Slovak Academy of Sciences**

**Klemensova 19**

**811 09 Bratislava**

**Slovak Republic**



**Invited speaker:**

**Alex Kaiserman**

(University of Oxford)

# Talks

**Alex Kaiserman**

(University of Oxford)

## **Responsibility and Iterated Knowledge**

**Abstract:** I defend an iterated knowledge condition on responsibility for outcomes: one is responsible for a consequence of one's action only if one was in a position to know that, for all one was in a position to know, one's action would have that consequence.

**Matteo Pascucci**

(Institute of Philosophy SAS, v. v. i.)

## **Diagrammatic reasoning on rights**

**Abstract:** The Hohfeldian theory of normative relations, which is intended to clarify different uses of the word 'right' in legal and judicial reasoning, has been recently analysed in terms of diagrams of opposition. These representations unveil logical dependencies among normative relations and hidden features of the theory, according to certain interpretations. Moreover, diagrams may be combined in order to illustrate interactions between first-order (e.g., claim) and second-order (e.g. power) normative relations. This talk will consist of a concise overview of the area.

**Daniela Vacek**

(Institute of Philosophy SAS, v. v. i.)

## **Two remarks on the new AI control problem**

**Abstract:** This talk focuses on the new AI control problem and the control dilemma recently formulated by Nyholm, which is most pressing in the case of advanced humanoid robots. I put forth two remarks that may be of help in (dis)solving the problem and resolving the corresponding dilemma. First, I suggest that the idea of complete control should be replaced with the notion of considerable control. Second, I cast some doubt on what seems to be assumed by the dilemma, namely that control over another human being is always morally problematic. I suggest that there are some contexts (namely, relations of vicarious responsibility and vicarious agency) where having considerable control over another human being is morally unproblematic, if not desirable. If this is the case, control over advanced humanoid robots could well be another instance of morally unproblematic control. Alternatively, what makes it a problematic instance remains an open question.

**Jozef Sábó**

(Institute of Philosophy SAS, v. v. i.)

## **Vicarious Responsibility for AI Systems: some Considerations and Challenges**

**Abstract:** Matteo Pascucci and Daniela Vacek introduced the concept of vicarious responsibility as a suitable foundation for establishing (legal) liability for damages caused by AI systems. In existing legal frameworks, vicarious responsibility serves as a mechanism for assigning liability primarily in two scenarios. First, when a legal entity (i.e., an entity possessing its own rights and obligations) fulfils the criteria for liability, but the actual responsible party is another legal entity with its own rights and obligations, such as in an employee-employer relationship. The second scenario occurs when a legal entity breaches its preventive duty or adequate level of care concerning damages caused by an entity lacking legal subjectivity, such as an animal owner and their animal. Under current regulations, AI systems do not possess recognized legal subjectivity, making the conceptual transfer of their "responsibility" to a third party through vicarious responsibility impossible. However, defining preventive responsibility practically, in relation to the (semi)autonomous behaviour of an AI system, can be challenging in terms of determining the adequate level of care required on the part of another legal entity who should be responsible for the damages caused. The talk will explore these issues and several other open questions related to the implementation of the vicarious responsibility concept for the legal regulation of AI systems' liability.