

MODAL METAPHYSICS:  
ISSUES ON THE  
(IM)POSSIBLE  
IV



*METAPHYSICS.*  
SK



**BOOK OF ABSTRACTS**

**AUGUST 30-31, 2016**

**BRATISLAVA**

Dear delegate,

MODAL METAPHYSICS: Issues on the (Im)Possible IV is organized by the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences, Slovak Philosophy Association and metaphysics.sk research group.

The idea behind the conference is to put together researchers working on the problems of modality and provide thus an actual overview of the field. It is our pleasure to host contributors from all around the world and create thus an excellent, philosophically appealing and professional environment in Slovakia.

Of course, the conference would be impossible without the support of the Institute of Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences. Namely, our gratitude belongs to the director of the Institute of Philosophy for generous support. We also thank to all who directly or indirectly contributed to the conference, academic and program committee, administrative staff of Slovak Academy of Sciences and last but not least to all speakers. Without them the conference would not be (im)possible.

Martin Vacek  
(August 24, 2016)



**GIDEON ROSEN**

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**Modality in the Metaphysics of Ethics**

The paper assumes a non-naturalist view of ethics according to which particular moral facts are ultimately grounded in non-normative facts together with general moral principles. This view raises two questions. The first concerns the form of these general principles. The second concerns their modal status. The paper argues that pure moral principles best understood as modalized generalizations of the form It is normatively necessary that whatever is PHI is F (where PHI is non-normative and F is normative), though not every such fact is a principle; and that given plausible assumptions, most such principles are metaphysically contingent. This view raises further questions about the epistemology of ethics, and about the range of metaphysically possible variation in moral principles, answers to which are briefly sketched.

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**The Questions of Ontology**

The ontological question, Quine famously told us, is curious in its simplicity. Not only can it be asked in three words — what is there? — but it can be answered in just one: everything. But though Quine thinks that everyone will accept the truth of this answer, he thinks that ontology remains a lively discipline insofar as there remains room for disagreement about cases: thus one philosopher might disagree with another about whether or not there are such things as numbers, properties, composite objects, temporal parts, and so on. Each side will, of course, agree that there is what there is. But they disagree nonetheless, since they disagree about what there is, and thereby about to what ‘everything’ amounts. In his influential paper “The Question of Ontology”, however, Kit Fine has argued that Quine’s conception of ontological inquiry is doubly wrong, since ontological questions are not questions about what there is and neither are ontological questions properly answered by saying that there are (or are not) things of the relevant sort. Rather, Fine thinks, ontological questions are questions about what there *\*really\** is and are properly answered only by saying that all of the things of the relevant sort are real. In my talk, I aim defend a broadly Quinean picture of ontology by arguing that both Fine’s criticisms of Quine, and the conception of ontological inquiry that Fine subsequently develops, are problematic.

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**Dispositional Arrays  
(Why So Scared of Possible Worlds?)**

Some philosophers believe in the existence of genuine irreducible powers (or equivalently, dispositions), and that they are more acceptable, naturalistic, not ad hoc and actualist-friendly candidates to replace possible worlds (PWs) in one's analysis of modality. This new ontology-cum-semantics project (dispositionalism) does not engage with PW-ontology and avoids PW-semantics altogether (viz., the usual "Leibnizian" semantic clauses for box and diamond).

I argue that such a swift opposition between powers and PWs is unwarranted. I will present a power-based ontology of PWs, which in turn offers a power-based applied PW-semantics for modal discourse; a PW is taken to be a dispositional array, viz., a power for the entire world to be so-and-so. The motivation is straightforward: dispositionalists only have quandaries against existing PW-ontologies, not against PW-semantics per se, nor against the intuition behind the Leibnizian bi-conditionals. Keeping an applied PW-semantics in the loop also allows the dispositionalist to blunt the charge that a power-based theory of modality deprives itself of the theoretical virtues and sheer formal power of PW-semantics. It may be a price to pay for the dispositionalist (who is a "realist" about modality, at least in the sense that our theories of modality involve mind-independent objective modal facts) that the best interpretation of modal discourse is a purely formal device that fails to map unto anything.

I discuss several features of this proposal, from the nature of dispositional arrays, to the "true at" relation, and finally to the rules of construction for PWs, and the modal constraints it may be subject to.

Eventually the dispositionalist will afford both a PW- and non-PW- semantics. Because the ultimate source of modality is the same for both semantics (powers), there is a correlation between the two. When we say that p is possible, the former takes it as saying that the entire world is such that p is within the range of its potentialities, while the latter goes down to pinpoint the exact localized power, that is responsible for that potentiality. In the two interpretations, we are always looking at the same things, but at two different levels of generality.

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### **Unknowable Truths and Limits of Knowledge: What Conclusions Can We Draw from Fitch's Paradox of Knowability?**

Fitch's paradox of knowability proves that, necessarily, if there is an unknown truth, then there is an unknowable truth, a truth that could not possibly be known. As we are not omniscient, we have to conclude that there are unknowable truths. I discuss the impact of Fitch's argument on the question of whether there are limits to (human) knowledge and I will show that there is no impact at all. Fitch's argument is rightly considered a powerful argument against anti-realism, but it neither implies nor indicates that there are unanswerable questions or that it is impossible to become omniscient.

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**Kei Chiba**

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**Aristotle's Modal Ontology - Overcoming Potentiality-Actuality  
Reading**

Ever since the latin translation of Aristotle's corpus in 13<sup>th</sup> century in which both 'entelecheia' and 'energeia' are translated as 'actus (actuality)', most of Aristotelian scholars have conflated these two notions and developed Aristotelian modal ontology in the framework of 'potentia (potentiality) - actus (actuality) dichotomy. This conflation ignores Aristotle's subtle analysis of being. I shall investigate Aristotle's modal ontology by distinguishing and relating each of his three modal notions the power-ability (dunamis), the completeness (entelecheia) and the at-work-ness(energeia), so as to establish his two different but complementary accesses to being in general.

By 'modality' I mean the constituent and characteristic of any entity such as form, matter and their resultant composite as its mode or way of being by means of which any entity shows its characteristics with respect to its unity and being. This modal perspective elucidates what ontological characteristics the form and the matter have, so that we may be able to grasp even non-sensible entities such as 'soul' how it works and how it can be grasped within his systematic framework of the study of being.

An important characteristic of Aristotelian philosophy is found in his access by setting up pairs of similar and relevant words. I construe that the one side element of a pair is presented from [L] the logos perspective and the other side is presented from [E] the ergon perspective. We will be able to grasp his ontology properly by distinguishing these two perspectives and making them complementary. There are such pairs as follows:

[L]	vs	[E]
'the form (eidos: the substance according to the logos)		
vs		
'the shape (morphē: the shape of the composite like the shape of matter poured in to the mold where the shape is 'mixed' with the matter),		
'the for the sake of which (to hū heneka)		
vs		

'the goal (telos: the last thing toward which the prior and posterior are confirmed)'

'the power-ability and completeness (entelecheia: 'the one and to be in the governing way' as the account of power-able thing)'

vs

'the power-ability and the at-work-ness (energeia: use or manifestation of the relevant power-ability here and now)'

While both logos (ratio or source of unity) and ergon (work) are two fabrics of the world in the way of being interwoven as to their entities or their works, they are discerned according to their ontological characteristics and their corresponding soul's cognitive faculties either discursive reason or direct perception and comprehension (nūs). Basically the group [L] whose characteristics are all invisible by themselves can be grasped only through the formation of modal definition. There is no doubt that in order to form a modal definition, pieces of information must be gained from group [E] by observations inductively. This distinction of access can be found in Aristotle's different descriptions of substance either as 'the substance according to the account (logos)' or as 'substance as at-work-ness'. The former is basically presented from [L] the perspective of offering a universal definition as the account of the unity of the relevant thing. The latter is basically presented from the perspective of [E] direct grasp of entities' dynamic works here and now by soul's cognitive faculty such as perception and comprehension in the context of heuristic inquiry.

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### **The Problem of Advanced Modalizing**

Cases of so-called 'advanced modalizing' are problematic for genuine modal realists in two big ways: they call into question the adequacy of the standard Lewisian translation schema for modal sentences, and (perhaps worse) they indicate that genuine modal realism fails as an analysis of modality. So far, those seeking to defend genuine modal realism have

chosen either to revise the standard translation schema, or to recast genuine modal realism as a non-reductive account of modality. In this paper, I suggest a solution that leaves genuine modal realism, its translation schema, and its ontology intact.

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### **Defending Modal Monism without Relying on Two-Dimensional Semantics**

One of the central issues in the metaphysics of modality is the debate between Modal Dualism and Modal Monism. According to Modal Dualism the space of conceptually possible worlds exceeds the space of metaphysically possible worlds while, according to Modal Monism, the space of metaphysically possible worlds coincides with the space of conceptually possible worlds. A remarkable aspect of this debate is that the Modal Monists almost always find themselves in the defensive. This is due to a seemingly conclusive argument - the Master Argument for Modal Dualism, as I will call it - which rests on a bunch of well-known examples of the necessary a posteriori. In view of this argument both parties seem to see the burden of proof on the side of the modal monist. It is taken to be on them to show that there is a way to block the MAMD without running afoul with the obvious facts. To this end, Modal Monists developed a formidable, but highly controversial two-dimensional semantics of the terms giving rise to the problematic examples. Since there is no comparable pressure on Modal Dualism,

the result of the debate is assumed to depend on the fate of two-dimensional semantics. Against this, I will show that there is an argument for Modal Monism - the Master Argument for Modal Monism, as I will call it - that makes use of the same examples as the Master Argument for Modal Dualism and seems to be no less conclusive. Once the unbalance of the debate is, thus, adjusted, I will argue that, all things considered, the Modal Monist is in the better position to block her opponents master argument than the Modal Dualist.

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### **Object Dependency in Timothy Williamson's Deductive Argument for Necessitism**

In his 'Modal Logic as Metaphysics' (2013) Timothy Williamson famously argues for necessitism, that is, for a view according to which necessarily, everything is necessarily something. His argument is mostly abductive, that is, it appeals to the cost that logic and metalogic have to bear if the thesis of necessitism is rejected. But he also presents a straightforward, deductive argument. One of instances of this argument refers to quantification into singular noun phrase ("the proposition that..."). The central thesis of necessitism

$NNE \square \forall y \square \exists x x=y$

follows here from the following three premises:

$$P1 \quad \Box \forall y \Box (\sim \exists x x=y \rightarrow T\pi(\sim \exists x x=y))$$

$$P2 \quad \Box \forall y \Box (T \pi(\sim \exists x x=y) \rightarrow \exists x x= \pi (\sim \exists x x=y))$$

$$P3 \quad \Box \forall y \Box (\exists x x=\pi (\sim \exists x x=y) \rightarrow \exists x x=y)$$

where an operator  $\pi$  applies to a formula  $A$  to give a singular term  $\pi(A)$  denoting the proposition that  $A$  expresses - "the proposition that  $A$ ", and  $T$  is a truth predicate.

By P1, if you were nothing, the proposition that you were nothing would be true. By P2, if the proposition that you were nothing were true, that proposition would be something. By P3, if the proposition that you were nothing were something, you would be something. If we instantiate a variable with a proper name, such as "Socrates", in this argument, we arrive to the famous argument that concludes that necessarily, Socrates is something:

- (1) Necessarily, if Socrates is nothing then the proposition that Socrates is nothing is true.
- (2) Necessarily, if the proposition that Socrates is nothing is true then the proposition that Socrates is nothing is something.
- (3) Necessarily, if the proposition that Socrates is nothing is something then Socrates is something.

Therefore,

- (4) Necessarily, Socrates is something.

In my talk I would like to discuss some difficulties that this argument seems to encounter - focusing mostly on the problems raised by the third premise of Williamson's proof, which states that necessarily, if the proposition that Socrates is nothing is something then Socrates is something, and thus presupposes the Object Dependency Principle (OD) for propositions. It may be

argued that OD makes Williamson's proof either inconsistent or circular. In order to explain why this is so in a detailed way I shall present a recast version of the third premise of the proof and two ways of interpreting it that are due to two different notions of the truth-operator involved in this recast version (it might be understood as either redundant or non-redundant). I also consider two responses that a necessitist might provide to defend Williamson's proof (one of them appeals to a possible different way of interpreting the truth-operator which would not lead to such difficulties; another one suggests that the truth-operator need not be involved in the proof at all) together with some difficulties that they encounter.

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### **Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View**

Philosophical analysis was the central preoccupation of 20th-century analytic philosophy, but faces many challenges in the current methodological debate. A neglected challenge is that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are unclear. According to the standard textbook view, a philosophical analysis aims at a strict biconditional that captures the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the relevant category. To evaluate this view, I present a number of conditions of adequacy on successful philosophical analyses. These conditions show that the textbook view is untenable, and that even many sophisticated alternatives are inadequate. I therefore propose the concept grounding view as a more promising account. Accordingly, successful philosophical analyses require necessary biconditionals that are constrained by suitable grounding relations among the concepts involved. This view meets the

challenge that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are unclear, and it also provides a satisfactory account of philosophical analysis in its own right.

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### **A Real Definition of Token Physicalism**

Token physicalism is the view that every mental particular - every belief, desire or conscious experience - is a physical particular. It is often thought to face a dilemma: Either token physicalism is too weak a physicalism to be worthy of the name,<sup>1</sup> collapses into type physicalism, the view that every mental property is a physical I argue that this dilemma arises only on a flawed understanding of what is property.<sup>2</sup> for a particular to be mental or physical. I'll suggest a different approach, one which appeals to the essentialist concept of a real definition. On this approach, token physicalism turns out to be a much more substantive and interesting view than previously thought.

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**Conceivability, Possibility, and The Inconsistent Triad. The  
Kripkean Challenge to Modal Rationalism**

Kripke's cases of the necessary a posteriori challenge conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge, by showing that what is a priori conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. I take Chalmers's Modal Rationalism to be the best attempt at meeting the Kripkean challenge. For Chalmers, conceivability plus the two-dimensional semantic structure give us access to metaphysical modality. However, I argue that Chalmers's account involves an inconsistent triad composed of (1) Two-Dimensionalism, (2) Modal Monism, and (3) a Kripkean Metaphysics. I present the three theses and show how only two of those can be true at a time, while the project needs all of them in order to succeed. Specifically, Chalmers's conceivability entails possibilities that the Kripkean still rejects as genuinely metaphysical. Still, some interesting theoretical positions emerge from the three possible combinations that the triad allows. I suggest that one of those offers a promising way out for Chalmers. But it comes with a cost, as it requires abandoning modal monism and reshaping the scope of what a priori conceivability can give us access to.

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### **Is 'Metaphysical Necessity' Ambiguous?**

Rosen has recently argued that our notion of metaphysical modality is ambiguous since it leaves room for two different systematic conceptions which both conform equally well to the established standard view of metaphysical modality, but which disagree about the modal status of a differential class of propositions including truths of fundamental metaphysics. The crucial premise of his argument is that one of the two conceptions, the Non-Standard Conception, classifies some of these propositions as metaphysically contingent. I first argue that the correct conceivability-based definition of metaphysical possibility which is part of this conception is equivalent to a version of Essentialism and use this equivalence to uncover an ambiguity in the principle on which Rosen's argument for this premise is based. On one of the two disambiguations, the principle fails to support one of the premises of the argument, on the other, parts of the argument are rendered superfluous and a simpler alternative argument emerges. This alternative argument however fails to support Rosen's ambiguity charge. It establishes that the Non-Standard conception fails to deliver an eligible candidate-notion of metaphysical modality, since this notion collapses into that of logical necessity.

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**Cristina Nencha**

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**Was David Lewis a Necessitist?**

Necessitism is the thesis that necessarily everything necessarily exists. The standard negation of necessitism is contingentism. Timothy Williamson is a necessitist and claims that David Lewis is a necessitist too. This is a surprising interpretation of Lewis. My aim, therefore, is to discuss what I take to be Williamson's main reason for saying that Lewis is a necessitist: he maintains that Lewis trivializes necessitism. My conclusion will be that Williamson's argument does not really show that Lewis is a necessitist and that something else has to be shown in order to arrive to this surprising understanding of Lewis's theory.

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**More Than Impossible: Negative and Complex Probabilities and Their Interpretation**

What might mean "more than impossible"? For example, that could be what happens without any cause or that physical change which occurs without any physical force (interaction) to act. Then, the quantity of the equivalent physical force, which would cause the same effect, can serve as a measure of the complex probability. Quantum mechanics introduces those fluctuations, the physical actions of which are commensurable with the Plank constant. They happen by themselves without any cause even in

principle. Those causeless changes are both instable and extremely improbable in the world perceived by our senses immediately. Even more, quantum mechanics involves complex probabilities as forces explicitly as follows. Any probability distribution may be represented by its characteristic function, which is its Fourier transformation and thus a complex function sharing one and the same phase, i.e. a constant phase. The overlap of probability distributions imposes a corresponding restriction of the degrees of freedom in each space of events for the result in any of the overlapped spaces is transferred automatically in all the rest of them. That restriction of the degrees of freedom can be considered as a generalization of the physical concept of force (interaction) as to quantum mechanics. Indeed, any force (interaction) in the sense of classical physics causes a special kind of restriction of the degrees of freedom to a single one. Quantum force (interaction) also restricts, but to a more limited probability distribution with less dispersion and entropy rather than to a single one new value. Particularly, that consideration interprets negative probability as a particular case of complex probability, which is what is immediately introduced. The understanding of probability as a quantity, corresponding to the relation of part and whole, needs to be generalized to be able to include complex values. For example, probability can be thought as associable with the number of elementary permutations of two adjacent elements for a given element of a limited series to reach its last element (i.e. its upper limit) and more especially, to the ratio of that number to the corresponding number of those permutations as to the first element (i.e. the lower limit) of the series. Then, the introduction of negative probability requires only the reversion of the direction of elementary permutations from the upper limit to the lower limit. The narrow purpose of the paper is to introduce negative and complex probability relevant to special and general relativity and thus to events in our usual perceptive world rather than to microscopic or micro-energetic events studied by quantum mechanics (Section 3). The prehistory and background (Section 2) include the generalization and utilization of 'negative and complex probabilities' in quantum mechanics and probability theory, and Section 4 compares their

use in quantum mechanics and information, signal theory, probability theory, and special and general relativity.

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### **Counterfactuals as Property Relations**

In "Analyzing Modality" and Possibility, Michael Jubian develops a Platonic account of modality in terms of relations between properties. For Jubien, modality involves relations with abstract parts of the actual world. His account is meant to reconcile metaphysical doctrine with ordinary thinking about the world. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the possibility of an analysis of counterfactuals that I extrapolate from Jubien's analysis of modality. First I will sketch his theory in some detail in §1, limiting myself to his analysis of de dicto modality. Then I will explore a property analysis of counterfactuals in §2. In order to flesh the analysis out, I will appeal to David Lewis's account of counterfactuals. While I find an analysis of counterfactuals in terms of properties promising, I argue that Jubien's metaphysics pose a significant problem to the consideration of related possibilities.

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**Alexander Roberts**

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**Modal Expansionism**

In arguing that something is possibly the case, familiar patterns of prima facie sound modal reasoning appeal to recombinatorial principles. And, indeed, there is a family of recombinatorial principles that are strongly theoretically motivated, for rejecting them would equate to imposing arbitrariness on modal space. However, an apparent paradox due to Kit Fine (2002, pp.223-224), later reformulated by Peter Fritz (forthcoming), is seen to allegedly demonstrate that two plausible recombinatorial principles are inconsistent with one another and cannot therefore both feature in modal theory. A solution to the alleged paradox is proposed in the form of a novel conception of metaphysical modality, according to which it fails to be the maximal objective modality. On this view, for any objective modality, there will always be some further, more-inclusive modality; or, in the terminology of possible worlds, modal space will always be open to expansion. This modal expansionism is shown to also resolve further modal paradoxes and difficulties, based on other artefacts of recombinatorial reasoning ( $\neg\beta_4$ ).

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**Jakob Schieder**

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**Explaining Essence and Modality**

Ever since Kit Fine launched his attack on an explanation of essence in terms of modality, the converse direction of explanation, explaining

modality in terms of essence, has gained adherents. The necessary truths, on this explanation, are true in virtue of all essences whatever. However, one of the biggest obstacles for a proper explanation of modality in terms of essence is that the notion of essence as well as its exact connection to modality is itself left unexplained. For how is it that something is true in virtue of the essence of something? While the notion of essence has regained its rank as being philosophically respectable, and as such has some claim to being taken as primitive, it would be helpful if there would be an explanation of what it takes to be the essence of a thing, and how this gives rise to necessary truth. In this paper an explanation of essence that explains how it gives rise to necessary truth will be sketched. Taking a cue from Fine, who, when elaborating on how we may understand what essences are, states that defining a term and giving a real definition of an object "is not merely parallel but [...], at bottom the same" , I will argue that essence can be fruitfully explained in terms of what it takes to be the referent of a representation. With this explanation of essence in hand, the connection to necessity can be straightforwardly explained. In the first section, some general considerations about representations, reference, and truth will provide the framework in which essence is to be explained. The second section will demonstrate how essence explains modality, and in the third section some objections are considered.

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### **Saving Strict Adequacy**

An important motivation for believing in the modal realist's ontology of other concrete possible worlds and their inhabitants is its theoretical utility, centrally the reduction of ordinary modal talk to counterpart

theory as showcased by David Lewis's 1968 translation scheme. In a recent paper Harold Noonan, following the lead of John Divers, argues that Lewis's scheme is not strictly adequate by the counterpart theorist's own lights, and that nothing short of jettisoning *de dicto* contingency will help. In this paper, I argue that this is a serious overreaction. First, I show that Noonan's problem does not touch Lewis's proposal, since his translation scheme is not even concerned with the relevant sentences. Thus, Noonan's problem only points to a limit in scope. I then go on to propose a straightforward extension of the translation scheme that provides translations for the allegedly problematic sentences, but does so endangering neither adequacy nor *de dicto* contingency.

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### **Possible Worlds and Substances**

Despite the notions of possible worlds and substances are very important subjects of contemporary metaphysics, there are relatively few attempts to combine these in a united framework. This paper considers the metaphysical model of the origin and the evolution of possible worlds that occur from an interaction between substances. I involve Leibniz's doctrine of the striving possibles that every possibility of substance has its essence and tendency towards existence. It is supposed that the activities of substances are constantly aimed at using this tendency in all possible ways. Only the consistent and stable interactions between the substances give birth to stable objects in one of many worlds. Thus, the activity of substances changes from the possible modality of being to the actual modality of being in a form of existence of the worlds.

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**The Role of the Quine-Church Debate in the History of Modal Logic**

Modal logic and modal metaphysics had a long way until they became one of the most respectful fields of contemporary philosophy. To understand some of their major landmarks, the subject of this study is a certain micro story. In particular, it is the early development of modal logic in the twentieth century, and its heroes are Willard van Orman Quine, Alonzo Church and The Journal of Symbolic Logic (JSL) with its review section, edited by Church for four decades. The hypothesis, defended here, claims that both the reviews and articles of others that appeared in the JSL functioned as a major tool for drawing the map of philosophy and symbolic logic - a negative review in the JSL could mean that the given author or idea is off the table or that certain ideas were delayed in the field. This kind of institutional and problem-centric principle, besides being wholly in accordance with the aims of Church and the journal, gives us a suitable interpretative key to understand what happened from the mid-30's to the mid-60's regarding modal logic when it didn't have that widely accepted stance and applicability which characterizes it nowadays. It is also claimed that Quine's animadversions against modal logic did not get the same attention that is considered to be the case nowadays. The community of logicians paid attention only to the technical aspects of C. I. Lewis' systems and did not take Quine's arguments and remarks seriously. One of the reasons behind this, as I shall argue, is to be found in the two reviews of Church about Quine's articles which claimed that we can answer all of Quine's questions and modal logic is not threatened from either a logical or a philosophical point of view. Since Church and JSL had

the relevant authority in the field of logic, scholars may have thought that Quine's problems could be dismissed. §

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### **Evaluating the Contingent Fundamentality Thesis**

One lacuna in the rapidly expanding literature on the nature of the fundamental concerns the modal strength of fundamentality. This paper addresses this gap by exploring the contingent fundamentality thesis - that is, the claim that being fundamental is a non-necessary property of some fundamentalia. In particular, this paper responds to four objections to the thesis, as well as examines how it interacts with various claims about the modal existential status of the fundamentalia themselves. By doing so, I hope to provide a starting point for discussing broader issues about the relationship between fundamentality and modality.

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### **Fictional Names, Rigidity, and the Inverse-Sinatra Principle**

Saul Kripke in his Naming and Necessity lectures (1972/1980) discusses in detail his views about the reference of proper names in the actual world and in nonactual possible worlds, invoking in the process considerations about rigidity and causal-historical chains. His focus is on

proper names that refer (or referred) to concrete objects, and the two pages that he devotes to names like 'Sherlock Holmes' (along with his subsequent 1973/2011, 1973/2013) leave unclear how exactly Kripkean views on proper name reference are supposed to extend to the likes of 'Holmes'. This paper sets out to answer this question. The constraints and connections uncovered do not hinge on (i) whether we accept or reject that Holmes exists/has being in some sense, and (ii) whether we accept or reject that (on at least some uses), the name 'Holmes' has a referent.

DAY 1 (August 30, 2016)		
	5th Floor	4th Floor
8:00 - 10:00	Registration	
10:00 - 10:15	Opening	
10:15 - 11:15	<b>Robert Michels</b> "Is 'Metaphysical Necessity' Ambiguous?" (Comments: <b>Nathan Wildman</b> )	<b>Zsófia Zvolenszky</b> "Fictional Names, Rigidity, and the Inverse-Sinatra Principle" (Comments: <b>Vladislav Terekhovich</b> )
11:15 - 12:30	Lunch	
12:30 - 13:30	<b>Meagan Phillips</b> "Counterfactuals as Property Relations" (Comments: <b>Lorenzo Azzano</b> )	<b>Jakob Schieder</b> "Explaining Essence and Modality" (Comments: <b>Antonella Mallozzi</b> )
13:30 - 13:45	Coffee Break	
13:45 - 14:45	<b>Zuzanna Gnatek</b> "Object Dependency in Timothy Williamson's Deductive Argument for Necessitism (Comments: <b>Alexander Roberts</b> )	<b>Nathan Wildman</b> "Exploring the Contingent Fundamentality Thesis" (Comments: <b>Joachim Horvath</b> )
14:45 - 15:00	Coffee Break	
15:00 - 15:45	<b>Alexander Roberts</b> "Modal Expansionism"	<b>Alex Steinberg</b> "Saving Strict Adequacy"
15:45 - 16:00	Coffee Break	
16:00 - 16:45	<b>Kei Chiba</b> "Aristotle's Modal Ontology - Overcoming Potentiality- Actuality Reading"	<b>Vasil Penchev</b> "More Than Impossible: Negative and Complex Probabilities and Their Interpretation"
16:45 - 17:00	Coffee Break	
17:00 - 18:15	<b>GIDEON ROSEN</b> "Modality in the Metaphysics of Ethics"	
20:00	Dinner	

<b>DAY 2 (August 31, 2016)</b>		
	<b>5th Floor</b>	<b>4th Floor</b>
<b>10:15 - 11:15</b>	<b>Alex Kaiserman</b> "A Real Definition of Token Physicalism" (Comments: <b>Jakob Schieder</b> )	<b>Lorenzo Azzano</b> "Dispositional Arrays" (Comments: <b>Meagan Phillips</b> )
<b>11:15 - 12:30</b>	Lunch	
<b>12:30 - 13:30</b>	<b>Antonella Mallozzi</b> "Conceivability, Possibility, and The Inconsistent Triad. The Kripkean Challenge to Modal Rationalism" (Comments: <b>Alex Kaiserman</b> )	<b>Adam Tuboly</b> "The Role of the Quine-Church Debate in the History of Modal Logic" (Comments: <b>Philipp Berghofer</b> )
<b>13:30 - 13:45</b>	Coffee Break	
<b>13:45 - 14:45</b>	<b>Dirk Franken</b> "Defending Modal Monism without Relying on Two-Dimensional Semantics" (Comments: <b>Zuzanna Gnatk</b> )	<b>Vladislav Terekhov</b> "Possible Worlds and Substances" (Comments: <b>Vasil Penchev</b> )
<b>14:45 - 15:00</b>	Coffee Break	
<b>15:00 - 16:00</b>	<b>Joachim Horvath</b> "Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View" (Comments: <b>Frances Heather Fairbairn</b> )	<b>Cristina Nencha</b> "Was David Lewis a Necessitist?" (Comments: <b>David Mark Kovacs</b> )
<b>16:00 - 16:15</b>	Coffee Break	
<b>16:15 - 17:15</b>	<b>Frances Heather Fairbairn</b> "The Problem of Advanced Modalizing" (Comments: <b>Robert Michels</b> )	<b>Philipp Berghofer</b> "Unknowable Truths and Limits of Knowledge: What Conclusions Can We Draw from Fitch's Paradox of Knowability?" (Comments: <b>Robin Neiman</b> )
<b>17:15 - 17:30</b>	Coffee Break	
<b>17:30 - 18:45</b>	<b>RICHARD WOODWARD</b> "The Questions of Ontology"	















