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(M)any Questions?

A Comparison of the Use of Questions in Wittgenstein's first 37 paragraphs of *Philosophical Investigations* with Austin's essay "The Meaning of a Word"

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ABSTRACT: Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy is closely related not only to the content but also to the form of his investigations. The following paper presents the uniqueness of Wittgenstein's writing style, namely his use of questions, by comparing part of his work with Austin's essay. For this purpose a typology of questions with regard to their function in the text is established and applied. The difference between Wittgenstein's and Austin's writing style is then documented by the frequency of certain types of questions, and omission of others, and related to some of Wittgenstein's remarks about his approach to philosophical inquiry. The difference is then summarized tentatively as one between "pedagogical" and "academic" writing style, which poses questions concerning the translation of Wittgenstein's investigations into academic prose.

KEYWORDS: Academic – Austin – pedagogical – *Philosophical Investigations* – philosophy – questions – response – stylistic – "The Meaning of a Word" – typology – Wittgenstein – writing style.

1. Why bother with Wittgenstein's style?

One of the first concerns that strike a reader of Wittgenstein's texts – published or unpublished – is the peculiarity of his writing style. Despite

discussions about contrast and/or continuity between Wittgenstein's earlier and later writings,[1] his style is always rather unorthodox.[2] It is also noteworthy (but not often noted) that introductions, interpretations and applications of Wittgenstein's insights are usually formed in a manner that does not take his style into account.[3] The usual initial activity of an author who wants to make use or sense of Wittgenstein consists of *translation* or *transposition* of Wittgenstein's text into more common forms of academic prose – as if Wittgenstein's style was a nutshell to be cracked and thrown away in order to understand and process his work.

To contrast this approach, I would like to present the following remark made by Wolfgang Huemer:

> The harmony of style and content in both books that Wittgenstein published or prepared for publication in his lifetime comes not by accident; Wittgenstein struggled to develop a new form of presenting philosophical views, which clearly expresses at a stylistic level his efforts to take new paths in philosophy; leaving the burden of tradition behind. (Gibson – Huemer 2004, 2)

When we admit the possibility that Wittgenstein's style could be as significant as the content of his work itself, questions arise. Don't we miss something crucial when we try to straighten Wittgenstein's writings up into stylistically smoother forms? Could we loosen the relationship between the content of Wittgenstein's work and its style without distorting his thoughts? In the foreword to *Philosophical Investigations* (hereafter abbreviated 'PI') Wittgenstein made a comment which indicates that these questions are not misleading. Wittgenstein describes his attempt to "weld" his results into a more compact whole and he continues:

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1 See e.g. Conant's *Wittgenstein's Methods* in Kuusela – McGinn (2011).

2 Although in very different ways – e.g. the style of *Tractatus* is often referred to as *aphoristic* (Nordmann 2005), or *formal* (Grayling 1988), while the style of *Philosophical Investigations* is seen as *dialogical* (High 1967), *pedagogical* (Burbules 1999) or *therapeutic* (Peters 2002).

3 Cf. Burbules (1999): "Of the many hundreds of books and articles written on Wittgenstein and his work only a very tiny proportion deal with the question of Wittgenstein's style. Few philosophers have approached Wittgenstein centrally through an examination of his style or considered the question of his style as important or interesting in a philosophical sense."

> ...my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. (Wittgenstein 1968, vii)

Changing the composition without "crippling of thoughts" was thus something unfeasible even for the author of PI. I do not suggest that such a stylistic shift is therefore always necessarily destructive (that would lead to the rejection of nearly all Wittgensteinian publications – including this paper). Rather, I claim that understanding, interpretation and possible application of Wittgenstein's work must go hand-in-hand with careful attention to his writing style.

The main goal of this paper is to substantiate a rather vague claim about Wittgenstein's "dialogical", "therapeutic" or "pedagogical" writing style of PI. There are many aspects of the style of PI that deserve attention: its paragraph form, poetic use of metaphors, models of "language games", dialogical passages, inserted pictures, mathematical and logical formulas or its unornamented language without philosophical jargon and technical terms. This short paper concentrates on one simpler feature of Wittgenstein's style developed in PI – namely his use of questions. This choice was inspired by Anthony Kenny, who noticed that "The *Investigations* contain 784 questions. Only 110 of these are answered, and seventy of the answers are *meant* to be wrong" (Kenny 1959, 235). Even this loose[4] numeration indicates an unusual pattern within Wittgenstein's use of questions. Savickey (1999, 130) notes:

> Wittgenstein's use of questions differs not only from his earlier writings but also from conventional argumentation and criticism. He does not ask or answer conventional philosophical questions and it is often difficult to know how to respond to his questions.

This paper expands on this issue in more detail.

The appropriate method of this elaboration should be neither too vague (thus relying only on intuition), nor too complicated (as a paper of this brief length has certain limitations). Therefore, I submit that the most suitable approach is to compare a part of Wittgenstein's text (§§ 1-37) in

[4] The amount of questions in PI is usually quoted with reference to Kenny without further review. However in contrast to Kenny I found 1448 questions in English translation of PI, 1120 of them in the 1st part and 328 in the 2nd part of *Investigations*.

Wittgenstein (1968, 2-18)[5] with a philosophical text of a similar *topic* and *extent*.[6] Austin's (1970) essay "The Meaning of a Word" serves this purpose well for several reasons. First, both Wittgenstein and Austin are major figures of the 20th century analytical tradition. Second, they both share an interest in ordinary language, including its non-declarative forms such as questions. In addition, in the given texts, they both consider the subject of *meaning*. Third, concerning extent, both texts have a similar length (Austin circa 7600 words, Wittgenstein 7200 words). Finally, the last and most crucial similarity between these two texts is that they contain a similar amount of questions: Austin 75, Wittgenstein 71. It is for these reasons that Austin's "The Meaning of a Word" serves as a good counterpart in our attempt to shed some light on Wittgenstein's use of questions in PI. The result of this comparison will not lead to a conclusive description of "Wittgenstein's style" but it does help us to foreshadow some of the basic elements and patterns related to the role of questions in the composition of PI.

2. How to compare the use of questions?

The task of this chapter is to find a suitable method to compare the use of questions in Austin's essay "The Meaning of a Word" (from now on referred to as the 'text-A') and first 37 paragraphs of Wittgenstein's PI (from now on referred to as the 'text-W'). Although these texts were selected because of their relative similarities, we cannot conceal their obvious differences.

For example, Austin's essay forms a coherent whole while Wittgenstein's paragraphs are a small part of a larger unit.[7] These texts are, so to say, elements of a different level of compositional hierarchy. Is this fact undermining the possibility of meaningful comparison? This could be an issue if the overall structure or flow of arguments was at stake. In our case

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[5] The range of these passages is set down with regard to Savigny, who suggests that §§ 1-37 have a common subject. See Ammereller – Fisher (2004, 45).

[6] The condition of extent similarity is naturally more sustainable than a topic similarity. I acknowledge that the latter is formulated only in a gross and simplistic manner.

[7] Although it is not a simple task to demarcate this unit – e.g. Wittgenstein suggests that *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* should be understood as a (counter)part of PI.

this asymmetry does not obstruct our efforts because the use of questions can be described with respect to mere local context, without the need to analyze the relation to the whole textual unit. The inquiry into the relation between the selected part and the whole (i.e. are §§1-37 a fitting sample of PI?) should take place only if we generalize our conclusions. This is irrelevant for the sake of comparison of questions in the given texts.

Before we delve into the comparison itself, we must address one remaining issue. Namely, what do we consider a *question* in this paper? This may seem an odd concern until one considers Wittgenstein's following observation:

> Of course, we might use the words "statement" and "command" to stand for grammatical forms of sentence and intonations; we do in fact call "Isn't the weather glorious today?" a question, although it is used as a statement. (Wittgenstein 1968, 10)

As Wittgenstein points out, not every sentence which ends with a question mark (or to put it more precisely – which has the grammatical structure of a question) is *used* as a question. Bearing this in mind, this work will operate with a purely grammatical conception of the question, although our method establishes a specific category for this rare type of question/statement (suggestion).

In order to find a way to compare the use of questions in text-A and text-W we have to develop a common ground; preferably a taxonomy which brings similar types of questions together into groups in order to analyze the frequency in which they occur. In this way we can then compare individual questions within the scope of one question-type.

Taxonomies are based on a defining aspect of the selected material. We want to form a classification of questions sorted according to their usage, but the notion of the term "use" is still quite fuzzy. A more precise definition of the term "use of question" is given above – the use of questions could be described with respect to mere local context. The main area of our investigation is thus the specific connection between each question and the surrounding text. This classification is naturally not the only possible taxonomy, however, any classification of this type must account for the function of the question in the flow of the argument and develop a unifying method. It follows that, this classification is not utterly objective. The author's own preconceptions and interpretations naturally play a role in its

construction. Thus it must be understood as an inter-subjective meeting point between the two texts and my preconceptions and interpretations of them. If some objectivity (or maybe wider inter-subjectivity) can be claimed, it resides in the relative clarity of our approach which makes a criticism of any *part* of the construction or application of this categorization possible without the need to reject the whole method.

Hereafter, a possible classification of question-types in text-A and text-W is proposed. We begin with an explanation of the method in which this categorization was constructed. Firstly, the questions in text-A and text-W were marked and, in their close context all sentences that could be understood as responses to them were highlighted. We prefer the term "response" rather than "answer" (which is too specific) or "reaction" (which is too general). Responses in our present case include direct answers, further questions, examples, etc., but not reactions (i.e statements *about* given questions, etc.). This formed the *first level* of classification which separates the questions from the responses – class A – and the questions without response – class B.

The *second level* of classification, although different for the A and B classes, is based on the manner of responses (including the absent responses). The given responses are either inappropriate A1 or appropriate A2. The absent responses are either not expected (irrelevant) B1 or some kind of response is expected (relevant) B2.

Afterwards, the question-types in the *second level* classes were categorized into groups according to their similar features, which introduced the *third level* of classification. The final method of classification can be presented as follows:

A. Response is included in the surrounding text
   - A1 – Response is inappropriate
   - A2 – Response is appropriate
     - A2a – presentation of possibilities
     - A2b – specimen of question
     - A2c – "no"
     - A2d – "I don't know"
     - A2e – "yes, but ..."
     - A2f – clarification
     - A2g – refusal

B. Response is not included in the surrounding text

B1 – Response is irrelevant
- B1a – type of question
- B1b – specimen of question
- B1c – refusal of question

B2 – Response is relevant
- B2a – inappropriate dichotomy or conjunction
- B2b – suggestion
- B2c – "rather not"
- B2d – open question

For our next task, the *third level* of this classification will be crucial. For this reason, the current section concludes with a few comments explaining the features in which question-types are grouped in the *third level* classes.

Class A1 (inappropriate response) does not have any subcategories. For our purposes, it will be treated as a *third level* class. A possible answer is stated here (in text-W it is sometimes in the form of a different question) and this answer is then rejected.

Category A2 (appropriate response) consists of questions with responses in the form of A2a (presentation of possible answers), A2b (specimen of question) – this category is similar to group B1 – the only difference being that an answer is stated here as a part of a specimen.[8] Common aspects of questions in classes A2c (no) and A2d (I don't know) are clear. The responses in the form of "if-then" are included in A2e (yes, but) category. Question-type A2f introduces a sort of clarification. The class A2g (refusal) is very close to B1c with one distinction: in A2g the refusal is stated in the form of an answer, while in B1c it is mentioned in adjacent comments (using words like "spurious", "absurd", "silly", etc.).

In class B1 (the response is irrelevant) none of these questions are meant to be answered. They function as a specimen of the question. Specimens in B1a are mostly general forms of B1b questions. Category B1c contains specimens of questions which are rejected. Other subcategories could be formed (e.g. B1a2, B1b2) but for the sake of brevity we consider it one level with B1a and B1b.

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[8] For further explanation of "specimens" see the introduction to class 'B1'.

In B2 (response is relevant) a response is not directly stated, but it is relevant for some sort of argument extension. Questions in B2a present us with a dilemma caused by inappropriate dichotomy or conjunction. B2b is a suggestion in the form of a previously mentioned question. It is predominantly negative. B2c questions mostly appeal to the reader's experience and they presuppose a negative answer. The last category, B2d, contains questions which call for some sort of clarification (like A2g), but none are presented.

3. Response to objections

One of the objections which could be stated concerning this method of analysis is that the aforementioned appeal to "sufficiency of local context" has a trace of (often detested) atomism. Isn't this segmentation of the text into small units clustered around individual questions in opposition to Wittgenstein's and Austin's "holistic" approach to language (Murphy 1997, 23)? It only seems so on the surface. First of all, it is hard to imagine a method of comparison which does not require some sort of segmentation and classification of material. Furthermore, a narrowing of context or some form of concretization is necessary when examining and comparing the use of language. Wittgenstein's "language games" are a perfect example of the usefulness of simplification (cf. High 1967, 70-74). An accusation of atomistic or reductionist tendencies would apply only if we were attempting to reduce *every* aspect of the use of questions to the links with local textual segment; as if there were no different, more complex levels of understanding of the 'use of questions' (e.g. the writer's intention, the reader's interpretation, etc.). A description of these 'hermeneutical aspects' of the use of questions could not be *exhausted* in an account of the relation of questions to local context. However, some elements of more complex levels *manifest* themselves in the analysis of local level because these levels are connected. This assertion is rather holistic in its nature.[9]

Another substantial objection can be raised against the scope of our focus, which may seem too narrow. The use of questions may be understood

[9] Cf. Murphy (1997, 25): "We might say that the whole is partially constitutive of the part, whereas the part acts upon (affects, partially determines) the whole."

as a symptom of a deeper philosophical cause. However, we should not overlook the importance of questions in philosophical enquiry. Wittgenstein claims, "One could teach philosophy solely by asking questions" (Wittgenstein – Ambrose – Macdonald 1979, 97). If that is the case, we should pay attention not only to particular questions which are raised but also to preferred types of questions which embody Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy. In other words, the main philosophical thrust of Wittgenstein's work in PI lies undeniably in the content and formulation of concrete questions which call for detail analysis (see P. M. S. Hacker's volumes of *Analytical Commentary on Philosophical Investigations*). However Wittgenstein's philosophical method displays remarkable harmony of content and style and our focus on the style of PI sheds light on what is *shown* in the act of *saying* something. Wittgenstein's preference of certain types of questions is not circumstantial. On the contrary, it could be claimed as essential for reaching the purpose of PI. Could one teach philosophy (in the sense of PI) without asking the types of questions frequently used by Wittgenstein?

4. Comparison of the use of questions in text-A and text-W

In section 2, we argued for the necessity of classification for comparison and we formed the structure of this classification with regard to the chosen texts. The charts below show the results of application.



Chart sorted by the freqency of question-types in text-A



Chart sorted by the freqency of question-types in text-W

At first glance, we can see a major difference between the question types used in text-A and text-W. We can now contrast these statistical results. In section 4.1 we will examine the most frequent question-types in text-A and text-W. We will follow in section 4.2 by attending to absent types in these texts. Section 4.3 will deal with other cases where both text-A and text-W use the same question type, with the exception of the types discussed in section 4.1 and 4.2.

4.1. The most frequent question-types

Text-A

The beginning of text-A introduces a list of seven "specimens of sense" and ten "specimens of nonsense" questions. Even if we do not include these specimens in the number of questions in text-A itself, the most frequent question types are still those from class B1 (the response is not included and is irrelevant), respectively:

- B1c (refusal of question)[10]
- B1b (specimen on question)[11]
- B1a (type of question)[12]

[10] E.g.: "What-is-the-meaning-of a word?" listed under "specimens of nonsense" in the introduction.

[11] E.g.: "What-is-the-meaning-of (the word) 'rat'?" listed under "specimens of sense" in the introduction.

The quantity of these types of questions is without a doubt connected with the extraordinary manner of text-A. When we briefly scan Austin's other texts we see that these types of questions are not as common here. They still play a significant role in "Are there *A Priori* Concepts?" (see Austin et al. 1970, 32-54) and in "Other Minds" (see Austin et al. 1970, 76-116). However, they are not so common in other essays of *Philosophical Papers* and in Austin's most influential work *How to Do Things with Words* (Austin 1962). The fact that the proportion of the amount of question-to-text length is noticeably lower in Austin's other texts should also be taken into account.[13] The frequency of questions in text-A is similar to the frequency of questions in text-W mainly because of Austin's tendency to accumulate samples of questions, and in the end mostly to refuse them.

Text-W

- Questions B2c (without a response but anticipating a negative answer)[14] are the most frequent here. These questions are aimed at the reader (about half of these questions contain the word "you") and serve to engage him/her in the observation.

The following three question types occur in the same amount or frequency:

- A1 (a response is stated but it is inappropriate)[15]: The response is stated in the form of question B2c, two times in the form of a statement and once in the form of comparison ("do not say... that is just if..."). Text-A also uses this type of question with inappropriate answers. They are all from the "field of philosophy" – either a quotation from Moore, Morris and "nominalists" or examples of strange "philosophical" answers

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[12] E.g.: "What is the meaning of *so-and-so?*"

[13] Cf. "The Meaning of Word" (c. 1 question per 101 words), *How to Do Things with Words* (c. 1 question per 294 words), PI §§1-37 (c. 1 question per 102 words), PI in total (c. 1 question per 65 words).

[14] E.g.: "Certainly, but does 'wanting this' consist in thinking in some form or other a different sentence from the one you utter?"

[15] E.g.: "And what is modified by the rule, the glue-pot, the nails?"—"Our knowledge of a thing's length, the temperature of the glue, and the solidity of the box."

to questions about meaning. They are refused as incoherent (Moore, Morris), inadequate and lacking attack on the misleading form of question, or even imbecilic. The frequent occurrence of A1 followed by B2c in text-W indicates that the refusal is connected more in reference to the reader's own language training here than in text-A. In her treatment of Wittgenstein's use of questions, Savickey is focused predominantly on these types of questions, which are used to "redirect our investigation to the grammar or use of our words and to help clarify that grammar" (Savickey 1999, 137).

- A2a (presentation of possibilities):[16] These possibilites are connected with an observation of certain cases ("child", "you", "people", "he", "one", "someone") and they are not stated as a complete list (using the words "example", "various", or "countless"). The possibilities are approached by specification but not for the sake of systematization. We will call this an "open presentation of possibilities" in contrast to "closed presentation of possibilities" where some sort of overview and systematization is at stake.
- B2b (suggestions)[17]

It has already been mentioned that Kenny (1959, 235) claims that most of Wittgenstein's answers are meant to be wrong. In text-W, we notice that even his unanswered questions often presuppose a negative answer. Therefore, we see that the predominant occurrence of questions of this type combined with the open presentation of possibilities constitutes *pedagogical style* (Burbules 1999) involving the reader in the investigation, and training him or her in the art of asking suiting questions, or restating the misleading ones. In addition, Wittgenstein's suggestions in the form of questions could be understood in this pedagogical (and dialogical) manner in which the reader is drawn into the process of scrutiny.

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[16] E.g.: "But then, is there not also something different going on in him when he pronounces it,—something corresponding to the fact that he conceives the sentence as a *single* word?—Either the same thing may go on in him, or something different."

[17] E.g.: "Don't you understand the call "Slab!" if you act upon it in such-and-such a way?"

4.2. Absent question-types

Text-A

- One of the most noticeable differences in the use of questions in the given texts is an absence of text-W's most freqent type, B2c (without a response but anticipating negative answer)[18] in text-A. Based on the absence of type B2c, we see that text-A is not anticipating the reader's engagement in the process of investigation in a same manner as text-W.
- A2e (yes, but):[19] This specific way of dealing with Yes/No (or A/B) questions which are presenting us with inappropriate dichotomy is not used in text-A. The topic of inappropriate separation arises, but it is considered to be 'a matter of mere extraordinary'. The conclusion which follows reads: "A new idiom might in odd cases be demanded" (Austin et al. 1970, 69).

It may be suggested that Austin's writing style in text-A is more accommodating to the "academic" writing style than the aforementioned "pedagogical" manner of text-W. The categories of "academic" and "pedagogical" style are elements based on the needs of our comparison. To clarify what contradistinguishes the "academic writing style" from the "pedagogical writing style" in this paper, we must be able to trace their varying attitude towards the reader. The attitude of an "academic" relationship to the reader (in its pure form) is analogous to the relationship of the lecturer to his audience. The main goal of a lecturer is to convey information to his audience. He presupposes that his listeners have their own method of handling this information. Questions in the academic style are mostly used as types or specimens which are not expected to be answered. A "pedagogical" relationship to the reader (in its pure form) is analogous to the relationship of a teacher to a pupil. Here, the training in method of acquiring or dealing with information is substantial. Between these extreme examples, there is a spectrum of possible approaches tending to one or the other. I assert that

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[18] E.g.: "Do you say the unshortened sentence to yourself?"

[19] E.g.: "And one has to say this in many cases where the question arises 'Is this an appropriate description or not?' The answer is: 'Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe.'"

one feature which helps us distinguish whether a given text is more "pedagogical" or "academic" is the occurrence, or, respectively, absence of the B2c type of questions.

Text-W

- B1c (refusal of question):[20] There are two examples of "refusal of question" in text-W but we assigned them to class A2g. This was done with respect to the manner of refusal. Questions in class A2g are refused because they are uncalled for in certain contexts, whereas the questions in B1c are rejected as "spurious," "absurd" or "silly" in general. In text-W there is no such refusal present. Wittgenstein is not banning questions; nor is he banning the use of certain pictures that form (or distort) our understanding (e.g. words as names for objects, etc.). He claims: "And the best that I can propose is that we should yield to the temptation to use this picture, but then investigate how the *application* of the picture goes" (Wittgenstein 1968, § 374). When we acknowledge the absence of B1c we can argue that Wittgenstein's attitude towards potentially misleading questions is similar.
- B2a (inaproppriate dichotomy or conjuction):[21] At first sight, it is suprising that Wittgenstein[22] is not occupying himself in text-W with such cases of inaproppriate dichotomy or conjunction in a similar manner as text-A. Further examination reveals that text-W also addresses certain dichotomies but in a different setting and with different responses than text-A. Text-W deals with dichotomies using type A2e (yes, but) instead of B2a (inaproppriate dichotomy or conjuction). Austin (1961, 68) argues that "Ordinary language breaks down in extraordinary cases". He presents some of these *extraordinary* cases and shows that attempts to fit them into ordinary categories fail and that is why we need a better description here: "There may be plenty that might happen and does happen which would need new and better

[20] E.g. in Text-A: "'What is the meaning of a word?' But there is something spurious about this question."

[21] E.g. in Text-A: "Are we to rush at this with the dichotomy: *either* 'being approved of by me' is part of the meaning of 'being thought good by me' *or* it is not?"

[22] Who thought that the quotation from *King Lear* "I'll teach you differences" could be a motto for PI (cf. Rhees 1981, 157).

language to describe it in" (Austin 1961, 69). At the same time, Wittgenstein is not interested in *extraordinary* cases "demanding better language" because the notion of extraordinarity could easily lead us astray. This claim can be supported by following Wittgenstein's suggestion that "it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up,—to see that we must stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties, which in turn we are after all quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal" (Wittgenstein 1968, §106). In text-W, Wittgenstein deals with dichotomies our *ordinary* language places before us (e.g. "is this appropriate description or not?", "is the call 'Slab!' in example (2) a sentence or a word?", etc.). And these dichotomies could be made more appropriate by describing the proper conditions of a response in the form of A2e (yes, but/if, then).

- A2d (I don't know):[23] Wittgenstein is not leading himself or his reader to the point where "I don't know" would be an appropriate response. He states that "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about'" (Wittgenstein 1968, §123), and these "philosophical problems should *completely* disappear" (Wittgenstein 1968, §133).

Our description of Wittgenstein's "pedagogical" style was formed in contrast to his "academical" style with regard to emphasis on method rather than on transfer of information. This importance of method over mere assertion of facts is explicitly accented in the introduction to "Remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough*". Wittgenstein states that "[t]o convince someone of the truth, it is not enough to state it, but rather one must find the *path* from error to truth" (Wittgenstein et al. 1993, 119). Nor is it enough to state and ban the error. The "pedagogical" approach consists of finding and leading the way from it. It can be suggested that this attitude manifests itself (among other ways) in the *absence* of B1c, B2a and A2d question-types.

[23] E.g. in Text-A: "When we consider what we really do want to talk about, and not the working-model, what would really be meant at all by a judgement being 'analytic or synthetic'? We simply do not know."

4.3. Question types present in both texts

In this section we will focus on the question-types that are present in both texts, with the exception of those we have just discussed.

- There is no substantial difference in the use of A2b (specimen of answered question)[24] and A2c (no),[25] apart from the fact that the appearance of A2b is more common in text-A than in text-W.
- A2f (clarification):[26] There are three questions in text-A fitting this category. Two of them lead to an investigation of a certain "temptation" – a term that is also frequented (19 times) in PI. Austin's account of temptations is quite similar to Wittgenstein's, in the curious belief that all words are *names*, in effect *proper* names,[27] the inclination to ask "What in it (sentence) is 'x'?", and the notion that every sentence *must* be either analytic or synthetic.[28] However, Austin concludes, "Of course, all my account of our motives in this matter may be only a convenient didactic schema: I do not think it is – but I recognize that one should not impute motives, least of all rational motives ..." (Austin 1961, 62). Here text-A employs the method of Wittgenstein's approach

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[24] E.g. in Text-A: "For example, I ask Old Father William 'What is the point of standing on one's head?' He replies in the way we know."

[25] E.g. in Text-A: "Here there is a good reason for calling the things both 'feet' but are we to say they are 'similar'? Not in any ordinary sense."

[26] E.g. in Text-A: "But are those really the difficulties which baffle us? Of course, *if* it were certain that every sentence *must* be either analytic or synthetic, those *must* be the difficulties. But then, it is not certain: no account even of what the distinction means, is given except by reference to our shabby working-model."

[27] Cf. Wittgenstein (1968, §27): "Think of exclamations alone, with their completely different functions. Water! Away! Ow! Help! Fine! No! Are you inclined still to call these words 'names of objects'?"

[28] Cf. Wittgenstein (1968, §50): "What looks as if it *had* to exist, is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made. And this may be an important observation; but it is none the less an observation concerning our language-game – our method of representation."

Cf. Wittgenstein (1968, §131): "For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison – as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality *must* correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.)"

but soon retreats because it "may be only didactical scheme" and he doesn't want to "impute motives." We can assert here that Wittgenstein is not imputing motives (as if he observed someone else). He rather consciously yields to linguistic temptations to show the reader how they operate and how to find one's way out. Text-W, however, does not use question-type A2f to investigate these temptations. A2f rather helps us situate the description to the level of the "use" of words (i.e. the part which uttering these words plays) in a given language-game.

- B2d (open question):[29] This question type is similar to A2f but there is no response presented in the text. Austin doesn't introduce these questions until the last part of text-A where they serve as a suggestion of a possible (but not realized) development. In text-W, these questions are more common and more evenly distributed. We can say they are more intertwined with the process of investigation here because text-A always places them at the very end of the paragraph while text-A usually (except two cases) situates them in the middle.

The description enabled by specification or localization of the use of words and open questions that lead the reader through the process of investigation is in conformity with the notion of the previously-accepted characterization of Wittgenstein's "pedagogical" style. We also noticed that text-A (in questions calling for certain clarification) comes close to Wittgenstein's interest in misleading patterns. However, this route is promptly abandoned.

5. Conclusion

According to Wittgenstein:

> Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions. (Wittgenstein 1968, §126)

[29] E.g. in Text-A: "Such a remark cannot fail to be misleading. Why make it? And why not direct attention to the important and actual facts?"

The use of such *philosophy* cannot then consist of the application of a philosophical thesis in various disciplines (linguistics, sociology, theology, etc.). It is rather the application of a method which enables us to notice something that is in front of our eyes (Wittgenstein 1968, §129). In order to understand this method one has to pay attention to Wittgenstein's writing style. In this paper we focused on one aspect of Wittgenstein's style; namely his use of questions. We compared questions from a section of *Philosophical Investigations* with questions in Austin's essay "The Meaning of a Word" by using a categorization of questions developed specifically for this comparison.

Wittgenstein's style is often described as "pedagogical". This characterization can be brought out by the results of our examination of Wittgenstein's use of questions in text-W.

First of all, it exhibits itself in the extraordinary amount of questions used. The frequency of Austin's questions in text-A is comparable to the frequency of questions in text-W because of his quotation of "specimens of questions". In Austin's other texts the frequency of questions is noticeably lower.

Secondly (and in harmony with a previously quoted remark from *Philosophical Investigations*), we claimed that the main feature of this "pedagogical" approach manifests itself in questions that involve the reader into the course of investigation and train him in the method of asking suitable questions. The most common question types here are B2c (rather not), A1 (inappropriate response), A2a (presentation of possibilities), and B2b (suggestions).

The third important feature is Wittgenstein's way of dealing with issues that obscure such observation-inappropriate analogies, pictures or dichotomies. Wittgenstein is not merely stating that questions, analogies and pictures are misleading in general and therefore should be avoided. Questions B1c (refusal of question), B2a (inappropriate dichotomy or conjunction) and A2d (I don't know) are absent here. Rather, he leads his reader 'on a way to truth' by using questions invoking the observation of specific and localized use of words. Savickey (1999, 245) claims: "Wittgenstein uses questions (in response to philosophical questions) to help us remember or recall to mind the grammar or use of our words." This is the case with Wittgenstein's most frequent questions: A2e (yes, but), A2f (clarification) and B2d (open question).

Readers of *Philosophical Investigations* are expected to approach this text as an exercise book rather than a written lecture. This suggestion is in harmony with Wittgenstein's claim in the preface to *Philosophical Investigations*: "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" (Wittgenstein 1968, viii). This paper shows the importance of Wittgenstein's method, which is manifested in his use of questions. Therefore, I submit that interpreters of Wittgenstein should consider the possible destructive consequences of a transcription of Wittgenstein's text into a common academic style, in which questions are mostly rhetorical or organizational devices.

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