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Jan Dejnožka: *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance* CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016, 647 pages[1]

As the title indicates, *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance* investigates two main topics: modality and logical relevance in the work of Bertrand Russell. It claims to be the only study of Russell's views about modality and logical relevance ever written (p. xi) and as such deserves attention of anyone interested in the magnum opus of the philosopher. In the scope of more than six hundred pages, Dejnožka brought to light many aspects of Russell's philosophy which, implicitly or explicitly, record Russell's interest in modal matters. Dejnožka's strategy is quite straightforward: to gather together relevant quotations including modal notions and, consequently, interpret them in a systematic and 'Russell friendly' way. True, such a comprehensive overview is unique and of interest of a wider group of philosophers. Projects of this character though often face a threat of misrepresentation, overestimation of one's position, or simply a danger of going (far) beyond what the particular papers and books bear. Although I am not claiming this is Dejnožka's case, I will try to show some potential risks of the project.

Dejnožka's excursion into the philosophy of Bertrand Russell comes in ten chapters. After an extensive introduction, Dejnožka presents his main objective: to resist a view dubbed as 'V': the view that 'not only did Russell not offer a

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modal logic (he did not), but also that he ignored modality or was against modality' (p. 35). Namely, the chapter 'Propositional Functions and Possible Worlds' goes through several Russell's arguments for a theory according to which logical modalities are certain specific properties of propositional functions (MDL). Having distinguished between logic and ontology, Dejnožka proceeds to say a bit more about the latter. In chapters 'Russell's Three-Level Theory of Modality' (Chapter 3) and 'The Ontological Foundation' (Chapter 4) two main issues are discussed: three (not rival) senses of 'exist' and three senses of 'possible' as their correlates; and the most fundamental level of Russell's ontology and theory of modality (I will return to these chapters in due course). Chapter 5 moves the reader's attention to several Russell's critics or, in other words, proponents of 'V'. In particular, Dejnožka critically examines Rescher's reasons for 'unwillingness to recognise the merely possible (the *contingently* possible) as a distinct category' (p. 77, emphasis in original), yet concludes that 'he [Rescher] agreed…that he had not read much Russell' (p.86).

The more logic burden part of the book starts with Chapter 6 entitled 'Russell's Eight Implicit Modal Logics'. The chapter is a test-based since, as Dejnožka suggests, his goal is to describe 'two tests for imputing an implicit modal logic to Russell' (p. 87). In practice, he aims to show that some bits of Russell's writings can be paraphrased into MDL and it variants: implicit alethic logic (pp. 92-105); implicit causal logic (pp. 105-110); implicit epistemic logic (pp. 110-116); and implicit deontic logic (pp. 116-119). Chapter 7, 'Russell's Implicit Possible Worlds Semantics', focuses on Russell's use of possible worlds talk and philosophical issues such talk raises: negative facts (p. 168), rigid designation and trans-world identity (p. 171), essential properties (p. 173) and the problem of alien individuals and alien properties (p. 181). Again, through the numerous references, Dejnožka illustrates Russell's inclination toward possible worlds talk although, as he points out, in some passages Russell regards such talk as mere "phraseology" (p. 184). In Chapter 8 the author goes back to roots of Russell's modal considerations. In 'The Motives and Origins of Russell's Theory of Modality' Dejnožka reintroduces Russell's three-level theory of modality, summarises his account, boldly concludes that Russell's critics 'do not know him [Russell] very well' (p. 211) and offers ten criticisms on his own.

The last two, and the most extensive, chapters move from modality to relevance. The heart of Chapter 9 named 'Russell's Implicit Relevance Logic' is found in Dejnožka's claim that Russell has a largely explicit theory of both relevance and an implicit relevance logic. Chronologically, relevance is detected in Russell's

Principles (p. 244), 'Necessity and Possibility' paper (p. 245), *Principia* (p. 247), 'Our Knowledge of External World' (p. 251), *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* (p. 251), *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (p. 252), *An Outline of Philosophy* (p. 272), *The Analysis of Matter* (p. 252), *Inquiry* (p. 275), *Human Knowledge* (p. 276) and *My Philosophical Development* (p. 276). 'Probability as Degree of Logical Relevance', the final chapter, mostly concerns probability, its relation to induction and the causal relation, and the way Russell treats them. Historically oriented reader will definitely find interesting Dejnožka's 'History Chart of Relevance Rules' (p. 480), 'History Chart of Common Terms for Relevance' (p. 481) and the 'Relevantist Members of the Inner Temple (p. 481).

So much about the structure of the book. In the second part I would like to discuss some (partly interconnected) issues Dejnožka raises in the context of 'Russell's writings + Dejnožka's comment' package. Namely, I will look at the issues of modality as bearing three different, yet interwoven, problems: the problem of semantics, the problem of epistemology and the problem of metaphysics.

On several places in the book, Dejnožka relates the notions of existence and possibility. The core of the debate, Chapter 3, is the distinction between three senses of 'exist'. The first, primary, sense reflects, according to Dejnožka, Russell's robust sense of reality summed in a motto 'to be is not to be nothing'. The second sense of 'exist' is Berkeleyan and Humean conceived as 'to be correlated with other particulars (sense data) in appropriate ways'. It seems that this sense has an epistemological reading since only things we have an appropriate relation to, an acquaintance with, exist. Finally, the third 'exist' concerns the logical structure of existence assertions. Such Fregean definition of existence is to be understood as a property of a propositional function (see also Chapter 2 for more about propositional functions).

So far so good. Now, following the above mentioned distinction, Dejnožka goes on and maps it into an analogous distinction within the scope of 'possible'. According to a primary sense of 'possible' all and only existents are possible. According to the second sense only groups of correlated particulars are possible. Finally, a tertiary sense concerns the logical structure of possibility assertions.

This distinction, however, does not exhaust the structure of Dejnožka's interpretation of Russell. Beside the primary, secondary and tertiary levels, he imposes 'modal features of interest' on every level. To start with the primary level, we get the following: (i) the primary existence of a sense-particular is logically contingent and can be known only through empirical acquaintance (p. 56); (ii) there is no such

thing as a merely possible particular; and (iii) the existence of a particular is transcendentally necessary with respect to thought and language. Descending to the secondary level, another three modal features are identified: (i*) the secondary existence of a group of correlated particulars, qua secondary existence, is not absolutely, but plainly relatively contingent; (ii*) there is a clear sense of relative structural possibility of secondary existence given a primary existence of some particular; (iii*) the secondary existence or ordinary things is not transcendentally necessary. Finally, the tertiary level is further analysed via the following modal aspects: (i**) a propositional function is possible if and only if it is sometimes true; (ii**) a propositional function is possible if and only if it describes something which has secondary reality; (iii**) a tertiary existence assertion may be said to have transcendental necessity in a derivative sense if and only if it is logically deducible by existential quantification over logically proper names. The so-called MDL {1, 2, 3} articulates Russell's full theory of modality.

Dejnožka suggests that MDL {1, 2, 3} is then an articulation of Russell's full theory of modality. To do so however, at least two things should be shown: one, all of (i) – (iii**) are mutually consistent; two, they provide an exhaustive analysis of modal discourse. Dejnožka argues on behalf of the former by resisting the view that, despite its logical consistency, 'x is unicorn' turns out to be impossible on Russell's view. Namely, anything that has secondary existence not only has features (i*) – (iii*) relative to its secondary existence, but also features (i) – (iii) relative to its primary existence. Importantly, 'with respect to modal feature (ii*) on the secondary level of existence unicorns are *combinatorially* both possible and contingent' what is 'perfectly consistent with their being impossible according to modal feature (ii) on the primary level of existence' (p. 60, my emphasis).

Two caveats. First, Dejnožka seems to appeal to a combinatorial theory of modality or, more precisely, a combinatorial theory of possible worlds. Such theory has roots in the Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and appeared (in some form) in Quine's 'Propositional Objects' (Quine 1968), Cresswell's 'The World is Everything that is the Case' (Cresswell 1972), Skyrms's 'Tractarian Nominalism' (Skyrms 1981) or Armstrong's *A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility* (Armstrong 1990). The core of these theories is a construction of some distribution of matter throughout a spacetime region, be it a Newtonian spacetime or some non-classical spacetime. This however, raises at least two worries: the worry from circularity, and the worry from incompleteness.

The worry from circularity is the following: the set-theoretic constructions, or simply the recombinations, determine the position of mereological atoms (with

'atom' being rather a neutral notion) and their sums as well as the situation on the world at the micro-level. Yet, if it is so (and we have few reasons to think it is not) there should be a tight connection between micro-level and macro-level. Put even stronger, in order to metaphysically explain the going-on in the actual world (explanandum) by means of recombinations (explanans) one has to posit a necessitation relation between the two. Since the relation is modal in nature, we deal with a circular analysis (what can be a reason for Russell's scepticism about modality as a fundamental or irreducible concept).

The worry from incompleteness arises as far as we recombine actual atoms only and omit possibilities of the being merely possible atoms. Although I am not sure how strong the intuition 'there could be worlds with more matter' is, one can still back it up with a simple (transcendental) consideration: a world to which no individuals, worlds, or properties are alien would be an especially rich world. There is no reason to think we are privileged to inhabit such a world. Therefore any acceptable account of possibility must make provision for alien possibilities (cf. Lewis 1986, 93). Dejnožka discusses alien individuals and alien properties in several places (pp. 52, 81, 166, 182) yet he, in my opinion, does not square MDL {1, 2, 3} with this (again, maybe disputable) possibility properly.

Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance is literally a full-length study of Russell's views on modality. It does both, highlight the 'modality bearing' passages in which Russell implicitly or explicitly comments on the problems of modality, and interprets them in a spirit of the overall unity, systematicity and Russell's ingenuity. To repeat, it is always a hard and risky enterprise to find an important, although to the date ignored, features in the life works of the most influential philosophers of 20th century. But Dejnožka's book does present one such enterprise and as such is a stimulative and worthy contribution to (the history) of philosophy.

Martin Vacek

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Petr Glombíček: *The Philosophy of Young Ludwig Wittgenstein* [*Filosofie mladého Ludwiga Wittgensteina*] Nakladatelství Pavel Mervart, Červený Kostelec, 2016, 216 pages[1]

There are numerous monographs about Ludwig Wittgenstein, but only a few of them were published in the territory of former Czechoslovakia. Most of them are translations of books authored by foreign authors, while those by Czech or Slovak authors are rare. Most notably, they include two books by Ondřej Beran, namely *"Střední" Wittgenstein: cesta k fenomenologii a zase spátky* (*The "Middle" Wittgenstein: His Journey to Phenomenology and Back Again)* and *Soukromé jazyky* (*Private Languages*) – see Beran (2013a; 2013b). A collection of papers *Studie k filosofii L. Wittgensteina* (*Studies on the Philosophy of L. Wittgenstein*) published by the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences is also worth mentioning (see Dostálová & Schuster 2011). Those who are interested in philosophy are certainly pleased by the fact that a new book by Petr Glombíček *Filosofie mladého Ludwiga Wittgensteina* (*The Philosophy of Young Ludwig Wittgenstein*) has appeared.

Capturing the gist of young Wittgenstein's philosophy is by no means an easy goal. Analysing selected topics *cum grano salis* of "a Schopenhauerian interested in formal logic" with the aim to map and outline the influence of other thinkers on his development is far from a routine task. This was Petr Glombíček's aim, though he admitted that this aim has changed in the course of writing the book. I think one should appreciate the change of focus because the result of Glombíček's effort is a book that is unique, at least in our geographical area.

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