D I A L Ó G Y

Proper PROPER Names (1)

Bjørn JESPERSEN - Marián ZOUHAR

> *All in all, proper names are a mess*
> *and if it weren't for the problem*
> *how to get the kinds to come in for dinner,*
> *I'd be inclined to just junk them.*
> *(David Kaplan)*

ZOUHAR, M.: **THE PROBLEM OF REFERENCE AND PROPER NAMES**

Problems concerning proper names. The most common intuition concerning proper names is rather poor: a name is such a kind of expression which is used to denote a thing without invoking any property of the thing designated.[1] This intuition, although no doubt right, is unilluminating. The question which still remains is that of the determination of the referent of a proper name: How is it possible that my use of a name refers to the right object (i.e. the bearer of the name)? In other words, which uses of a name can be understood as acts of reference, performed by a speaker, to a particular individual? Also, why is it that one speaker successfully refers to some individual, using a name, and the other does not? To illustrate an interesting problem, consider the name "Aristotle". I know of at least two Aristotles, i.e., people who bear the name "Aristotle" - the one is a philosopher, the other a shipowner. Does it mean that every token of the name must be ambiguous? Surely not. Thus, some kind of disambiguation must be involved. What is needed are conditions which clearly determine which of the two people is the referent of a token of "Aristotle" when the token is used.

This fundamental problem is connected with some other problems concerning the philosophical aspects of the reference of proper names, whose solutions require a rather sophisticated theoretical apparatus. The problems include: the question of true negative existential statements with proper names in subject position (e.g., "Romulus does not exist"); the problem of true identity statements "$a = b$" where "a" and "b" are proper names (e.g., "Hesperus is Phosphorus"); and the problem of

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This first part of the dialogue includes introductory remarks of both participants. The second part, which will appear in the next volume of *Organon F*, will contain the discussion about our respective positions, presented in these introductions. We decided to take this form of the dialogue, because our views are extremely different and our approaches to reference of proper names stems from different backgrounds. (B.J. - M.Z.)

statements with proper names occurring in propositional-attitude contexts (e.g., "Pavel knows that Aristotle was a pupil of Plato").[2]

Description theories of proper names. These problems heavily influenced semantical theories in such a way that they became rather different from common intuitions concerning proper names. Beginning with cautious hints of Gottlob Frege, these problems led to an explicit *description theory of proper names* as developed by Bertrand Russell and, later, by Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Searle and Peter Strawson. According to this theory, proper names do not belong to a special semantical category of expressions but are, more or less, semantically similar to definite descriptions. It means that proper names are, in fact, disguised definite descriptions and the right analysis unmasks them to be just that;[3] or definite descriptions are associated with proper names in such a manner that a proper name expresses a sense identical to the sense of some definite description.[4] The first version is much stronger because its consequences are relevant not only for the semantics of names but also for their syntax. Later, these quite simple description theories were replaced by more sophisticated ones, e.g., theories by Wittgenstein, Strawson and, especially Searle, in which a single description is replaced by a cluster of descriptions (Searle's inclusive disjunction).[5]

This solution has one important merit: it presents an elegant account of the determination of the reference of a name, since it formulates conditions under which a name can refer to an object. Consider the name "Aristotle". What our intuitions tell us is just that "Aristotle" is the name or the expression which is used to designate the particular man Aristotle. But does this answer include an account of the way the name refers to or determinates its referent? Obviously not. For what is left out in our intuitions is the manner of identification of Aristotle which would fix the referent for the name. Consequently, how can we know which object the name refers to? Description theories present the following solution: the referent of the name (Aristotle) is that object which *fits* the description (or set of descriptions) associated with the name. If "Aristotle" is associated with the description, "the teacher of Alexander the Great", this description determines the referent of the name: it is that only man who taught Alexander. Thus, if a name refers *via* description, its referent is clearly determined.

It is worth mentioning that these theories are both intuitively and formally wrong. According to description theorists, proper names must be descriptive expressions, like descriptions. It means that they not only refer to an object but at the same time describe it. And this does not square with our intuitions.[6] Several philosophers have presented many formal arguments against description theories.[7] One of the most influential ones is due to Saul Kripke and is called *the modal argument*:[8]

1. The proper name *n* means the same as the description *the F*. (Supposition)

2. The sentence "*n* is *the F*" is analytical, therefore necessarily true.
(Consequence of 1)

3. However, it is not necessarily true that *i*, the referent of *n*, is the only *F*.
(Denial of 2)

4. Hence, *n* does not mean the same as *the F*. (Conclusion)

In other words, the sentence "Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander the Great" is not necessarily true because the sentence "Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander the Great" is true.

Causal theories of proper names. So a new theory of reference is called for. New theories employ the notion of *causal chain*: a name refers to that object which stands at the beginning of a causal chain of communication in which the name is used. At the beginning of the chain there is a so-called *initial baptism* in which a name is introduced *as the name of some object.* Then the name transfers from one speaker to another, in a communicative chain, while its reference does not shift, as far as a speaker wants to use the name in the same way as his predecesor. So when we use a name we refer to that object which stands at the beginning of the chain.[9]

It should be borne in mind that not every new theory of reference is strictly causal. For example, Donnellan prefers speaking about historical theory, because he wants "to avoid a seeming commitment to all the links in the referential chain being causal".[10] But Kripke's causal version was more popular and was developed by Michaél Devitt at considerable length.[11] Though I cannot completely agree with Devitt's theory, he manages to bring out several important facts concerning the causal connection between names and the world. Now, I'll try to outline a causal theory based upon Kripke's and Devitt's ideas, although partly differing from their approaches in some respects.

The important insight gained by causal, but not descriptional, theories is that the semantics of names is fixed at the beginning of a causal chain, when the name is first introduced. What happens then is that an expression is paired off with an object, whereby the expression is transformed into *the name of* the object, and this object is transformed into *the referent of* the name. Two distinct items, originally independent of each other, are in some way linked together. *The object is fixed as the referent of the name.* Therefore, we should take a closer look at this fact.

However, I think that Devitt's outline of this process is not completely correct. He suggests that the reference of a name is *fixed* during the first *uses* of the name.[12] But I suspect that, for this reason, it cannot be completely clear which object is fixed as the referent of the name; what is missing is some manner of distinguishing the object from others. Therefore I think that the first *use* of the name must be preceded by a formal act in which the name is introduced. In this act the name is not *used* but *mentioned.*[13] Imagine the following: I want to introduce the name *n* for the individual *i*. I can use the sentence - let us call it *introductory sentence* - "This [pointing at *i*] is called '*n*'".[14] *n* is mentioned, not used, and this sentence associates with *n i* as its referent. For example, *b* cannot understand *a*'s utterance "John is happy", if *b* does not know who John is, or, alternatively, who the referent of the name is. Before using this utterance, *a* must fix the referent of the name "John". This can be done only by employing the introductory sentence of the kind mentioned, or a similar one, e.g., "The

man with the glass of champagne is called 'John'". For every understanding of "John" on b's behalf, it is presupposed that the referent of the name is fixed for b. Therefore, the first time b comes across the name "John", the name cannot be *used* but must be *mentioned*.

What actually happens in case of n and "John" is that two semantic types, n and "John", respectively, come into being.[15] It means that some formerly "referenceless" string of letters has become a name of some object and this explains why it is possible to use the expression with a reference fixed in this manner. Every *use* of "John" (every token of the semantic type "John") is, from this moment on, parasitic upon the occasion when it was first mentioned. The referent of "John" is determined descriptively and is identical with the referent of "the man with the glass of champagne" in the introductory sentence.

It should be noticed that in spite of employing descriptive (ostensive, demonstrative) manners of fixing the reference of names, this approach is different from that of description theories. Description theories find another, more important, room for descriptions: the referent of the name is that object which fits the description associated with the name. According to my version of causal theory, this is not so. The description is chosen when it is clear which object is to be described by it. In the act of introduction of a name, a speaker sees some object which he wants to name. He also notices that the object is such-and-such and this fact about the object causes the speaker to select, in most cases, the description "the object which is such-and-such". Using this description, he may introduce the name for his hearer. It means that we are not looking for the object which satisfies some description, but we are looking for some description which appropriately describes (or, identifies in the case of other kinds of expression) the selected object.[16]

It should be mentioned that the description used for fixing a referent for a proper name need not be such that the object satisfies the description. In the above example about "John", the speaker may wrongly suppose that the particular man has champagne in his glass. However, for the purposes of a speaker, this description may do its identificatory job. We might say, with Devitt, that what is important is the referential use of the description, not the attributive one, to use Donnellan's terminology.[17]

Bearing these ideas in mind, we may say that this causal element is important for an act of introducing a name. The causal element is semantically relevant, because of its importance for fixing the referent for a name. Now, causal theories recognize also another causal connection; this connection plays a role in spreading the name within the community of speakers; one speaker's use of the name may cause another speaker to acquire the ability to use the name, etc. But, contrary to many causal theorists, I suggest that this second causal connection is of no importance for semantics of proper names; its purpose is only a pedagogical one, in that it merely describes how the name is learned. Thanks to causal connection with other members of the community, the speaker acquires the ability to use tokens of a particular name-type. But, from a semantical point of view, it might be said that a speaker is causally connected with an object because of the fact that when the speaker uses a name-token he uses a token

of a certain name-type *which* is causally bound together with the object; not because of the fact that the speaker has its role in a causal chain of communication.

Now it is clear that not every use of a name can be classified as a term referring to an object. It depends upon the stage of mastering a name-type by a particular speaker. For example, parrots do not refer, because we can hardly say that they master any name-types; they master only a sound which corresponds in some degree to a name. The reason is that a speaker did not causally act upon a parrot in such a way that the parrot realized the sound as an expression referring to this or that object.

The grasping of a name-type comes in stages. Let me illustrate this point by the following example. Two people, *a* and *b*, are talking about *c*, using the name "*c*" for him. Someone else, *d*, knowing neither *c* nor the name "*c*", is listening to their discussion. Suddenly, *d* asks: "What would *c* say about that?" Surely, *d* referred to *c*. How is it possible? His use of "*c*" was preceded by some kind of introductory sentence which may have run as follows: "*a* and *b* are talking about someone using the name '*c*'." If *d* accepts this stipulation, he can use the name and he can make successful references to *c*.[18] Needless to say, *d* may successfully refer to *c* only in certain situations, namely in those which are in some way or other connected to the one involving conversation between *a* and *b*. When *d* would know more about *c*, he might refer to *c* in more cases. This means that referring is an ability that one person may possess to a higher degree than some other person. This fact explains, of course only the reference of speakers. But reference of names is explained in terms of introduction: a name refers to that individual for which it was introduced as a name. The pragmatics of proper names is much richer than their semantics.

JESPERSEN, B.: NAME-CONSTRUCTION-INDIVIDUAL

Reference to individuals. The sole semantic task of a proper name is to refer to a specific individual. Hence this one-line characterization is verbally uncontentious,

> proper name *n* refers to individual *i*.

But, of course, both the notions of proper name and individual are in need of philosophical clarification. In what follows I will present, in a very schematic way, the two dominant theories of proper names, known as (*i*) description theory and (*ii*) direct reference theory (or, new theory of reference), mention a few of their vices and virtues, and finally, no less schematically, outline my own proposal. Unfortunately, I can lay no claim to originality, since the basic idea has already been put forward by Messrs. Pavel Tichý and Pavel Materna.[19]

Embedded in discussions of proper names is a twin problem that I wish to dismiss right away. One part is how the referent (individual) of a name is fixed. The other is how we, as language users, may come to know who or what a given name refers to. I must admit I simply do not understand how these themes can present themselves as problems, since semantics is evidently not an empirical matter. We need not

investigate the world to find out what words mean. So the answer to the first "problem" is that *n* is paired off with *i* by way of stipulation, i.e. linguistic *fiat*. And the answer to the second question is that someone who masters a given language masters the linguistic *factum* that *i* has been assigned to *n* in that language. In neither case is there anything semantically, logically or philosophically interesting involved, since they are matters of linguistics. Semantical analysis simply takes it for granted that individuals have already been assigned to names. What semantical theory is concerned with is rather to account for the meaning relation obtaining between a term and an individual.[20]

The pivotal point is here the interplay between theory of reference and theory of meaning. I wish to argue that the referent of a proper name is nothing but a specific individual and that no descriptive content is in any way associated with the name. This may sound like direct theory, but there are important differences. Firstly, the reference relation between a name and an individual is not unmediated. Secondly, the meaning or sense of a proper name is not an individual (its referent). I shall also argue that a presentation of the individual is unavoidable. This may sound like description theory, but only superficially so, since, as said above, the presentation of the individual associates no descriptive content with the name. No conditions, that is to say, need be fulfilled.

Instead a third position, neither fully direct nor fully descriptional, is conceivable - or so I shall argue.

If accepted, the semanticist will have available to him a theory of proper names that allows him to solve various puzzles concerning proper names in notoriously problematic ("intensional") contexts in a fairly straightforward and, in my opinion, intuitively satisfactory manner.

Description theory. This theory comes in two versions. Either (*i*) a (syntactic) proper name *n* is synonymous with, or shorthand for, a definite description *d*, or (*ii*) *d* is assigned to *n* as the meaning of *n*, while *n* remains a member of the autonomous category of proper names.[21] In either case the reference of *n* is the actual value of d.[22] An individual must fulfil a certain empirical condition to be the reference of *n*. An example: The sentence

(*a*) Bratislava is a city,

where "Bratislava" is (what the description theorist calls) a proper name, is found, upon analysis, to be of the form

the F is a G,

where "the F" is a term for the condition.

Sometimes it is felt that it must be made explicit in the analysis that the reference of *n* is the actual satisfier of *the F*, i.e.,

the actual F is a G.

The virtue of description theory is that it conceives of meaning as an abstract, "mind-friendly" entity. But its virtue is also its vice, since not the condition but the satisfier of the condition is construed as the reference of the name. This way semantics is contaminated by empirical facts. Hence, if *the F* is *the capital of Slovakia*, the reference relation of *n* becomes modally and temporally sensitive.

In order to understand (*a*), one must fix the value of *the F* prior to understanding that the reference of *n* is to the individual Bratislava. This requires empirical investigation of the world. Furthermore, (*a*) not only says that some specific individual *i* is a city, but also that *i* is the capital of Slovakia - which is an additional piece of information. In the case of the reinforcement seemingly accruing from "actual", it is even more obvious why facts must be kept out from the realm of semantics. In order to understand (*a*), on these terms, one must first fix the actual world and then fix the satisfier of *the F* in that world. Only omniscient creatures, however, are able to pinpoint the actual among all possible worlds, since the actual world is the set of all propositions true *simpliciter*.[23]

Also the inclusion of a constant "actual" for the actual world is detrimental to the very notion of truth-condition as a function from worlds into chronologies of truth-values. Truth-conditions must be the same for all *wt*-couples, hence they endure no relativization to features of the satisfier in a particular world (at a particular time), including the actual one.

Direct theory. This theory skips the mediation provided by *the F*, construing instead *n* simply as a term for *i*. The virtue of the theory is that the reference relation between *n* and *i* obtains independently of the vagaries of the world; no facts are allowed to intrude. Another virtue is that direct theory is much more in keeping with the one-line characterization given at the beginning. Thus, sentence (*a*) says of individual *i* referred to by *n* that it is a city.[24]

However, to the question what the meaning (as opposed to reference) of *n* is, direct theory replies that *i* itself is the meaning. So meaning and reference coincide. It is an important, if tacit, assumption that the individuals which proper names refer to are three-dimensional objects with a beginning and an end in time. This saddles direct theory with three problems, as I see it.

The first is that, since it is meanings we grasp when we grasp a term, we are somehow supposed to grasp, in our intellects, Bratislava itself. I just never understood what it would mean to intellectually grasp a concrete (as opposed to abstract) thing.[25]

The second problem is that, for all its minimalism, direct theory still hasn't pruned its individuals enough. As I said, the individuals referred to are, according to direct theory, people of flesh, blood and bones, cities of houses, streets, traffic signs, etc. But all these empirical properties should be explicitly expelled from direct theory, since they are irrelevant and give the wrong impression about the nature of the individuals referred to.[26] All that matters is the numerical identity of *i* (as is also evident from various versions of the celebrated so-called modal argument presented in favour of direct theory).

The third problem concerns what kind of answer direct theory would present to the question as to how *n* refers to *i*. The semantical theory of direct theory includes only the notions of name and individual, so no semantical answer can be given. At least the description theorist could point to an individual's satisfaction of a condition. Instead direct theory must give an account in pragmatic terms, typically historical or causal or communication chain, collective linguistic practise, etc., from which no semantics could possibly be extracted.

My main claim is that what is semantically relevant in singular reference is nothing but the numerical identity of a specific individual. A theory should be devised that would (*i*) turn proper names, properly understood, into terms for "naked" individuals, that is, individuals whose empirical properties are explicitly irrelevant, and (*ii*) offer an abstract mode of presentation of each individual. This will do as a first approximation,

proper name *n* expresses presentation *p* of individual *i* and refers to *i*.

Some assumptions must be made in order to move forward. First, assume that all *wt*-couples share the same universe of discourse consisting of "naked" individuals. Next, assume that *p* is identical to the meaning of *n*. Finally, assume that presentations are what Tichý calls "constructions".

Constructions of individuals. The notion of construction *à la* Tichý is introduced to capture, in various well-defined manners, the idea of a specific itinerary towards a certain (kind of) object. The itinerary is intellectual in nature, an abstract procedure, that is, specifying how one may start out at some point p_m and end up at point p_n.

The leading idea behind the notion of construction of objects may be adumbrated by way of a slightly flippant example. Suppose you want to bake a cake. You find a recipe for chocolate cake, and it tells you to mix water, flour, sugar, cocoa (etc.) in certain ways. What results from this process is a chocolate cake. The recipe, farfetched as this may sound, is a construction of this particular kind of object, *viz.* a chocolate cake.

Tichý enumerates six different kinds of construction, of which *variable* and *trivialization* as the only two simple, "immediate" ones. The difference between the two is that a variable *x* constructs an object ϱ only relative to a valuation *v*, whereas a trivialization $°X$ of *X* is self-sufficient. In the case of a trivialization, the point of departure p_m and the destination p_n coincide, as is seen from the definition of trivialization (*X* is any sort of object):

df. $°X$ *contructs X*.

The definition is quite brief, and not very philosophically illuminating. Two examples may help to fix ideas.

Example 1: $°Cake$ contructs the intension *cake*, which, relative to world/time-couples, returns sets of cakes, i.e. individuals which satisfy the condition for being a cake. Exemplified here is a descent from construction over intension to extension.

Example II: Where *Bratislava* is of the logical type *individual*, °*Bratislava* skips the intensional level and goes straight to the extensional level, in that °*Bratislava* constructs a specific individual *i*. Since *i* is not itself a construction, it must be obtained by means of a construction, and trivialization is the most natural way to do it. (An equivalent but much less natural construction of *i* would be, e.g., °ι$x[^\circ=x$ °*i]*.) Technically speaking, the intensional level - which is where the modal and temporal parameters are located - might be included, namely by means of a constant function f, that is, $[\forall wt[f(w,t)=i]$, i.e., one which returns one and the same value *i* at all *wt*-arguments. But this would be both misleading and superfluous, since there are no wordly or temporal sensitivities that require to be taken into account.[27]

A trivialization of an individual *i* is a recipe for getting at *i*.[28] What is obtained, however, is exclusively what is logically relevant about *i*. The only logically relevant feature of *i* is the numerical identity of *i*, that is to say, *i*'s numerical distinctness from everything else.

Name, construction, individual. The theory of the semantics of proper names that the above apparatus provides material for comes down to this,

proper name *n* expresses construction °*i* of individual *i* and refers to *i*.

Strictly speaking, the idea behind this thesis should be rephrased so as to incorporate the element of mediated reference. Hence,

n expresses °*i* and refers to whatever individual is constructed by °*i*.

The two formulations are equivalent, since *i* is necessarily the only individual constructed by *i*. (The reference relation is taken as primitive.)

Semantically speaking, *understanding* a proper name amounts to knowing which construction is the meaning of the name. Epistemologically speaking, understanding perhaps comes down to something like Russell-style acquaintance. Only what we are acquainted with are not sense-data but numerical individuators. As for personal names, it might very well be the case that it is relative to each language-user which terms in his idiolect are proper names, depending on with whom he has (not) had acquaintance. Only acquaintance can guarantee the sort of immediate identification of an individual which trivialization consists in.

The quest for non-descriptive, mind-friendly (abstract) presentations of individuals triggered the introduction of the notion of construction. So how does a construction of *i* enable us to intellectually grasp *i*? Tichý has a brief discussion of this, which I don't think I can completely agree with.[29] He says that to grasp Etna in thought is to grasp Etna's numerical identity, which is to know *which* among all individuals is Etna. He infers that, since individuals can be intellectually grasped, they can occur in constructions. Problem is, Tichý takes individuals to be both "naked" and concrete. The problem is not that something concrete cannot occur in something abstract - think of concrete teapots occurring in abstract sets of teapots - but that Etna and all other individuals can be mind-friendly only if they are abstract. I therefore

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infer that it is only Etna's numerical identity - a highly abstract object - that occurs in constructions.

Consequently, if we associate with sentence (*a*), "Bratislava is a city", a propositional construction as its meaning, we get,

(*a'*) $\lambda w \lambda t [{}^{\circ}C_{wt} \, {}^{\circ}B]$.

The thought that this construction invites us to think is that the naked individual of Bratislava is a city (i.e. occurs in the set of cities at the *wt*-couple selected for evaluation).

An individual trivialization is a *concept* of the individual constructed by it: ${}^{\circ}X$ constructs X and is a concept of X.[30] So the familiar expression "individual concept" may be maintained, but its sense will be different from the one found in the literature, where it invariably represents the condition to be *the F*. On this new construal, ${}^{\circ}i$ is an individual concept of *i*. The "content" of the individual concept is nothing but *i*'s numerical identity. This, and nothing else, is the semantical contribution a proper name *n* referring to *i* and having ${}^{\circ}i$ for its meaning makes to a so-called "singular proposition", as direct theory calls propositions where a condition is applied to a specific individual.

The theme of singular propositions shouldn't be broached here; suffice it to say that what is commonly known as a "singular proposition" is, to my mind, most adequately interpreted as a construction constructing a proposition (a function from <w,t>-couples to truth-values) and, at any given *wt*-couple, applying a function to a specific individual, whereby a truth-value is obtained. Since what is trivialized is an individual and not an individual-office, the function is not partial but total.[31]

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FOOTNOTES

[1] "Proper name" and "name" are used equivalently.

[2] These problems are put aside in this introduction.

[3] Cf. Russell: "[T]his single word 'Romulus' is really a sort of truncated or telescoped description, and if you think of it as a name you will get into logical errors. When you realize that it is a description, you realize therefore that any proposition about Romulus really introduces the propositional function embodying the description as (say) 'x was called "Romulus"'." ([14], 243).

[4] Cf. [9].

⁵ Cf. [15]; [16], 20 and 182; [22], §79.

⁶ At the end of the day, it seems that John Stuart Mill was right in holding that proper names have denotations but not connotations.

⁷ See, e.g. [4] and [11]. Donnellan's arguments are aimed to show that a use of a proper name can succesfully refer to its bearer also in cases in which the associated description is not satisfied by the object and, moreover, some other object, instead of the bearer, satisfies it. According to him, "(*a*) a proper name may have a referent even though the conditions laid down by the principle [of identifying descriptions] are not satisfied and (*b*) where the conditions are satisfied, the object that ought to be the referent according to the principle need not be the true referent" ([4], 335-336).

⁸ Cf. [11], 57, 74-76.

⁹ In fact, the idea of a causal chain of communication is originally mentioned by Strawson, though he did not develop any explicit *theory* based on this idea. Cf. [16], 182.

¹⁰ Cf. [6], 3.

¹¹ Cf. [3], especially, chapters 2 and 5.

¹² Cf. [3], 26-29.

¹³ The same observation was made by Yagisawa in [23], 226. But Yagisawa's point is negative, because he employed this idea as a critique of theories of reference which rely on historical chains. On the other hand, I try to present some positive suggestions built upon the mention/use distinction.

·¹⁴ Of course, other kinds of singular expressions may be invoked instead of the pronoun "this". Demonstrative constructions (e.g. "this man"), definite descriptions, other proper names are also available. These kinds of expressions are more satisfactory because of the unique determination of the referent which a simple pronoun like "this" may lack.

¹⁵ A very useful notion of semantic type was introduced by Devitt in [3].

¹⁶ Cf. also Donnellan's apt metaphor in [4], 356. This fact concerning the role of descriptions was not recognized in full by Kripke, but by Gareth Evans: "the important causal relation lies between [some] item's states and doings and the speaker's body of information" ([8], 217-218).

¹⁷ In this fact lies, according to Devitt, the semantical significance of Donnellan's distinction. Cf. [3], 46-56. Donnellan says: "A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing" ([5], 285).

¹⁸ Similar examples are presented by Kripke in [11], 116n, and Evans in [8], 212-213. Evans also formulates an important critique of Kripke's approach.

¹⁹ Cf. [19], §§40, 43 and [13], 395. This is not to say that the theory of proper names I present should necessarily be attributed to Tichý. His §40 contains a referential scheme only superficially distinct from the one used in "my" theory together with a brief discussion of the graspability of individuals. His §43 makes the further, sweeping claim that neither extensions nor intensions but only constructions receive reference. This latter claim is in all likelihood an exaggeration, since for some purposes it is better to have the terms involved refer to intensions and extensions.

Tichý's only explicit discussion of proper names concerns (syntactic) proper names that are either "fictional" or "historical", such as "Sherlock Holmes" or "Aristotle", respectively. His theory is this. "Aristotle" does not refer to a specific individual but to an individual concept (known as "individual offices" or "individual determiners" in Tichý's Transparent Intensional Logic). "Aristotle is a G" would have this construction for its meaning: $\lambda w\lambda t[°G_{wt} ° \iota x[°F_{wt}x]]$.

A principle of acquaintance briefly rears its head ([19], 264). One might conjecture that once "Aristotle" was a term for a specific individual but changed its status and became a term of an individual deteminer, since his numerical identity is now irretrievable and the existence of Aristotle is not logically guaranteed. "Sherlock Holmes" does not refer to a specific individual either, but it is on a par with the term for a free variable ranging over individuals. Also the wt-parameters are free. "Sherlock Holmes is a G" has this construction for its meaning: $[°G_{wt}x]$. Cf. [19], §49. Materna, however, has suggested in conversation that this might be an alternative: $[°G_{wt} °F_{wt}]$.

[20] Whereas linguistic theory is allowed to simply assume that, in a given language, certain strings of letters or sounds make up words, i.e. items endowed with meaning. The areas of linguistics and semantics are commonly conflated in discussions of, for instance, proper names, in that a term like "Pegasus" may be offered as an example of a (semantic) proper name because its grammatical status is the one of a proper name. Cf. [21], 481.

[21] The former version is probably owe to Russell, cf. [14]. The latter version is Fregean in nature, and has been advocated by, for instance, Church and Dummett, cf. [2], Introduction, and [7], Appendix III. I present a formal objection, with significant philosophical implications, to Dummett's proposal in [10].

[22] For someone who is not at all sympathetic to description theory, it is tempting to assume that (ii) cannot really be kept from collapsing into (i).

[23] Further vices include (i) those cases where d is undefined in the actual world, making n a so-called "empty name", which is a bizzare (and, I believe, impossible) property of a proper name; (ii) the choice of *the* definite description d to go along with n: speakers may talk at cross purposes because they associate different conditions with n. The speakers may come to realize that one and the same individual satisfies these various conditions, but not without consulting extra-semantical reality. (Wittgenstein problematizes the tacit assumption in description theory that there are privileged definite descriptions associated with names; cf. [22], §79.); and (iii) it is common usage that "definite descriptions refer to individuals", which always sounded peculiar to me. For me, reference is exclusively a (linguistic) relation obtaining between a term (a linguistic item) and an object, not a relation between a function and its values (which is a logical relation). Cf. also [20] for a supplement to this catalogue of vices.

[24] The choice of this *de re* formulation, as it is known in the literature, is deliberate.

[25] Neither did Frege. What we grasp ("erfassen") are presentations ("Arten des Gegebenseins") of objects. But Russell, no less famously, held that we do grasp material objects when we have so-called "acquaintance" with them, which is, very roughly speaking, what we have when we are aware of a thing right before us.

[26] The tension between construing ordinary proper names as rigid designators and having empirical individuals be their referents comes to a head, I think, in the case of (what would seem to be) the contingent existence of the referents; cf. the Kripke's footnote 27 below mentioning partial functions. It would be type-theoretically wrong to locate existence at the level of extensional entities such as individuals, since existence statements would invariably come out true. One of only two type-theoretically acceptable solutions is to consider the birth and death of a person, the founding and demise of a city empirical properties of individuals just like *being green* or *being happy*, and "to come into and go out of existence" should be reinterpreted to mean *to be born* and *to die*. But then the concept of individuals is a radically different one. The other solution is to identify each individual with a complete "life-story" *à la* Leibniz. Cf. [1] for an excellent discussion of bundle *versus* substance theories (haecceitism, in this case).

[27] Cf. Kripke: "In the formal semantics of modal logic the 'sense' of a term t is usually taken to be the (possibly partial) function which assigns to each possible world H the referent of t in H. For a rigid designator, such a function is constant" ([11], footnote 22).

[28] Constructions are defined to consist of at least one step. A trivialization consists of exactly one step, which only just qualifies it as a procedure. There is a slight philosophical problem involved in this, since Transparent Intensional Logic advocates a procedural semantical theory. Technically, however, it is unproblematic, since any system including procedures of several steps must contain one-step procedures as well.

[29] [19], §40.

[30] In Materna's sense of the word "concept". Cf. [12].

[31] The claim that the function is total is likely to offend the intuition that Bratislava fails to, as it is put, *exist* in all worlds at all times. Presupposed in my claim is a radical anti-essentialism. (Not to the effect that no properties are non-trivially essential, but to the effect that essential properties reside not in extensional but intensional entities. Of course, anti-essentialism *tout court* is untenable.) Following is a brief, intuitively based statement of the kind of anti-essentialism presupposed. Some individuals are, actually and presently, people, and they are given personal names like "Novák", "Gottfried" and "Mobuto". Other individuals are, actually and presently, cities and bear names like "Bratislava", "Århus" and "Pyongyang". In some other worlds, at other times or even presently, these same individuals exemplify slightly or vastly different empirical properties. People are born and die, cities are founded and crumble, but individuals remain. They just shed their previous properties and take on some new ones. Eccentric and bizzare as this scenario may seem, there is nothing to prevent a word like "Bratislava", which refers to i in the actual world at the present moment, from being a proper name for i in worlds and at times where and when i instantiates properties that are a far cry from the requisites that go with being a city like Bratislava, such as containing houses and streets, being made of steel, concrete, mortar, bitumen, etc. (*Requisites* are Tichý's essential properties; cf. [18].) That is to say, "Bratislava" invariably refers to i, and at some wt-couples i is an elephant, a speck of dust, a cobweb, a grand piano, and so on. Any empirical property goes, since, in logical space, the sky is the limit. Which again is to say that Bratislava, actually and presently a city, might have been all of the above, and much more on top of that.

But it probably does not imply that up and down the temporal axis in the actual world Bratislava ever occurred or will occur as an elephant or a speck of dust, since the requisites associated with being a city determine the modal range of what an individual which happens to be a city might possibly have been before that or may possibly become afterwards. Throughout this discussion, it is vital to keep these three logical types apart: individuals/ι, individual offices/ιτω (i.e. functions from possible worlds into chronologies of individuals), and individual properties/ (σι)τω (i.e. functions from possible worlds into chronologies of sets of individuals).

It is my contention that Kripke, when excluding a host of empirical properties from those that could possibly be instantiated by the lectern he is standing next to while giving his *Naming and Necessity* lectures, allows the temporal possibilities in the actual world to delimit the modal span of the lectern. But up and down the modal axis, anything logically possible is possible. Or so I am presuming.

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