%0 Journal Article %J Organon F %D 2012 %T Textualizmus a právny pozitivizmus z hľadiska filozofie jazyka %A Neština, Marek %K A. Scalia. %K easy case %K hard case %K legal positivism %K ordinary meaning %K philosophy of language %K philosophy of law %K S. Soames %K textualism %X This paper addresses the problem which consists in the cases when the court properly makes substantive evaluative judgments in coming to a decision that determines what the law is. Since legal positivism says that one can determine what the law is without making any such judgments, there may seem to be a conflict here. The discussion of legal positivism throws light on contemporary disputes about the doctrine of interpretation known as “textualism.” S. Soames (textualism2) states that the content of a legal text is what the lawmakers say, assert, or stipulate in adopting the text. A. Scalia (textualism1) argues that the content of a legal text is the meaning – sometimes “the ordinary meaning” – of the text. The paper shows that legal positivism is consistent with the second definition of textualism. %B Organon F %V 19 %P 145-162 %U http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2012/1/145-162.pdf %9 State %2 Papers %3 145162 %# 1