%0 Journal Article
%J Organon F
%D 2012
%T Textualizmus a právny pozitivizmus z hľadiska filozofie jazyka
%A Neština, Marek
%K A. Scalia.
%K easy case
%K hard case
%K legal positivism
%K ordinary meaning
%K philosophy of language
%K philosophy of law
%K S. Soames
%K textualism
%X This paper addresses the problem which consists in the cases when the court properly makes substantive evaluative judgments in coming to a decision that determines what the law is. Since legal positivism says that one can determine what the law is without making any such judgments, there may seem to be a conflict here. The discussion of legal positivism throws light on contemporary disputes about the doctrine of interpretation known as “textualism.” S. Soames (textualism2) states that the content of a legal text is what the lawmakers say, assert, or stipulate in adopting the text. A. Scalia (textualism1) argues that the content of a legal text is the meaning – sometimes “the ordinary meaning” – of the text. The paper shows that legal positivism is consistent with the second definition of textualism.
%B Organon F
%V 19
%P 145-162
%U http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2012/1/145-162.pdf
%9 State
%2 Papers
%3 145162
%# 1