<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marton, Peter</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Truths, Facts, and Liars</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Truths, Facts, and Liars</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chuch-Fitch paradox</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">knowability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Liar Paradox</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">meaning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">moderate anti-realism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">truth</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2018/2/155-173.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">155-173</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">English</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Moderate Anti-realist (MAR) approach to truth and meaning, built around the concept of &lt;em&gt;knowability&lt;/em&gt;, will be introduced and argued for in this essay. Our starting point will be the two fundamental anti-realists principles that claim that neither truth nor meaning can outstrip knowability and our focus will be on the challenge of adequately formalizing these principles and incorporating them into a formal theory. Accordingly, I will introduce a MAR truth operator that is built on a distinction between being true and being factual. I will show then that this approach partitions propositions into eight classes, on the basis of their knowability. We will then ask the following question: Given the anti-realist principles, what kind of theory of propositional meaning can properly explain the &lt;em&gt;meaninglessness&lt;/em&gt; of &lt;em&gt;fully unknowable&lt;/em&gt; propositions? This question will lead us to the claim that the &lt;em&gt;meaning/content&lt;/em&gt; of propositions should be identified not with the set of possible worlds in which the propositions are &lt;em&gt;true/factual&lt;/em&gt;, but rather in which they are &lt;em&gt;known&lt;/em&gt;. This modified approach will then be used to analyze both the &lt;em&gt;Liar Paradox&lt;/em&gt; and the &lt;em&gt;Strengthened Liar&lt;/em&gt;. To anticipate the conclusion of this essay, it will be shown that a MAR framework can render definite truth and factuality values to the &lt;em&gt;Liar sentence&lt;/em&gt; and it will also confirm our intuition that such paradoxical sentences are devoid of proper meaning.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">155173</style></custom3></record></records></xml>