<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Voltolini, Alberto</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heidegger’s Logico-Semantic Strikeback</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heidegger’s Logico-Semantic Strikeback</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Impossibilia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">logical form</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">metaphysics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">nothing</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ontology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">possibilia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">theory of descriptions</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2015/1/19-38.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19-38</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">English</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In (1959), Carnap famously attacked Heidegger for having constructed an insane metaphysics based on a misconception of both the logical form and the semantics of ordinary language. In what follows, it will be argued that, once one appropriately (i.e., in a Russellian fashion) reads Heidegger’s famous sentence that should paradigmatically exemplify such a misconception, i.e., “the nothing nothings”, there is nothing either logically or semantically wrong with it. The real controversy as to how that sentence has to be evaluated—not as to its meaning but as to its truth—lies at the metaphysico-ontological level. For in order for the sentence to be true one has to endorse an ontology of impossibilia and Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1938</style></custom3><custom5><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></custom5></record></records></xml>