<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Miranda del Corral</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Against Normative Judgement Internalism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Against Normative Judgement Internalism</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Akrasia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Enkrasia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">normative requirements</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">norrmative judgements</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">practical reasoning</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/4/567-587.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">567-587</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">English</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Normative judgement internalism claims that enkrasia is an ideal of rational agency that poses a necessary link between making a normative judgement, and forming an intention to act according to that judgement. Against this view, I argue that enkrasia does not require the formation of new intentional states; instead, it requires that the agent’s intentions do not contravene her normative judgements. The main argument for considering that an intention ought to follow from a normative judgement is the claim that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. I will argue that this account is mistaken: practical reasoning aims at justifying certain actions or intentions, and thus its conclusion is a normative judgement. Defenders of NJI might argue, though, that intentions ought to follow from our normative judgements, because of certain requirements affecting not only practical reasoning, but rational agency. I argue that this conception of enkrasia is too demanding. Enkrasia, I suggest, is better understood as a restriction over our intentions: they ought not enter into conflict with our judgements.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">567587</style></custom3></record></records></xml>