<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wedgwood, Ralph</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Akrasia and Uncertainty</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Akrasia and Uncertainty</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Act individuation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Akrasia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">decision theory</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">John Broome</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">practical rationality</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">probability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">uncertainty</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/4/484-506.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">484-506</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">English</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">According to John Broome, &lt;i&gt;akrasia&lt;/i&gt; consists in a failure to &lt;i&gt;intend&lt;/i&gt; to do something that one believes one &lt;i&gt;ought&lt;/i&gt; to do, and such &lt;i&gt;akrasia&lt;/i&gt; is necessarily irrational. In fact, however, failing to intend something that one believes one ought to do is only guaranteed to be irrational if one is &lt;i&gt;certain&lt;/i&gt; of a &lt;i&gt;maximally detailed&lt;/i&gt; proposition about what one ought to do; if one is uncertain about any part of the full story about what one ought to do, it could be perfectly rational not to intend to do something that one believes one ought to do. This paper seeks to remedy this problem, by proposing an anti-&lt;i&gt;akrasia&lt;/i&gt; principle that covers cases of uncertainty (as well as cases of such complete certainty). It is argued that this principle is in effect the fundamental principle of practical rationality.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">484506</style></custom3></record></records></xml>