<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vraný, Martin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Empirická výzva filosofickému pojetí mysli</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">An Empirical Challenge to the Philosophical Conception of Mind</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cognitive architecture</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">consciousness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">language</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modularity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">philosophy of mind</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">unity of mind</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/1/50-71.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">50-71</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Czech</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article reflects on influential views of the mind that come from cognitive science and seem to undermine the traditional philosophical view that the mind is simply unified and transparent to itself. Specifical y, the modularity thesis is presented, along with its important modifications and criticisms, suggesting that the apparent unity can be ascribed only to higher cognition, if at all. Various theories of why the mind seems to be unified while being composed of autonomous modules are discussed. The overview results in the conclusion that our linguistic capacity plays a prominent role in the unity of the mind. </style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5071</style></custom3></record></records></xml>