@article {aytekin_t2012:2450,
	title = {Fodor on Causes of Mentalese Symbols},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {19},
	number = {1},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {3-15},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {Jerry Fodor{\textquoteright}s causal theory of content is a well-known naturalistic attempt purporting to show that Brentano was wrong in supposing that physical states cannot possess meaning and reference. Fodor{\textquoteright}s theory contains two crucial elements: one is a notion of {\textquotedblleft}asymmetric dependence between nomic relations,{\textquotedblright} and the other is an assumption about the nature of the {\textquotedblleft}causally operative properties{\textquotedblright} involved in the causation of mental tokens. Having dealt elsewhere with the problems Fodor{\textquoteright}s notion of asymmetric dependence poses, we show in this paper a difficulty with the other element of his theory concerning what kinds of properties are the causally operative ones in the tokenings of a semantic symbol in the brain of a perceiver. After presenting this difficulty, we examine three possible responses a Fodorian might make to our criticism.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2012/1/3-15.pdf},
	author = {Aytekin, Tevfik and Sayan, Erdin{\c c}}
}
