@article {raclavsky_j2008:1654,
	title = {Reformulating Tich{\'y}{\textquoteright}s Conception of Bare Individuals},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {15},
	number = {2},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {143-167},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {A bare individual was conceived by Tich{\'y} as an individual such as if the property the individual instantiates is non-trivial (contingent), it is possible for the individual to lack it (and still be the same individual); and for any trivial property (i.e. property with constant extension) that it cannot lack this kind of property. The exact readings of Tich{\'y}{\textquoteright}s original formulations of bare individuals are subjected to a detailed analysis to reveal that any of them is refutable by means of Cmorejian objection that there exist contingent properties which are partly essential (i.e. there exists an individual which cannot lack such property). To avoid such (valid) objection, the present paper attempts to rebuild Tich{\'y}{\textquoteright}s definitions into viable ones.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2008/2/143-167.pdf},
	author = {Raclavsk{\'y}, Ji{\v r}{\'\i}}
}
