@article {1065,
	title = {Searle on Emergence},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {19},
	number = {2},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {40-48},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {Searle{\textquoteright}s conception of ontological emergence is a basis for his explanation of mind and consciousness in the physical world. In this article, I try to show that a closer examination uncovers some possible ambiguities in Searle{\textquoteright}s conception of emergence. First, I try to show that Searle{\textquoteright}s distinction between emergent1 and emergent2 leads to a distinction between a strong and a weak interpretation of a causal consequence of interactions among constitutive entities and that from this point of view the existence of emergent2 is improbable only in the strong sense. Second, I attempt to clarify Searle{\textquoteright}s distinction between <i>explanation</i> and <i>deduction</i> of consciousness in his claim for the non-deducibility of consciousness . At the end I try to show in what sense is Searle{\textquoteright}s concept of emergence loaded with a form of mechanicism, one which is being abandoned in more recent ontological conceptions.},
	keywords = {consciousness, emergence, emergent property, mind, system property},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2012/2/40-48.pdf},
	author = {Havl{\'\i}k, Vladim{\'\i}r}
}
