<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vacek, Martin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Impossibilists’ Paradise on the Cheap?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Impossibilists’ Paradise on the Cheap?</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">David Lewis</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">impossible worlds.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modal realism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/3/283-301.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">283-301</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">English</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The aim of the paper is to discuss the ersatz theory of Lewis’s impossible worlds, point out its undeniable benefits and demonstrate its costs. Firstly, I present two approaches to Lewis’s impossible worlds taken as constructions out of possibilia. Secondly, I evaluate the proposals using the Lewisian criteria of success concerning the well defined conception of analysis. Although appealing, I do not find the proposals fully persuasive. Thirdly, I discuss the objection from an ad hoc distinction between possible and impossible worlds. I conclude that the objection does not present a special problem for the Lewisian theory. Finally, I motivate a theory of extended modal realism, to wit, modal realism enriched with concrete impossibilia.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">283301</style></custom3></record></records></xml>