@article {vlasakova_m2010:2080,
	title = {Zamy{\v s}len{\'\i} nad Fregovou definic{\'\i} {\v c}{\'\i}sla},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {17},
	number = {3},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {339-353},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {In his treatise Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Gottlob Frege tries to find a definition of number. First he rejects the idea that number could be a property of external (empirical) objects. Then he comes with a suggestion that a numerical statement expresses a property of a concept, namely it indicates how many objects fall under the concept. Subsequently Frege rejects, or at least essentially modifies, also this definition, because in his view that a number cannot be a property {\textendash} it should be an object. In this article, I try to show that Frege{\textquoteright}s first definition of number seems to be, despite his own opinion, much more promising than he supposed. I also argue that Frege{\textquoteright}s argumentation against the (possibly) empirical character of number is by no means convincing.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2010/3/339-353.pdf},
	author = {Vlas{\'a}kov{\'a}, Marta}
}
