@article {materna_p2000:132,
	title = {Dva druhy propozi{\v c}n{\'\i}ch postoj{\r u}},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {7},
	number = {3},
	year = {2000},
	pages = {243-256},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {The paper is based on transparent intensional logic. A sentence denotes a proposition (i.e., a function associating possible worlds and time points with truth-values) and expresses a construction in the sense of Tich{\'y}{\textasciiacute}s definition (reproduced in the paper). {\textquoteleft}Belief sentences{\textquoteright} refer to an attitude of some individual to the sense of the dependent clause, i.e., to the respective construction, which eliminates such problems as {\textquoteleft}paradox of omniscience{\textquoteright}. In the case of empirical dependent clauses we can observe that at least besides this relation to a construction one can define a relation of the subject to the state-of-affairs, represented by a proposition, i.e., by the denotation of the sentence. To stipulate such a kind of attitudes is justified by such cases where X says that (s)he believes that Chicago is smaller than Prague and Y refers to this X{\textquoteright}s belief saying that X believes that Prague is larger than Chicago.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2000/3/243-256.pdf},
	author = {Materna, Pavel}
}
