The problem of the epistemological status of logic is the core of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic. There are two known solutions to this problem: apriorism and aposteriorism. It appears that one solution or the other must be true. Scholars believe that the early Wittgenstein’s approach to the epistemological status of logic is a radical version of apriorism. The aim of the paper is to provide an adequate reconstruction of the later Wittgenstein’s solution. The main question is: Provided that there is a disagreement between the two Wittgenstein’s views of the epistemological status of logic, do we need to consider his later position as an example of aposteriorism? Our answer is: No. The later Wittgenstein’s position questions the conceptual framework of the whole philosophical discussion. His remarks on the epistemology of logic are directed against both apriorism and aposteriorism in the philosophy of logic.
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