Tha aim of the paper is to point out some of the characteristics of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as embodied in his vision of man and world and developed in his Phenomenology of Perception. The author focuses especially on Merleau-Ponty's criticism of several essential theses of J.-P. Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Merleau-Ponty tries to revitalize the bonds between those spheres of being, which in Sartre's vision are antithetical, and thus fully alienated. It should be remembered, however, that the essential problems of Phenomenology of Perception have their origins in his previous work, namely in The Structure of Behaviour (1942), in which they have been formulated independently of Sartre's vision.
*Príspevok je chránený zákonom o autorskom práve a právach súvisiacich s autorským právom (autorský zákon).