Detail príspevku/publikácie

Druhy nezhody a ich (semi)formálna rekonštrukcia

Filozofia, 2019, roč. 74, č. 9, s. 690-704.
Jazyk: Slovak
Súbor na stiahnutie: PDF*
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Naposledy zobrazené: 25.01.2020 - 08:51

Abstrakt

The phenomenon of doxastic (epistemic) disagreement pertains to contemporary discussions in epistemology. Moreover, a related notion of the difference of opinion (or standpoints) is at the centre of the theory of argumentation (cf. van Eemeren et al. 2014). In this paper, we propose a broader definition of argument which seems to serve a fruitful theoretical function in classifying different kinds of disagreement (difference of opinion). In particular, along with the well known categories of rebutting and undercutting arguments (cf. Pollock 1995; Besnard – Hunter 2008), we distinguish among various further kinds of disagreement which may be reconstructed by a (semi-)formal aparatus as competing arguments. As a result, we are able to represent not only competing justificatory arguments, but also arguments which underlie competing predictions and explanations. Hence, considerations on disagreement extend beyond the classical cases of counterarguments which have been analysed in the theory of argumentation.

Kľúčové slová

Argument, Competing arguments, Counterargument, Doxastic / epistemic disagreement, Types of disagreement