This paper deals with the epistemological claims of logic. Skepticism is a position in the philosophy of logic, according to which the „fundamental logical truths“ such as „Modus ponens is a valid rule of inference“, are unjustifiable. In his quest for a „plausible epistemology for logic“, Paul Boghossian subjected this position to an original criticism. He argues that the unique status of fundamental logical truths should also be justified. Otherwise, nothing can be really justified. He tries to demonstrate that, under such circumstances, the skeptical position does not represent „the stable platform to stand on“, either. The aim of this paper is to critically reconsider Boghossian’s attack on this position.
Claims of logic, Epistemology of logic, Fundamental logical truths, P. Boghossian, Realism, Rules of valid inference, Skepticism
*Príspevok je chránený zákonom o autorskom práve a právach súvisiacich s autorským právom (autorský zákon).