In this paper, I introduce a new aporia, the aporia of perfection. This aporia includes three claims: (1) Ought implies possibility, (2) We ought to be perfect, and (3) It is not possible that we are perfect. All these propositions appear to be plausible when considered in themselves and there are interesting arguments for them. However, together they entail a contradiction. Hence, at least one of the sentences must be false. I consider some possible solutions to the puzzle and discuss some pros and cons of these solutions. I conclude that we can avoid the contradiction that follows from (1) – (3) and still hold on to our basic intuitions, if we instead of (1) – (3) accept some slightly different propositions.
Aporia, Moral perfection, Ought-Implies-Can, Perfection, Unfulfillable obligations
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