Article/Publication Details

Do We Necessarily Need the Concept of Rule in Defining Social Phenomena?

(Original title: Potrebujeme pri vymedzovaní sociálnych fenoménov nevyhnutne pojem pravidla?)
Filozofia, 2012, vol. 67, No 7, pp. 582-591.
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The paper discusses the concept of rule and its role in understanding and defining social facts. On the background of the main objections against Winch’s conception of rule as the necessary and sufficient means for identifying a social phenomenon (M. Hollis, J. Bohmann, M. Gilbert) it questions the analogy between the linguistic activity, the Wittgensteinian conception of meaning and conceiving of agency as a meaningful social activity.


J. Bohmann, M. Gilbert, M. Hollis, Natural view, Rule following and the idea of social science, Rules as sufficient and necessary conditions for defining social phenomena, Social dependence, Social dependence of meaning and thought, Winch’s antinaturalism, Wittgensteinian approach to rule

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