The philosophy of dialogue has lain outside the main currents of modern philoso_phy for some time. This essay deals with the outlined conceptions of several dialogical thinkers. It examines a topical problem of the "radical other" and of the limits of intentionality. In the second part the author pays attention to the problem of the univisible forms of assimilation and appropriation of the other. The main part of the article seeks to show that dialogical thinkerś critique is rooted in the rejection of the one-sided (theoretical or practical) approach to the reality, especially to the unnoticed other. It is a claim, ignorated and drowned by the preclusive intends of theoretical or practical subject. It must be emphasised that the basic assumption (and the oldest myth) of the objective ontology is that of reality, which cannot resist and bid defiance to intends and ambitions of human "hunter of truth". The famous philosophers of the dialogue or of the other (Buber, Grisebach, Rosenzweig, Lévinas ect.) on the other side argued that (with respect to diachrony of time and diatopy of perspectives) not only inadvertency of situatedness of theoretical subject (relationality), but also objectivism´s forgetfulness of "other-side competences" should be strictly rejetced.