Article/Publication Details

Later Wittgenstein on Logical Rules

(Original title: Neskorý Wittgenstein o logických pravidlách)
Filozofia, 2011, vol. 66, No 2, pp. 109-121.
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In his remarks from later period, Ludwig Wittgenstein is frequently concerned with so-called external roots of our logical operations. He asks questions like: ‘How is anything like logical necessity possible?‘; ‚How is possible anything like following a logical rule under normal circumstances?‘; ‚Where is the compelling force of a logical proof coming from?‘; etc. In the philosophical community, it is generally accepted that the later Wittgenstein’s remarks deal with these questions, but the philosophical motivation behind these remarks is still not clear. Instead, there is a growing disagreement among various interpretations over these remarks. The present consideration is built upon the belief that Wittgenstein’s remarks try to communicate a new sense to us. I argue that, contrary to the generally accepted view, there is a new and positive sense in these remarks. My aim in this paper is to clarify the philosophical motivation behind them.

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