Article/Publication Details

High Standard Epistemology and the Appeal to Intuition

(Original title: High Standard Epistemology and the Appeal to Intuition)
Filozofia, 2009, vol. 64, No 7, pp. 680-692.
File to download: PDF*
BibTex EndNote Tagged EndNote XML RIS

Document Statistics:

Number of visits: 827
Number of visits today: 0
Last visit: 15.11.2019 - 17:15
PDF downloads: 456

Abstract

In the analytic tradition, the appeal to intuition has been a common philosophical practice that supposedly provides us with epistemic standards. I will argue that the high epistemological standards of traditional analytic philosophy cannot be pursued by this method. Perhaps within a naturalistic, reliabilistic frame intuitions can be evoked more coherently. Philosophers can use intuition as scientists do, in hypothesis- construction or data- collection. This is an ironic conclusion: Traditional analytic epistemologists rely on the appeal to intuition, but cannot justify it. Naturalists, on the other hand, are not that needy of such a method; yet they can better accommodate it within their view.

*The article is subject to copyright.