The paper departs from actual critical reception of Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s notion of truth (Wrathall/Malpas), according to which the failure of Tugendhat consist in his reduction of twofold character of truth (u nconcealment / proposition) on the level of propositional stance. The main thesis of the paper is that Tugendhat accepts this basic hermeneutical contribution of Heidegger, but he radically changes the relationship of both levels in the favour of propositio nal truth. This is possible only due to his analytical interpretation of the principle of non -contradiction – in the Heideggerian area of a relationship of yourself-to-yourself. The loss of critical dimension in the no tion of truth as “unconcealment” doesn’t primarily deal with the possibility of propositional truth in Being and Time – also as answer to Tugendhat’s critique, but has to do with the loss of critical responsibility in Heidegger’s concept of consciences. Tugendhat’s critique remains relevant because of hermeneutical situation, in which every “understanding of being” can be uncritically “uncovered” as truth “for itself”.
Idea of critical responsibility, Propositional truth, Twofold character of truth, Unconcealment