The paper deals with three problems concerning Cicero’s reflections on Chrysippus’ theory περι συµπαθείας in his De fato: 1) methodological differentiation between two types of sympatheia; 2) the critique of the stoic secondary causes; 3) the conception of powerful independent human will. The author comes to the conclusion that the sphere affected by sympatheia and secondary causes is with all probability divided by Cicero into two heterogeneous spheres: natura and fortuna. Due to this distinc-tion the everyday life activities are not determined by the stoic fatum any more. The conception of a powerful will gradually cultivated to be able to decide correctly and independently, is to underline his conviction. Further, other problematic theories incommensurable with independent human will can be thus rendered anew and more correctly.
Chrysippus, Cicero’s De Fato, Fate, Stoic συµπάθεια, Will