

was suggested by Aldo Iván Ramírez Abarca (a joint work with Jan Broersen). And that was the last talk of the day, and the last talk of the conference.

On the behalf of the organising committee it can be revealed that there is an incentive to organize a similar conference again in two years. The idea behind the first volume of this event was to bring deontic logic to Slovakia. However, the success of the event motivated the committee members to continue, and to set up the (more ambitious) goals for the future: to bring together deontic logicians with academics from different areas of logic and philosophy, such as modal metaphysics, theory of fiction, epistemic logic, hyperintensionality, and so on. Therefore, we hope to provide for an intriguing meeting of academics as well as topics in 2019.

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## References

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## Deflationism in Metaphysics December 15-16, 2017, University of Vienna<sup>1</sup>

Deflationism in philosophy is usually understood as a position according to which to utter a philosophical statement is to invoke that the statement is true, since truth plays no substantial role in philosophy. Deflationism in metaphysics is, by the same manner, to be understood as a position that to state a metaphysical statement is to state that the statement is true, period. Such (a family of) view(s) has provoked a large debate among metaphysicians and, unsurprisingly, the research program gathers philosophers from all corners of the world. The Emmy Noether

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Research Group Ontology After Quine: Fictionalism and Fundamentality (Ontologie nach Quine: Fiktionalismus und Fundamentalität), together with the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Vienna, organised an event focused on several aspects of deflationism in metaphysics. Bearing the same name, the workshop put together well-known philosophers working in metaphysics in general, its connection to truth in particular.

A line-up of the workshop included eight speakers. The first talk of the first day was given by Matti Eklund (Uppsala) entitled 'Personites and Existence'. Eklund stressed the significance of metaontological considerations in ethics and metaethics, and generalised it beyond the so-called personite problem. Jade Fletcher's (University of Leeds) 'Truth for Metaontological Deflationists' expressed an inclination to a specific easy-ontology-style conception of truth, given two requirements she identified. The last two talks were given by Tim Button (University of Cambridge) and Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Barcelona), discussing 'A Dogma of Contemporary Metaphysics' (in recorded version) and 'Substantive Metaphysical Debates about Gender and Race: Verbal Disputes and Metaphysical Deflationism' respectively.

The second day commenced with one of the organisers's talk, Delia Belleri (University of Vienna). In 'A Methodological Challenge to Deflationary Ontology', Belleri argued that either easy ontology 'changes the subject', or has the same difficulties as non-deflationary ontology. David Liggins's (University of Manchester) provided the audience with an excellent outline of Nicholas's Jones's argument for second-order realism, as well as well as challenges the argument faces. 'The Abductive Method and the Haecceities Argument for Necessitism' by Lukas Skiba (University of Hamburg) did both, looked at relevant theoretical virtues in the contingentism/necessitism debate, and scrutinised how they square with the Haecceities Argument. It is probably not a coincidence that the last slot belonged to the author of *Ontology Made Easy*. In her 'Conceptual Ethics and the Work of Metaphysics', Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth College) argued that metaphysics-first approaches to conceptual choice face several (epistemological) difficulties and, surprisingly or not, sketched a different one: the pragmatics-first approach.

Deflationism in Metaphysics workshop was a nice and successful event. The topic(s), speakers it hosted, after talks discussions and informal chats over the coffee breaks foreshadowed the direction towards which the debate may move. It is only to be seen whether the debate is on the right track.

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