

the role of a commentator, and Sergio Genovesi (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn), on a similar note, spoke about ‘Contingent Events’ (commented by Matthew Collier).

The last talk of the conference, the second keynote address, was delivered by Seahwa Kim. In her ‘Fictionalism, Modal Fictionalism and Truth in Fiction’, Kim discussed Jason Stanley’s objection that hermeneutic fictionalism is revolutionary fictionalism as well as Stephen Yablo’s if-thenism. She then argued that Stanley’s objection is based on the conflation of two usages of ‘hermeneutic vs. revolutionary’ and, subsequently, pointed out that fictionalism is incompatible with if-thenism. Finally, Kim commented on an ordinary notion of truth in fiction.

Issues on the (Im)Possible V picked on the previous conference’s temporal parts. Again, the presence of brilliant philosophers and personalities have made the organisers thinking about its future continuants. Readers thus should stay tuned and keep checking conference sites ([www.metaphysics.sk](http://www.metaphysics.sk)) which, beside the history of the Issues on the (Im)Possible, tracks and will track its further evolution.

*Martin Vacek*

### Current Trends in Deontic Logic November 22-24, 2017, Bratislava, Slovakia<sup>1</sup>

The first volume of the conference *Current Trends in Deontic Logic* was organized by the *Department of Logic and Methodology of Sciences* (Comenius University in Bratislava; D. Glavaničová, T. Kollárik, M. Zouhar), co-organized by the *Department of Analytic Philosophy* (Slovak Academy of Sciences; M. Vacek) and supported by the *Jan Hus Educational Foundation*. To our knowledge, it was the first conference on deontic logic in Slovakia.

A prelude to the conference was a seminar with Sven Ove Hansson. The seminar was devoted to the paper Hansson (2006) on the ideal-world construction in deontic logic and its criticism. In a nutshell, the crucial question is the following: Is it a good approach to analyse what we ought to do in terms of what we ought to

---

<sup>1</sup> ✉ Daniela Glavaničová

Department of Logic and Methodology of Sciences  
Comenius University in Bratislava  
Faculty of Arts, Gondova 2, 814 99 Bratislava, Slovak Republic  
e-mail: [dada.baudelaire@gmail.com](mailto:dada.baudelaire@gmail.com)

do in an ideal world (as the standard deontic logic and its siblings suggest)? Hansson argues that the answer is *no*. He abandons the standard approach and opts for a preference-based account instead. The above paper was introduced by Sven Ove Hansson himself, followed by commentaries (Zsófia Zvolenszky, Matteo Pascucci) and further discussed by the seminar participants.

The first official day of the conference was opened by Sven Ove Hansson's invited talk *The Intuitive Base of Deontic Logic*, which naturally continued the topic opened by the pre-conference seminar. How to isolate deontic concepts? How to analyse them formally? Standard analysis and its dyadic variant were introduced, their problems were exposed, and some alternative semantic constructions were considered.

The first contributed talk was given by Robert Trypuz and Piotr Kulicki, presenting about (multi-valued deontic) logics for normative conflicts, whilst self-driving cars were serving as a motivation. The next talk by Piotr Kulicki (a joint work with Xin Sun) was focused on the quantum imperative logic. After that, a sequence of three presentations devoted to hyperintensional deontic logic ensued. The first one was given by Federico L. G. Faroldi and Tudor Protopopescu. They employed Artemov's justification logic to analyse practical reasons. The second one was given by Daniela Glavaničová, who was talking about the hyperintensional logic of responsibility. The third talk was given by Albert Angelberger, who was talking about the analysis of free choice permission within the truth-maker semantics for deontic logic. The topic of the free choice permission reappeared with the talk by Igor Sedlár (a joint work with Frederik Van De Putte). After that, Zsófia Zvolenszky presented on common problems for the analysis of fictional and deontic discourse, focusing mainly on the analysis of conditionals. The last talk of the day was given by Stef Frijters (once more, a joint work with Frederik Van De Putte), who focused on the factual detachment.

The second official day of the conference started with the invited talk given by Olivier Roy, *Dynamic Logic of Power and Immunity*. As the title suggests, the talk was devoted mainly to Hohfeldian notions of power and immunity. Dynamic logic was employed, and the functioning of the model was illustrated by some legal examples.

The Hohfeldian theme continued with the presentation by Réka Markovich, who offered a formal representation of Hohfeld's categories. The next talk was given by Pere Pardo, who analysed obligations as maps on intentions. After that, Alessandra Marra presented about the Miners' Paradox, considering ways of determining when the Reasoning by Cases is a valid principle. The Miners' Paradox reappeared, and the analysis of oughts within the STIT logic without action types

was suggested by Aldo Iván Ramírez Abarca (a joint work with Jan Broersen). And that was the last talk of the day, and the last talk of the conference.

On the behalf of the organising committee it can be revealed that there is an incentive to organize a similar conference again in two years. The idea behind the first volume of this event was to bring deontic logic to Slovakia. However, the success of the event motivated the committee members to continue, and to set up the (more ambitious) goals for the future: to bring together deontic logicians with academics from different areas of logic and philosophy, such as modal metaphysics, theory of fiction, epistemic logic, hyperintensionality, and so on. Therefore, we hope to provide for an intriguing meeting of academics as well as topics in 2019.

*Daniela Glavaničová*

## References

HANSSON, S. O. (2006): Ideal Worlds – Wishful Thinking in Deontic Logic. *Studia Logica* 82, No. 3, 329-336.

## Deflationism in Metaphysics December 15-16, 2017, University of Vienna<sup>1</sup>

Deflationism in philosophy is usually understood as a position according to which to utter a philosophical statement is to invoke that the statement is true, since truth plays no substantial role in philosophy. Deflationism in metaphysics is, by the same manner, to be understood as a position that to state a metaphysical statement is to state that the statement is true, period. Such (a family of) view(s) has provoked a large debate among metaphysicians and, unsurprisingly, the research program gathers philosophers from all corners of the world. The Emmy Noether

---

<sup>1</sup> ✉ Martin Vacek

Institute of Philosophy  
Slovak Academy of Sciences  
Klemensova 19, 811 09 Bratislava, Slovakia  
e-mail: martinvacekphilosophy@gmail.com