ABSTRACT: The paper is based on a strict distinction between the notion of a person referred to by a fictional name, as uttered within a text of narrative fiction, and the notion of a fictional character. The literary functions of such a text require the reader to interpret the occurrences of a fictional name as records of utterances of that name by the narrator, referring to that individual which has been assigned that name at the beginning of the chain to which these utterances belong. This, according to the author’s view, provides proper basis also for interpretation of various kinds of extratextual use of fictional names. A literary character is, on the contrary, an element of a construction of a literary work and is identified by a set of requirements (e.g. of the kind mentioned above) imposed by the text’s literary functions on the reader. The author attempts to justify the assumption that the referential function of fictional names so understood is to be interpreted as directed to the actual world (rather than to an artificial world created by the writer), to specify the (rather limited) role reserved for pretense within this approach, to explain the implications of this account of fictional characters for the dispute between realists and anti-realists in this field etc.

KEYWORDS: Fictional name – literary character – fictional world – pretense.

Received: 3 April 2017 / Accepted: 27 July 2017

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1. The notion of literary functions

What follows is an extended version of a paper originally delivered at a conference in Bratislava in October 2016. Let me start in the same way as in that presentation, namely by a short comment on the conference title: *Semantics of fictional discourse*. I believe that it makes a good sense under a rather modest reading: there certainly are types or areas of discourse to which the term “fictional discourse” is quite naturally applicable and they certainly deserve careful semantic analysis. But the title can also be read as suggesting that there is a unique area of discourse called “fictional”, for which we are equipped with a commonly shared bunch of intuitions, in which proper names function in specific way, pretense plays specific role, the illocutionary force of utterances is modified in specific way etc. I am afraid that this picture is itself a kind of fiction, perhaps useful, perhaps misleading, perhaps both, depending on a given context. What I can see are types of situations, like reading a literary text of narrative fiction, following theatre performance, speaking about literary or dramatic characters, listening to somebody’s telling a joke etc., in which linguistic utterances fulfil specific functions which impose specific demands on the interpreters – and I cannot fail noticing that these functions and these demands are dramatically different. Without trying to interfere into the projects of my distinguished colleagues, I take it as a good reason for restraining my own aspirations – and my way of doing so in this paper will consist in focusing on literary texts of narrative fiction, the way we are supposed to interpret them and the discourse linked to them.

Now, even within this restricted field, I don’t think that we should start with discussing problems like the status of literary characters, their identity conditions, their completeness or incompleteness, the role of fictional names etc. According to my opinion, the basic question providing proper framework for addressing such issues is: what does the reader have to do (to assume, to accept, to imagine) in order to allow the text of narrative fiction to fulfill its literary functions? Moreover, I believe that substantial part of the talk about literary characters, including metatextual claims like

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2 I am grateful to the organizers, Marián Zouhar and his colleagues from the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, for the invitation to that exceptional meeting, and to the participants for inspiring criticism.
“Emma Bovary ruined her husband”, is precisely a talk about the demands just mentioned: about what we have to assume in order to allow Flaubert’s text to fulfill its literary functions.

Perhaps I should say a bit more to explain the prominent role I assign to the texts’ literary functions and to the demands they impose on the readers. Let me start with the trivial assumption that to read a text as a literary work of narrative fiction is to approach it as a bearer of certain literary functions and to make the interpretative moves required by these functions – the moves which will allow the text to function as such and such a piece of literature for us as its readers. The only thing which distinguishes literary functions from any other functions the text may have is that they together constitute the literary work represented by the text – indeed, I think it makes a good sense to approach the literary work as a structured complex of the text’s literary functions. The same function which counts as literary within such a complex, because it, in this framework, contributes to the constitution of a literary work, need not count as literary in another context. For instance, one of the functions of Balzac’s novel *The Splendors and Miseries of Courtesans*, making it (together with other functions) precisely that piece of literature it is, certainly is to show the situation in France in the restoration times, or, more specifically, to show what are the chances of a gifted but poor young man with high ambitions and not too strong moral scruples, trying to succeed in Paris in those times. It is symptomatic for Balzac’s project of *Studies (or: Scenes) of Parisian life* that this function is supported by an extensive historical material and will be blocked or at least seriously undermined if we are not ready to accept this material as reliable – and on this basis not just to pretend to believe, but to believe that Balzac’s narrator’s detailed descriptions of the structure of the police apparatus, of the role of the bills of exchange within the financial system etc. are true. Another function which can certainly be ascribed to *Splendors* is to engage the reader’s imagination, sensitivity and moral intuitions in following the tragic story of an ambitious young man – and a necessary condition for this function being efficient is to assume (this time in the *as if* mode) the existence of this person and to accept as a matter of fact (in the

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3 In what follows I will use the appendix “AI” to indicate the *as if* mode, e.g. in the form “to believeAI”, “the assumptionAI” etc. Sometimes, in particular when referring to
same mode) that he did the things described in the text. This includes a series of cooperative moves: for instance we should enable the sentence “Lucien signed the bill without hesitation”, as it appears in Balzac’s text, to fulfill its specific literary function, namely to establish the fictional fact that Lucien de Rubempré signed the relevant bill without hesitation – which requires that we assume that precisely this happened in the actual world.4

The fact that Balzac’s text imposes such requirements on the reader makes Lucien one of the characters of Balzac’s novel. Correlatively, the author can be said to have created the character named “Lucien” precisely in the sense that he wrote a text whose literary functions require the moves just mentioned. This formulation, as you can see, does not include any explicit reference to the author’s intentions and also does not ascribe any kind of pretense to him: it just speaks about the text’s requiring some pretense from the reader (we will return to this point in Section 7). And finally, the character named “Lucien” can be said to exist in that sense that there exists a text with literary functions which require us to assume that there exists a person with this name. The last sentence includes three occurrences of the term “to exist” which, apparently, should not be taken as referring to the same mode of existence. Let me take them in the reverted order:

other authors, I will use more common terms “to pretend”, “to make-believe” or “to imagine”, taking them as synonymous with “to believeAI”.

4 I hope that these two examples of literary functions (together with the next one related to Beckett, in Section 2) will make it clear why I don’t believe that it makes sense to strive at a general definition of a literary function, over and above the trivial remarks made at the beginning of this paragraph. Proposals with analogical aspirations made in the theory of fiction (like attempts to define fiction in terms of prompting an imaginative response) not only face obvious counterexamples but raise doubts about the prospects and value of any such enterprise (for a critical discussion see Friend 2008). In what follows I will focus on the function of presenting a story as told by a narrator, which (as we will occasionally see) can itself bear an inexhaustible variety of literary functions, each of them being potentially constitutive in that sense that it contributes to making a piece of narrative fiction the literary work it is. (This remark has been inspired by on an objection raised by one of the reviewers.)
(i) As readers of Splendors, we are supposed to assume, that there exists certain person (identified in a way we will discuss later), obviously not as a literary character but in the most ordinary mundane sense – in which for instance you could claim that there is a Rolls-Royce in your garage and I would pretend to believe you.

(ii) We assume the existence of a text which functions (or has a potential to function) as a literary work. The explanation of this mode of existence will depend on our position concerning certain not quite trivial issues, like the type-token distinction, the nature of linguistic conventions (if we take text as a sequence of expressions interpreted according to semantic conventions of some language) and the text-work relation. And the latter will involve us, among other things, into disputes concerning the role of the empirical author’s intentions and of the socio-cultural setting in the identification of the literary work (this issue will be briefly opened in Section 9).

(iii) The existence of a literary character is parasitic upon the existence of a text with certain literary functions, but not only that: it simply follows from the specification of these functions and it consists in these functions’ requiring certain moves from the readers, in the first place accepting certain existential assumption in sense (i).

Now, if we admit that the text, its literary functions and their parameters are abstract entities, we should not have any problem with admitting that literary characters are abstract entities as well: but we should be careful not to read into this claim more than what has been just said. To identify these entities is to specify certain moves required by literary functions of a literary text, similarly like to specify the meanings of expressions of a language spoken by some population is to describe the way they are used and interpreted in that population. As far as I can see, there is no need to make

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5 This corresponds to Amie Thomasson’s claim that “to accept that Austen wrote certain sentences in a novel pretending to refer to one Emma Woodhouse (not referring back to any actual person), but deny that she created a fictional character, is a mere distortion of ordinary usage” (Thomasson 2003, 149). I would just replace the reference to the author’s pretense by reference to reader’s pretense required by functions of the text (cf. Section 7).
further moves providing either meanings or literary characters with some more substantial metaphysical status.

There are various kinds of objections which can be raised by the realists concerning fictional characters: I will occasionally react to some of them in connection with some specific issues, but let me mention at least one of them right now. I mean the fact that we can quantify over fictional characters, e.g. in sentences like: “There are more craven than brave fictional characters”, which implies “There are fictional characters” (the example is borrowed from Friend 2007, 147). According to my understanding, what we claim when uttering such a sentence is this: “There are more cases in which a piece of fiction requires us to assume the existence of a craven person (as referred to in the fiction) than cases in which a piece of fiction requires us to assume the existence of a brave person.” The notion of fictional character has not disappeared here, it is encoded in the clause “requires us to assume the existence of”, and hence in the reference to requirements imposed on us by pieces of fiction. It should be clear that in this reading we do not interpret such quantified claims as made in the pretense-mode: they speak about pretense, but with full-blooded, unrestricted assertive force.

2. The principle $F$

I have suggested that the basic question we should start with, in order to create proper framework for the discussion about the role of proper names in the texts of narrative fiction, about the status of literary characters etc. is: what does the reader have to do in order to allow the text of narrative fiction to fulfill its literary functions?

Here is the general reply I propose as a starting point for discussing more specific topics:

/F/ The literary functions of a text of narrative fiction require that the reader approaches its sentences as records of utterances of an inhabitant of the actual world – the narrator, who tells us what happened in this world. 6

6 Obviously, this scheme applies only to narrative fiction in strict sense: the fictional content need not be presented to the reader as narrated, but, for instance, as a content of
Within this scheme, the interpretation of a text and its components, like fictional names, is pinned down to the actual world and to the narrator’s utterances (taking place in this world – as the reader is supposed to assume). Within the approach I am going to defend, this double linkage is crucial for the identification of the entities referred to in the texts of narrative fiction, for the solution of the completeness/incompleteness problem concerning these entities and for the explanation of completeness of the propositions expressed by sentences occurring in literary texts.

One might be tempted to add that the role of the reader further includes the presumption of the primary narrator’s credibility, which does not require justification, but can be withdrawn if the narrator proves to be (in some respect) unreliable. But it need not be the case and the narration can be construed so that it does not give us any chance to rely on what the narrator says – and correspondingly, the narrator himself does not raise any claim for our confidence. For instance, let us imagine that the literary text presents the world as a universal chaos and the narrator, his narrative tools and his narrative performance are construed as part and product of this chaos, as it is in Samuel Beckett’s late texts (cf. in particular Beckett 1979). In such a case, one of the basic literary functions of the text, namely to allow the reader to experience various aspects of the universal chaos, requires that the reader approaches the narrator as in principle unreliable – and Beckett’s narrator himself repeatedly points to his unreliability concerning not only the truthfulness of his claims but also the meaningfulness of his utterances. In short, while Balzac’s narrator proves his perfect condition on every page and certainly deserves the title “narrator in good shape”, Beckett’s narrator is the best example of the literary construct I suggest to call “narrator in decay” (cf. Koťátko 2016). This example shows that the question of the narrator’s reliability should be solved within the letters collected and published by an editor or as a content of somebody’s consciousness to which we are given direct access. Cf. Chatman (1978, chap. 4).

A narrator is called “primary” if her narrative performance is not embedded in a narrative performance of some other narrator.

For instance, Felix Martínez-Bonati assumes that accepting this assumption is a necessary condition for the meanings of the narrator’s utterances being fulfilled with images which constitute the fictional world of the literary work. Cf. Martínez-Bonati (1981, 31, 34, 129 et al.).
interpretation of particular texts rather than *a priori* on the level of the theory of narrative fiction. And I believe that several other issues frequently discussed by theorists of fiction should be approached in the same way, for instance the author–narrator distinction or the problem of the completeness–incompleteness of the narrated world and its inhabitants. Let me say a few words about the latter issue.

It seems indisputable that the literary functions of, let us say, Balzac’s *Splendors*, require us to approach Ester, Lucien, abbé Herera alias Vautrin etc. as human beings which are, precisely like us, complete in all respects obligatory for this kind of entities – and to assume that the narrator provides us with an incomplete description of these complete entities, precisely like we do it in everyday conversation when speaking about our neighbors. And, since the literary functions of the text require us to assume that the people as well as the places, events etc. referred to are complete, they *are* complete, in the only relevant sense in which the question of their completeness or incompleteness can be raised.9 If you ask how Balzac could have succeeded to create such complete entities, granted that he could provide us only with incomplete sets of descriptions, the reply is quite simple: he did so by writing a text whose functions require us to approach the entities referred to as complete. And, granted our principle $F$, approaching people, places, events etc. spoken about in Balzac’s text as complete does not require any special move: it is included in our interpreting the text as speaking about the actual world – provided that we regard this world as complete (in that sense that any possible state of affairs either is or is not a fact in this world).

But precisely this last assumption cannot be generalized for all kinds of narrative fiction. It seems fairly right to claim that the persons referred to in Beckett’s *Trilogy* are incomplete beings – indeterminate in substantial respects, including their personal identity: since it belongs to the literary functions of Beckett’s text that it confronts us precisely with such a picture of human beings and of the world they inhabit. “My heroes are falling to bits,” says Beckett, when explaining his difference from Kafka (cf. Shenker

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9 Cf. Stacie Friend’s remark that “for the anti-realist there is no contrast between what Anna (Karenina) is really like and how we imagine her to be” (Friend 2007, 152). I would just modify the last clause to “how we are required (by the text’s literary functions) to imagine her to be”.

and the reader is not given any reason to assume that she could assemble complete human beings from these bits, if she were allowed to collect all of them (i.e. if she had access to all the relevant information missing in the text). This confrontation of Balzac and Beckett is intended to show that the question of completeness or incompleteness of the persons referred to in narrative fiction cannot be solved on the level of a general theory of literary fiction: it should be raised over and over again within the interpretation of particular texts.\[^{10}\]

### 3. The actual world and the narrative fiction

So, I conclude that the general specification of the moves required from the reader by literary functions of a text of narrative fiction, as it is presented in our principle $F$, should not be complemented by any appendix concerning issues like the assumption$_{AI}$ of the primary narrator’s credibility or the assumption$_{AI}$ of the completeness of the entities spoken about in the text. But there is a much more controversial aspect of the principle $F$ than its apparent need for complementation, which deserves special attention because of its important implications. I mean the assumption that a text of narrative fiction directs our thought (as well as our imagination and our sensitivity) to the actual world, and that it does so quite straightforwardly (rather than through analogies, allusions etc.). According to this assumption, the author does not construct a new, artificial world: instead, she creates a text whose literary functions are anchored in and directed to the actual world and typically (but not necessarily) require us to assume$_{AI}$ that this world in some respects differs from what we believe to be the case outside the scope of the as if operator.\[^{11}\]

This may look like a revolt against the familiar jargon of possible worlds, but let us recall the lesson given to us by the author who introduced

\[^{10}\] Let me add, with gratitude, that I have benefited a lot from my discussion with Göran Rossholm on this topic (cf. Rossholm 2015).

\[^{11}\] In other words: instead of saying “We readers imagine that what is actual is a story-world” (Currie 2003, 147) one should say “We readers imagine that the story takes place in the actual world”.
possible worlds apparatus into modern semantics. In the opening paragraphs of *Naming and Necessity*, Saul Kripke attempts to calm down our philosophical temperament and imagination, which could be encouraged by the term “possible world” – by insisting that possible worlds are simply “total ‘ways the world might have been’” (Kripke 1972, 18). And he makes us sure that if we have (any kind of) problems with the term “possible worlds”, nothing will be lost if we speak about “possible states or histories of the world” instead. Following this advice, we can replace the popular claim that the author creates a new world (the fictional world of her novel) with a much less spectacular claim that the author invites us to imagine and accept as actual an alternative state of the world we live in.\(^{12}\) I believe that in this way we can reduce the danger mentioned also by Kripke, namely the possibility that our theoretical work will collapse to solving problems generated by the apparatus we have chosen.\(^{13}\)

For instance, if we resign on the creationist vocabulary of fictional worlds, we will not have to make intricate theoretical moves to explain how fiction and the thought and imagination generated by it works, in contrast to how our thought and imagination works when directed to the actual world – and then make other no less intricate moves to solve the problems generated by this construction, e.g. to reconcile our doctrine with the hardly resistible intuition that the authors of narrative fiction are trying to say something about how things go in our world. For example, that Balzac is trying to show us in *Splendors*, among other things, the rules governing the life of the high Paris society in the restauration time and that Beckett is trying to show us in his *Trilogy* what space does the world in which we live leave for meaningful action and mutual understanding.

In general, if we accept the principle \(F\) as the starting point and correspondingly assent to the equation:

\(^{12}\) I have defended this approach in polemics with representatives of the fictional worlds theory, in English e.g. in Koťátko (2014). I find my views very close to the position recently presented in Friend (2016).

\(^{13}\) “Certainly the philosopher of ‘possible worlds’ must take care that his technical apparatus does not push him to ask questions whose meaningfulness is not supported by our original intuitions of possibility that gave apparatus its points” (Kripke 1980, 18).
the world the narration is about = the world in which the narration takes place = the world in which we follow the narration = the actual world of our life,

then we, as the readers of narrative fiction, as well as the theorists of fiction can simply adopt a set of intuitively plausible (if not trivial) assumptions which would otherwise require special moves from the reader (like “recen-tering” and “transportation”, cf. e.g. Ryan 2010) and special justification from the theorist. For example, we can take for granted that the sentences uttered by the narrator and by the people she speaks about are sentences of one of the natural languages spoken in our world, for instance sentences of French, rather than sentences of some fictional language spoken in the fic-
tional world of, let us say, Madame Bovary. No transportation of the con-
tentions of French (as they evolved in the actual world from Latin and other roots) to another world is needed for justifying our reliance on our competence in French when interpreting the text.

4. Fictional names

Within this framework we can automatically assume that the names we find in a text of narrative fiction function in the same way as the names we use in everyday conversation. For the theorist studying the semantics of narrative fiction this implies that if she accepts, for instance, Kripke’s causal theory of names for ordinary discourse, she should automatically apply it also to fictional texts. Granted the principle , there is no space left for such a theorist for hesitating between the causal theory and its rivals. And since this is also my case, I am committed to the following principle:

\[ \text{The occurrence of an expression which behaves like a proper name in the text of narrative fiction indicates that the reader should suppose that in this stage of narration the narrator utters a proper name to refer to that individual which has been assigned that name at the beginning of the chain to which this narrator’s utterance belongs.} \]

This formulation is, admittedly, not too elegant: for most purposes it should be enough to say that we take the narrator as uttering a name to speak
about the person referred to by that name in his community – if we abstract from the fact that the same name (identified purely phonologically or orthographically) has usually more bearers. Needless to stress, the principle $F$ implies that the names used in everyday communication to refer to countries, cities, mountains, statesmen etc. do not change their referential function if they appear in a fictional text: since the universe of discourse remains the same as in everyday conversation, namely the actual world.

On the level of theoretical debates, the way in which proper names function in fiction is indeed open for discussion (and I have profited a lot from exchanges concerning this issue with Manuel García-Carpintero and Zsófia Zvolenszky, cf. e.g. García-Carpintero 2015, Zvolenszky 2015). But the reader, I suppose, spontaneously approaches the names in the text of narrative fiction in the way she is accustomed to from everyday communication: that means that she assumes (although in the as if mode) that the persons spoken about were given their names quite independently of the narrator’s performance, were then continuously referred to by means of those names and the narrator simply joins this practice. This assumption$_{AI}$ is applied automatically (which means that it doesn’t require justification), unless it is blocked by some special narrator’s move. For instance, the narrator can remark that “for understandable reasons” she changed the names of the protagonists. Alternatively, the narrator may in a metafictional, self-disclosing remark explicitly present her hero as a fictional construct with a fictitious name. So, in the First Chapter of the novel *Waverley* the narrator (on this occasion, I would say, coinciding with the empirical author, i.e. Walter Scott), overtly introduces the reader into his considerations which led him to choosing the name *Waverley* for his hero.$^{14}$ Obviously, in such remarks the occurrences of a name in the literary text are not presented as part of a chain of uses of that name, originating in an act of baptism independent of the narrator’s performance. But we, as cooperative readers accepting rules of the game, are still invited to approach$_{AI}$ the name and its occurrences in this way, because it has been introduced into the game precisely with this function, despite the ostentatious and self-disclosing form of this introduction.

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$^{14}$ I use the word “hero” as a term for the person spoken about by the narrator, rather than as a synonym for “character”.

5. Identification of the persons referred to in fiction and identification of fictional characters

But let’s focus on more straightforward cases like, e.g., the name “Emma”, as it appears in the text of *Madame Bovary*. The interpretation of its occurrences as records of the narrator’s utterances of that name, in which the narrator joins a chain of uses located in the actual world, provides us with a simple principle of the identification of the person we are thinking about under the name “Emma” when reading Flaubert’s text. It is the person uniquely satisfying the description (\(D\)) “the person to whom the name ‘Emma’ has been assigned at the beginning of the chain to which these narrator’s utterances belong”. The world to which this description is to be applied is fixed in advance as the actual world – by our locating the narrative performance and the entities referred to by the narrator into this world. So we are not confronted with any problem of the kind discussed by Gregory Currie (in Currie 2003): namely that such a description identifies various individuals in various “story worlds” of *Madame Bovary* (that means in those possible worlds in which everything said in the novel by the primary narrator is true). And we are not forced to conclude, following Currie, that the expression “Emma Bovary”, as it appears in Flaubert’s text, does not work as a name of an individual but rather as a name of “Emma-role”, which is a function from possible worlds to individuals.

The identificatory force of the description \(D\) is parasitic upon the reference to the narrator’s utterances and to the general mechanism of functioning of names. This, I believe, makes this way of identification safe against the problems potentially connected with the so called “individuation just by names”: here we have a case of individuation by names as uttered by particular speaker in particular circumstances. So, when equipped with our parasitic description \(D\), we can be sure that we are thinking and speaking (in the *as if* mode) about “the right Emma”, despite the fact that the same name plays a prominent role also in Jane Austen’s famous novel (Stacie Friend mentions this problem, addressing it to antirealists concerning fictional characters; see Friend 2007, 145). 15 To be sure, the identity of the

15 Similarly for the cases in which the narrator refers to a person by means of a description. The identification based on the occurrence of the description “the man in the
referents of the name “Emma”, taken$_A$ as used by Flaubert’s narrator, and
the name “Emma”, taken$_A$ as used by Austen’s narrator, is not thereby ex-
cluded: this possibility is just left open, as it should be. (Before starting to
read Flaubert’s text we cannot exclude that its literary functions require that
the utterances of “Emma” to be found there are interpreted$_A$ as referring
to the same person as the utterances of “Emma” in Austen’s text.) Simi-
larly, this approach leaves open the possibility that different names, taken$_A$
as uttered by different narrators, should be interpreted$_A$ as referring to the
same person, if it is required by the literary functions of at least one of the
texts in question – as it is e.g. with Homer’s “Ὀδυσσεύς”, Vergilius’ “Uly-
ses” and Dante’s “Ulisse” (cf. the discussion of this case in Friend 2014; I
will return to the problem of co-identification later). Finally, this approach
excludes actual persons bearing the name “Emma Bovary” as well as per-
sons satisfying non-parasitic descriptions based on Flaubert’s novel (like
“the only daughter of a farmer from Les Bertaux, wife of a doctor from
Yonville” etc.) from being acceptable candidates for the status of the per-
son the novel is about – unless we have a reason to believe that the literary
functions of Flaubert’s text require us to relate the narrator’s utterances to
any such person.

But this does not mean that the parasitic description $D$ is just an artificial
construct designed to keep apart fiction and non-fiction (where it is needed)
or to solve other potential problems of the theory of literary fiction: since
this parasitic way of identification is frequently applied in everyday con-
versation as well. For instance, if I witness a conversation in which the
participants use the name “John Smith” and I am not certain who of the
hundreds of bearers of this name is spoken about, I can still identify the
object of conversation quite precisely by means of parasitic description
“the person referred to in this conversation as ‘John Smith’”. In many cases
I would, for practical reasons, prefer having a device of identification less
bound to particular utterances made by particular speakers in particular sit-
uations, like “the present dean of the Philosophical Faculty of Charles
corner” in a text of narrative fiction has the form of an extended metalinguistic descrip-
tion: “the person uniquely satisfying the description ‘the man in the corner’ as used by
the narrator of this utterance”. Here, the reference to the narrator’s utterance eliminates
problems with multiple occurrences of this description on various places of the text, or
in other texts (cf. Friend 2007, 146, 149).
University”. But this does not question the identificatory force of the parasitic description available to me, that is its ability to pick out precisely one individual (provided that the conversation I witness has a determinate subject). And similarly in case of reading Flaubert’s novel. I assume_{AI} that there is a person uniquely satisfying the parasitic description “the person referred to by these narrator’s utterances of the name ‘Emma’” (which can be unpacked in the Kripkean way mentioned above), and it is the person identified in this way to whom I attach various non-parasitic descriptions I collect when reading Flaubert’s text. According to this picture, the burden of the identificatory task lies on the parasitic description bound to the narrator’s utterances and to the general mechanism of referential functioning of names, rather than on the bunch of non-parasitic descriptions provided by the text. Hence we can disagree about Emma’s properties without putting in doubt the presumption that we are speaking about the same: about properties of the person we assume_{AI} as the referent of the narrator’s utterances and to the general mechanism of referential functioning of names, rather than on the bunch of non-parasitic descriptions provided by the text. Hence we can disagree about Emma’s properties without putting in doubt the presumption that we are speaking about the same: about properties of the person we assume_{AI} as the referent of the narrator’s utterances of the name “Emma”. Unlike Stacie Friend I would not put it so that “we intersubjectively identify characters even if we disagree about them” (Friend 2007, 146); instead, I would say that we intersubjectively identify_{AI} a person and connect two different characters with Flaubert’s novel. Let me explain this point.

It should be clear that what I have been speaking about until now is not a way of identifying Emma as a fictional character:^{16} I have described a way in which the reader can think about Emma as about a real human being of flesh and bones, rather than as about a fictional character. The informational content involved in the parasitic identification based on the description $D$ is indeed extremely poor, but this should not disturb us: our question is whom we are thinking about, not how she is like. As attentive readers, we learn something about her from every new page of the book, but we think about her from the very first occurrence of her name in the text. On the other hand, to identify Emma as a fictional character is, within this

^{16} It should not be confusing to use the same name “Emma Bovary” both for the literary character and for the young lady we are supposed to assume_{AI} as existing in the actual world, we just should keep in mind that they are not bearing the name in the same way. We assume_{AI} that there exists a real person referred to by this name in the same way in which we are referred to by our names; and we use the same name for the literary character constituted (among other things) by this assumption.
account, to identify certain parameter of the literary functions of Flaubert’s text, precisely speaking, of the requirements imposed by these functions on the reader.\textsuperscript{17} Basically, this amounts to providing a list of assumptions the reader is required to makeAI in order to let the text fulfill its literary functions for her. In Emma’s case, the list will include:

\begin{enumerate}
\item the assumption that there exists precisely one person referred to by the narrator’s utterances of the name „Emma“ (namely the person to whom that name has been assigned at the beginning of the chain to which these utterances belong);
\item the assumption that that person (the person uniquely satisfying the description specified above) married a young doctor called Charles Bovary;
\end{enumerate}

etc.

The fact that the literary functions of Flaubert’s text require the reader to accept\textsubscript{AI} these assumptions constitutes Emma as a literary character with all its specific features, i.e. makes it what it is: such and such literary construct distinct from all other characters known to us from literature, drama, film or computer games, and of course distinct from theoretical constructs, legal constructs, etc. As far as I can see, there is no need to endow it with some metaphysically more substantial way of being in order to solidify its ontological status.

So, when I say that the parasitic description “the person referred to by the narrator’s utterances of the name ‘Emma’” provides the reader with a way of thinking about Emma, I do not mean that what is identified in this way is Emma as a fictional character. And, of course, I do not want to claim that there is some real person identified in this particular way. What I mean is that the availability of such a description makes the reader’s thoughts about a person called “Emma” quite determinate, complete or saturated at least with respect to the identification of their object. Put in terms of the

\textsuperscript{17} This obviously means to identify a component of the actual world: the fictional character called “Emma Bovary” exists in the actual world due to the fact that there is a text whose literary functions require us to assume\textsubscript{AI} the existence of a woman with that name, not as a literary character but as a being of flash and bones (cf. Section 1). So, I would say precisely the opposite to Anthony Everett’s claim: “Fictional characters exist in stories, not in the real world” (Everett 2013, 132).
adverbial account of reference (cf. e.g. Kriegel 2007), one can say that what acquires in this way a determinate content is the reader’s “thinking Emma-wise” or, equivalently, the reader’s “Emma-ward-esque thoughts”. This way of speaking does not commit us to there being any entity thought about or spoken about when one thinks or speaks about Emma.18

On the other side, even if the referential mechanism we are supposed to connectAI with the name “Emma” does not relate Flaubert’s text, nor our thoughts accompanying our reading the text, to any real or fictional entity, it plays an essential role in our assumptionAI that the text is related to a person called “Emma” existing in the actual world. It might be illuminating to compare this with the general aspirations of the non-relational theory of reference represented in the most inspiring way by Mark Sainsbury and Uriah Kriegel (cf. Sainsbury 2012, Kriegel 2007 and criticism in Koťátko 2014). Reference by means of fictional names (as they are used in texts of narrative fiction) is indeed non-relational, because it does not establish relation to any kind of entities referred to. But at the same time it confirms the primacy of the relational notion of reference, because the very determinedness of the reference by means of fictional names includes the assumption (although made in the as if mode) that it relates us to some real entities: that there are real persons, places, situations, events etc. the narration is about. Hence even the fictional reference, if understood in this way, undermines the universal pretensions of the non-relational account of reference. And, to be sure, our thoughts and claims about Emma as a literary character (like “Emma is the most famous Flaubert’s character”) are standard relational thoughts and claims about certain parameters of Flaubert’s text.

This may seem to contradict to our common way of speaking. When we are asked to characterize some literary character, e.g. Emma Bovary, we usually say things like: it was a charming, sensitive, ambitious, self-centered, frivolous etc. young woman – saying thereby things which cannot be

18 I take the following Stacie Friend’s words as pointing in the same direction: “Yet there is a reason to think that an anti-realist account is required independently of issues to do with fiction and fictional characters, since there are a wide variety of domains in which we seem to be talking or thinking about the same thing even when there is no thing we are talking or thinking about. Once we have such an account, it is not clear why we need fictitious objects” (Friend 2007, 154).
straightforwardly ascribed to a text or its parameters but only to a real human being. But there is no confusion or category mistake behind this way of speaking: it is just one example of an indirect predication, in which the property specified in the predicate term is not straightforwardly ascribed to the referent of the subject-term, but to another entity related to it in some easily identifiable way. In our case we characterize certain construct (literary character) by enumerating some of the moves constituting the construct, namely the assumptions$_{AI}$ required by the literary text, which together produce an image of a young woman bearing the name “Emma Bovary” with the properties mentioned, presented$_{AI}$ as an image of a real human being. The enumeration of properties ascribable only to concrete individuals can serve as a characteristics of a literary character only within this (typically implicitly assumed) framework.

6. **Fictional names: extra-textual use**

We have approached fictional characters as certain parameters of the literary functions of the texts of narrative fiction and admitted that this justifies their classification as abstract entities. We have found no motivation for postulating any other, metaphysically more substantial (and philosophically more appealing) kind of abstract entities to play the role of fictional characters, but the reason might have been that we have neglected some contexts in which people speak about fictional characters – some important levels of fictional discourse. But I think this is not the case, at least with respect to the kinds of use of fictional names frequently discussed under the title “paratextual” and “metatextual” and also with respect to negative

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19 Similarly: when saying about some symphony that it is noisy we mean that its standard performances are noisy, when saying that some sentence is clever we mean that the thought it expresses is a result of a clever way of thinking etc.

20 Another way of putting this would be to say that Emma as a character encodes (rather than exemplifies) the properties of the kind mentioned, borrowing the well-known terminology from Zalta (1988). I owe a lot to Marián Zouhar’s discussion about the merits and limits of Zalta’s encoding–exemplifying distinction in Zouhar (2016).

21 This part of the paper has been inspired by recent discussion with Zsofia Zvolenszky (cf. Zvolenszky 2015).
existential claims, in which fictional names appear. The interpretation of these cases I am suggesting does not add anything new to the approach I have been advocating above: hence I will be quite brief (with some exceptions).

(1)  **Paratextual use:**

“Emma ruined her husband.”

This can be quite naturally paraphrased by means of some fiction-operator, like:

(1’)  In Flaubert’s novel, Emma ruined her husband.

But the real point at issue is how to interpret this paraphrase: the principle $F$ suggests to unpack it in the following way:

(1’’)  The literary functions of Flaubert’s novel require us to assume$_{AI}$ that there exists a person referred to by the narrator as “Emma” and that that person ruined her husband.

That certainly does not commit us to the existence of any abstract entity called “Emma”, over and above our approaching the literary character called “Emma” as a parameter of the functions of the text. Obviously, it makes sense to say: Emma is one of the persons we have to assume$_{AI}$ as existing, in order to make sense of Flaubert’s novel. But this does not include any hypostasis: it amounts to saying that the literary functions of Flaubert’s text impose such and such demands on us. Stacie Friend has pointed out (in Friend 2007, 143) that if we take the name “Emma Bovary” (her example is “Candide”) as an empty term, the sentences containing it will not be able to express a complete proposition whether or not they are prefixed by a fiction operator. But within the approach suggested here, the term “Emma Bovary” does not come out as empty: when reading the text, i.e. in our confrontation with the name’s textual use, we are supposed to interpret$_{AI}$ it as a device of the narrator’s reference to a real person. And

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22 And correlative: “If statements apparently about Hamlet are not really about anything, if nothing we say about Hamlet is true, what is the point of talking about him? The anti-realist owes us an explanation of the function of fictional discourse” (Friend 2007, 143).
if it is used within a talk about a piece of literary fiction, it refers to certain parameter of that fiction, in a way which is made explicit in our analysis.

(2)  *Negative existential claims:*

“Emma does not exist.”

Here I opt for the following metalinguistic paraphrase:

(2’) The word “Emma”, *as it appears in Flaubert’s text*, does not have any referent in the actual world (i.e. it is not a proper name of any real person).

This paraphrase is, due to the clause in italics, perfectly compatible with the possibility that (a) there is (in the actual world) a person called “Emma”, (b) there is a person satisfying all the Emma-descriptions we find in Flaubert’s text and (c) there exists another text of narrative fiction in which the name “Emma” is (similarly like “Rouen” in Flaubert’s text) used to refer to a real entity.

(3)  *Metatextual claims:*

“Emma is a fictional entity.”

The interpretation I am suggesting combines elements of the paraphrases of (1) and (2):

(3’) The expression “Emma”, *as it appears in Flaubert’s text*, does not have any referent in the actual world, but the literary functions of the text require that we assume the opposite.

The clause in italics plays here the same role as in (2): it makes our claim compatible with some possibilities which no sound interpretation should exclude. As this paraphrase shows, I do not share the view that metatextual uses of fictional names require introducing fictional characters as abstract entities into our ontology – over and above what has been said about the existence of fictional characters as parameters of literary functions of texts of narrative fiction (cf. e.g. van Inwagen 1977; Kripke 2011; Zvolenszky 2015).

In this reading, the metatextual claim (3) implies the negative existential claim (2), since (3) is here interpreted as claiming that Emma is a *mere*
fictional character – which is, I suppose, the intuitively most natural reading. But let us imagine that somebody utters the sentence

(3a) Napoleon is a fictional character of War and Peace

without intending to imply that the name “Napoleon”, as it occurs in War and Peace, should not be read as referring to the real emperor we have heard about in the school lessons of history. I think this use of (3a) makes a good sense and the appropriate paraphrase would then be:

(3a’) The text of War and Peace requires the reader to assume that there exists a real person referred to by occurrences of the name “Napoleon” in that text.

The assumption behind this suggestion is that even if the name “Napoleon” is uttered in War and Peace with its standard referential function, it makes still good sense to speak about Napoleon also as about Tolstoy’s fictional character. Then we should distinguish:

(a) the person referred to by utterances of Napoleon in the text of War and Peace – which is the real emperor referred to by historians as “Napoleon I”;

(b) the fictional character named “Napoleon”, identified by a set of assumptions required by the text from the readers, including:

(i) There exists a person referred to by the narrator’s utterances of the name “Napoleon”.

(ii) That person is identical with the emperor referred to by historians as “Napoleon I” (in other words: the narrator and the historians participate in the same chain of uses of the name “Napoleon”).

(iii) That person defeated Russians and Austrians at Austerlitz.

(iv) That person saw and commented the half-dead body of Andrei Bolkonski on the Austerlitz battlefield.

Etc.

It might be objected against our analysis of the cases (1), (2) and (3) that it turns claims about non-linguistic objects to claims about language.
But it depends on how you decide to specify the topic of these claims: I understand them as claims about the world including (as part of the specification of their content) metalinguistic elements. The negative existential claim says that the world is such that it does not include any person referred to by certain name, as it is used in certain text. And the metatextual claim adds to this that the world nevertheless includes a piece of fiction which requires the acceptance $A_{AI}$ of an opposite existential assumption.

(4) **Claims about intertextual identity:**

(a) “Dante’s Ulisse is identical with Homer’s Odysseus.”

(b) “Dante’s Ulisse is different from Homer’s Odysseus.”

Before commenting on these claims let me say a few preliminary words related to Stacie Friend’s presentation of this case (in Friend 2014). The question is: is Dante’s Ulisse (referred to in the 26th Canto of *Inferno*) identical with Homer’s Odysseus? As Stacie Friend rightly points out, this issue is purpose-relative and context-sensitive (cf. Friend 2014, 321). In other words, this question can be understood as introducing quite different problems to be solved: hence we should not be surprised that we can be given incompatible, and yet intuitively plausible and fully justified replies. From my point of view we have to distinguish two readings of the question. One concerns the identity or non-identity of the *person* we are required to assume as being referred to by occurrences of “Ulisse” in Dante’s text with the *person* we are required to assume as being referred to by occurrences of “Ὀδυσσεύς” in Homer’s text. The other reading concerns Dante’s and Homer’s *literary characters*. So, we have in fact two different questions, which I would articulate in the following way:

(1) Do the literary functions of Dante’s *Inferno* require that we take $A_{AI}$ the occurrences of the name “Ulisse” as referring to the same person as the occurrences of the name “Ὀδυσσεύς” in *Odysseia*?

(2) Is Dante’s Ulisse the same character as Homer’s Odysseus?

I suppose everybody will agree that the reply to the first question is “yes”, while the reply to the second is “no”. Dante’s literary character named “Ulisse” is an element of the literary construction of *The Divine Comedy* and to identify this element is to specify the requirements it imposes on the
reader. In particular, Dante’s text requires the reader to accept a series of assumptions, including:

(a) There exists (in the actual world) a person referred to by the occurrences of the name “Ulisse” in the text.

(b) That person is identical with the person referred to by the occurrences of the name “Ὀδυσσεύς” in Homer’s Odysseia.

(c) That person suffers in the eighth circle of the hell in one flame with Diomedes.

Etc.

This list gives a clear reply to both questions raised above: it is certainly different from the list of requirements connected with the name “Ὀδυσσεύς” in Homer’s Odysseia. There are some overlaps (for instance the readers of both texts are required to believe that the person referred to by the relevant name spent some time in the company of an enchantress called “Kirke”), but there are also incompatible requirements (in one case we are required to believe that the hero returned to Ithaca, met again his wife, son, old dog etc., in the other case we are required to believe that the hero never returned home and instead died on the sea). At the same time, the Inferno-list includes requirement that the reader identifies his hero with that of Odysseia: otherwise she would not make proper sense of the 26th Canto of Inferno.

Analogically, imagine a commercial in which a body-builder dressed in a (synthetic) piece of lion skin, armed with a monstrous mace and calling himself “Hercules” suddenly appears in a supermarket and loudly demands his favorite yoghurt. Again, it seems clear that we are supposed to assume that it is the same person as the one referred to in Greek myths by the name “Ἡρακλῆς”, in other words, that the same man who killed the Nemean Lion, Learnean Hydra, Stymphalian Birds and countless other creatures is now asking for his yoghurt – otherwise the intended effect would not work. But at the same time, the character of the sketch differs from the character of the myth, precisely because of the yoghurt affair (i.e. for similar reasons as in the Ulysses’ case).

Finally, let’s take the Pierre Menard case from Borges’ famous story. Here we will probably agree with Borges’ narrator and numerous
commentators that the main character of Cervantes’ novel *El ingenioso hidalgo Don Quixote de la Mancha* and the main character of Pierre Menard’s novel bearing the same title are different, as is the whole construction of the novels, despite their texts being word by word identical. But unlike in Ulysses’ case, I don’t see any reason why we should, as readers of Menard’s novel, assume that the name “Quixote”, as uttered by Menard’s narrator, refers to the same person as the name “Quixote”, as uttered by Cervantes’ narrator. What is clear is just that the construction of Menard’s novel includes reference to Cervantes’ novel: the identity of their texts and the contrast of the literary projects is indeed something the Menard’s reader is supposed to be aware of and to appreciate.

(5) *Intentional transitive constructions:*

“I pity Emma.”

I think that the proper interpretation of this case should start with the question: how would I explain the claim I intend to make in uttering this sentence, when asked e.g.: “What are you speaking about? Whom do you claim to pity?” The proper reply would of course depend on the kind of challenge behind this question. In our present context, I would probably say something like this: “Flaubert’s novel will make sense to me as a piece of narrative fiction only if I imagine, or pretend to believe, that there exists a person referred to by the narrator as ‘Emma’, who did such and such things and to whom such and such things happened. I have imagined that and it made me feeling pity.” It should be clear that what I pity here is a person of flesh and bone I am supposed to imagine as existing, not a literary character: the literary character named “Emma” is an ingenious literary construct which I can only admire. Stacie Friend has pointed out, when speaking about sentences like (5), that according to realists “the best explanation of these phenomena is that we are thinking and talking about fictional objects” (Friend 2007, 147). But a natural response to a realist claiming this would be that we certainly don’t pity fictional objects. We, in conformity with the requirements imposed on us by the functions of literary texts, assume that there are certain persons who behaved in certain ways and certain things happened to them – and this induces certain emotional response.
7. The role of pretense

It should be clear that neither the paratextual statement nor the metatextual statement nor other kinds of statements we have been just discussing are, under this interpretation, made in the as if (or pretense) mode. They are full-blooded statements about Flaubert’s novel which, if made sincerely, manifest beliefs (rather than make-beliefs) of the speaker. Stacie Friend has pointed out that “Whether or not we accept realism, we must allow pretense a significant role in explaining thought and discourse about fictional characters” (Friend 2007, 154). I agree that this role is significant, but would like to add that it is also quite narrow:23 in my account, pretense is involved just as a requirement imposed on readers by the literary functions of the text. 24 When speaking about fictional characters in (for instance) metatextual claims we do not continue in this pretense and there is no reason for doing so: we make straightforward, serious claims about the literary functions of a text. And, as I have already noted (in Section 1), when speaking about the author’s creative achievement, we do not have to ascribe to her any pretense either. It is quite sufficient to say that the author creates a text with certain parameters – text whose literary functions require (among other things) that the reader makes certain moves in the mode of pretense. When doing this the author does not make any assertions, nor pretends to be doing so, nor performs any other acts whose proper reception would require that the charitable audiences adopt a special stance involving the “disengagement from certain standard speech act commitments, block-

23 For an account of fictional discourse based on a radically extended application of the notion of pretense see Everett (2013).

24 According to Friend, the anti-realist account of various kinds of claims made within fictional discourse requires slips between various games of make-believe, and hence we need “a way to distinguish those games” (Friend 2007, 153) – which antirealists still owe us. But the approach I am proposing does not require any such slips, since, as I believe, there are no games of make-believe played here. Friend suggests that according to anti-realists, “in talking about fictional characters we engage in the pretense, established by authors of fiction, that there are such and such persons, places and things” (Friend 2007, 153). This is certainly not my position: in fictional discourse we seriously speak about fictional characters, without pretending that they are anything else than components of the construction of literary works.
ing inferences from a fictive utterance back to the speaker or writer, in particular inferences about beliefs” (Lamarque & Olsen 1994, 46). The point is that the author does not occupy any “official” position within the basic interpretative scheme or division of roles specific for reading narrative fiction. It is the narrator to whom the reader is supposed to assign the utterances of sentences she finds in the text and the performance of the speech acts indicated in these utterances, among them full-blooded assertions, imposing on the assumed speaker all the commitments connected with this speech act type. This includes that it makes good sense to approach the narrator as making unjustified statements, as lying, as making insincere promises and using all kinds of communicative tricks we know from everyday communication – otherwise the construction of an unreliable narrator would be impossible. So, there is no reason and no space for general “disengagement from standard speech act commitments” related to the author or to the narrator: like in everyday communication, this move is applicable only in special cases, e.g. when the text includes signals that the narrator is joking.

Within this approach, the starting point are the functions of the text and the characteristics of the author’s creative act is derived from the specification of these functions. The reverted order is much more popular, owing to authors like John Searle, Saul Kripke or Gareth Evans (cf. Searle 1975; Kripke 2013, 17; Evans 1982, 353): here the (intentional) characteristics of the author’s creative acts is an essential part of the explanation of the functions of literary texts, in particular of the role played by proper names within these texts. So, the author is said to pretend that she uses expressions like “Emma Bovary” to refer to real human beings (John Searle and many others) or, equivalently, to pretend that the conditions of reference connected with the names she utters are satisfied in the actual world (Saul Kripke). I take it as an attraction of the approach I have argued for that it does not require any speculations about the mode of the author’s creative act. Instead, we specify the functions of literary texts of narrative fiction and add that if the author’s creative act is purposeful, it includes the intention to produce a text with these functions. Pretense enters into this picture on another place: the author creates a text which will fulfill its functions for the readers only if they accept some assumptions in the mode of pretense.

When doing so, the author can be said to “make the first move in a game of make-believe”, in that sense that she makes a move which (if successful)
will prompt acts of make-believing on the part of the readers. But this move need not have the form of “a deliberate initial pretense” (Evans 1982, 353). The author may simply intend to create a text which will function in such and such a way and approach this project in purely “constructivist” manner, which will not require her involvement in the form of make-believing that such and such things happened, or “pretending to have knowledge of things and episodes” (Evans 1982, 353). Nobody will deny that a well-trained liar can produce in her audiences a belief that \( p \) without herself believing that \( p \). Why not to admit that a writer can deliberately produce in her readers a make-belief that \( p \) without herself make-believing that \( p \)?

8. Confrontation with the fictive utterance theory of fiction

Let me compare this approach briefly with the one proposed by the fictive utterance theorists of fiction. So, according to David Davies:

Whereas it is a condition for assertion that the speaker intends the audience to believe what she states, in fictive utterance the author intends that her audience make-believe what is narrated (Davies 2001, 265; more recent discussion and development of this position see in Davies 2012).

I think that both claims – about assertive utterances and about fictive utterances should be revised in an analogical way. First, I believe that it is hopeless to try to define assertion in terms of speaker’s intentions, since it is always easy to find clear counterexamples – cases in which the speaker does not have some of the required intentions but there is no reason to deny that she makes a full-blooded assertion. For instance, the condition mentioned by David Davies is certainly not necessary: I can utter the sentence “Jane isn’t at home” with the intention to create in the audience the belief

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25 Or let us imagine a writer who seriously takes herself as describing real events but does so with high literary aspirations, intending to create a great novel. Let us say that she succeeds (the result is appreciated as a piece of high literature) but her beliefs concerning the events described come out as false. Will anybody claim that in order to be justified in regarding her as an author of a piece of narrative fiction, we will have to reevaluate her original attitudes, classifying them as make-beliefs?
that Jane is at home, since I hope that the audience will take me, in this
particular case, as trying to deceive her (for instance because she assumes
that I want to prevent her from meeting Jane). But even then I certainly
assert (as I intended) that Jane isn’t at home – unless the context is such
that it blocks the projection of the conventional meaning of the sentence
uttered into the meaning of my utterance. Hence, rather than defining as-
sertion (and other speech act types), in terms of conditions which must be
fulfilled on the part of the speaker, it should be defined in terms of its com-
 municative functions. In our case, these functions certainly include that my
utterance commits me to believing that Jane isn’t at home and to intending
to create or activate the same belief in the audience. 26 Analogically, the
specific status of the occurrences of sentences within literary texts of nar-
 rative fiction should be explained by specifying their function within this
context, rather than by specifying the author’s intentions. I have suggested
(cf. the principle F in Section 2) that their function require the reader to
interpretAI them as records of the narrator’s utterances related to the actual
world.

The ambitions of the fictive utterance theory of fiction are not limited
to literary texts of narrative fiction: but when we apply it to a reader of such
a text who interprets an occurrence of a sentence S expressing (as uttered
in given context) a proposition p and indicating the assertive force, we get
the following confrontation:

D.D.: The interpreter believes that when uttering the sentence S the au-
 thor intends to produce in her a make-belief that p. On this basis
(i.e. on the basis of the recognition of this intention) and as part
of her interpretative cooperativeness, the interpreter make-bel-
ieves that p.

P.K.: The interpreter make-believes (= believesAI) that there exists a
real person (the narrator) who asserts that p (by uttering S). On
this basis and as part of her interpretative cooperativeness, the
interpreter make-believes that p (provided that she approaches
the narrator as reliable).

26 I have defended the view that speech act types (and corre latively utterance mean-
ings) should be defined in terms of commitments to certain attitudes imposed on the
speaker rather than in terms of actual speaker’s attitudes e.g. in Koťátko (1998).
9. Determination of literary functions

This should not be read as implying that the author’s intentions have no relevance for literary interpretation. I have pointed out (in Section 7) that the empirical author does not occupy any official position in the interpretative scheme set up by the literary functions of texts of narrative fiction. Its main coordinates are fixed by assumptions $A_1$ concerning the narrator, her utterances and the actual world as the supposed universe of discourse and as the sphere in which the narrative performance is supposed to take place. This does not exclude that our knowledge about the empirical author and our hypotheses concerning her intentions may play an important role within the broad basis of interpretation, from which we approach the text and identify its literary functions (and thereby the literary work represented by the text). It can and need not be so, depending on our understanding the very enterprise of reading a literary text. If we take it as an opportunity for communication with the empirical author, the respect to her (probable) intentions will be the main constraint. If we approach the literary text as an artifact anchored in certain socio-cultural environment and as a medium for our intellectual and emotional intercourse with that environment, the literary conventions, the image of the world, the hierarchy of values etc. prevailing (according to our knowledge) in that environment will be the main constraint. And obviously, both approaches can be efficiently combined. But if we approach the literary text primarily or exclusively as a source of aesthetic pleasure, or as an inspiring challenge for our intellect, imagination, sensitivity, moral intuitions etc., we may feel free to opt for any reading which, according to our view, maximizes this potential of the text, without any respect to its author’s intentions or its socio-cultural coordinates. A radical version of this kind of dealing with a literary text is mentioned in the end of Borges’ story on Pierre Menard, as the so called “new art of reading”: an example is to read *Odysseia as if* it were written in Rome in Augustus’ time (at the turn of the era), hoping that this will generate an exceptionally powerful aesthetic experience. As usual, each approach can be enthusiastically defended or rejected, either as guilty in intentional fallacy, or in conventional fallacy, or simply as cynical – but the decision is in the last instance always on the reader. As far as I can see, there are no *apriori* principles or transcendental conditions of reading a literary text which would disqualify some of the interpretative attitudes
mentioned, in that sense that the reader who opts for it does not approach the text as a piece of literature.

References


