Proper names (such as ‘Obama’), indexicals (such as ‘I’) and demonstratives (such as ‘that dagger’) are singular terms. The job of singular terms is to pick out objects, and according to current orthodoxy not only the truth but also the meaning of – or proposition expressed by – a sentence containing a singular term depends on what object is, in fact, picked out. Insofar as the identity of the singular proposition depends on the identity of the referent, the identity of a singular thought corresponding to (or involving) that proposition depends on the identity of the object thought about as well. An obvious problem with this picture is that some singular terms, such as ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Vulcan’, do not refer to anything but are nevertheless able to occur in sentences that seem perfectly meaningful and sometimes even true (‘Vulcan does not exist,’ for instance). Moreover, we entertain thoughts about Santa Claus and Vulcan that seem to be genuinely singular, and even in the absence of referents they seem to succeed in fulfilling their representational task. To put the core problem as succinctly as possible: When we characterize thoughts expressed by sentences containing singular terms, we need to involve the objects referred to by those singular terms themselves; yet the fact that these sentences are meaningful even if the terms (apparently) do not refer to anything suggests that the referents themselves are extrinsic to the nature of those thoughts.

The amount of philosophical work done on fiction and on mental and linguistic representation of things that do not exist (if anything) is staggering, and an impressive number of strategies have been tried out. Virtually all of the claims in the above paragraph have been rejected by someone at some point, for instance. Empty Representations: Reference and Non-existence, edited by Manuel García-Carpintero and Genoveva Martí, can hardly claim to be comprehensive – there is, beyond the useful introduction, no detailed discussion of Meinongian theories, for instance – but it does cover a number of important contemporary questions, views and strategies deployed to account for such representations. As such, it will be valuable to anyone who wishes to get up to date on the state-of-the-art research on these issues, and indispensable to anyone working on empty names or singular thought. It should be noted, however, that apart from the lucid overview by García-Carpintero
in the introduction, the book is perhaps less helpful as an introduction to the issues. Some of the contributions are rather technical, and several are applications or modifications of frameworks that the authors have developed in detail elsewhere – a comprehensive evaluation of which will probably require consulting those other works.

The book is divided into four parts, of which the first, *Foundational Matters: Singular Thoughts and Their Attribution*, concerns, somewhat loosely, general theoretical issues surrounding singular thought, in particular the association between singular thought and acquaintance – whether the ability to entertain singular thoughts about \( x \) requires that one stands in some special epistemic relationship to \( x \) – and how these concerns play out when those thoughts turn out not to refer. In “Transparency and the Context-Sensitivity of Attitude Reports” Cian Dorr mounts a powerful and interesting defense of the idea that although singular beliefs and reports of singular beliefs are transparent (that if \( x = n \), then one believes that \( \varphi(x) \) if one believes that \( \varphi(n) \)), the intuition that substitution of singular terms does not generally hold can be explained by the context-sensitivity of belief ascriptions. He provides a careful explanation of how context-sensitivity may be invoked to explain such intuitions, and an interesting Kaplan-style semantics for context-sensitive sentences as well as a thoughtful discussion about what the source of the context-sensitivity of belief reports may be. What is perhaps missing is a precise formulation of what the semantic content of a typical belief report actually is when given what he calls a *non-uniform* interpretation, or what an ascription whose embedded clause contains a non-referring term could convey to an audience, but the framework nevertheless provides an interesting starting point for further exploration.

Robin Jeshion, in “Two Dogmas of Russellianism”, argues that contemporary Russellians have often failed to address a tension between three theses Russell himself ascribed to: That noun phrases are either directly referential or quantificational, that the only objects to which we can directly refer are those with which we are acquainted, and that there are two ways of thinking about particular objects: singularly or descriptively. Those theses constitute what she calls ‘the Russellian trinity’ – an agent \( A \) is acquainted with \( o \) iff \( A \) can directly refer to \( o \) iff \( A \) can think singularly about \( o \) – and she endeavors to show that contemporary Russellians who accept that all proper names are directly referential, should reject the other two theses. In particular, she argues, first, that perceptual and testimonial information usually considered sufficient to establish reference is often insufficient to make agents acquainted with that reference in any meaningful sense (Russell himself, of course, maintained that we are only acquainted with sense-data, thus avoiding the possibility of error through misidentification, but most contemporary philosophers
adopt a more liberal view of acquaintance). Second, some of our referring expressions are empty and so, pace realists about mythical characters, resist any sort of acquaintance relation, as do referential terms introduced by purely descriptive stipulation; so-called ‘descriptive names’. Of course, the second point assumes (Jeshion offers no argument here) that empty and descriptively used names are genuinely referential names, which is certainly a controversial assumption. The main problem with maintaining that descriptively introduced names are referential, for instance, is not that it threatens a close association between acquaintance and reference, but that it threatens to commit us to a priori contingent beliefs that should not be a priori – it would entail that the true proposition Whitcomb Judson invented the zip can be known a priori by anyone who knows that someone did. If descriptive names were not directly referential they would be no counterexample to an acquaintance condition on reference (though, as Hawthorne & Manley (2012) have argued in detail, an acquaintance condition may not help circumvent the problem either). If descriptive names are not ordinary, referential proper names it is a short step to concluding that empty ones aren’t either.

Jeshion goes on to argue against the acquaintance requirement in favor of a view she calls ‘cognitivism’ (defended in more detail in Jeshion 2010), according to which we think about individuals through object files, where the fact that a mental file is an object file is a matter of the normative and functional role of the file – the significance of the object itself to a thought – rather than whether the agent is acquainted with the referent of the file. Ken Taylor and François Recanati defend similar conceptions of singular thought in their contributions to this volume; Recanati even retains an acquaintance condition, though his understanding of acquaintance is, at least as compared to Russell’s original idea, so diluted that any disagreement with Jeshion on that score may be little more than terminological.

Jeshion also rejects Russell’s claim that there are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive ways of thinking about objects in the world – singularly and descriptively – and the arguments for this claim are less developed. The idea that singular thoughts are object-involving is dismissed in a paragraph, and the most intriguing version is rejected simply by appeal to incredulity: ‘It cannot be literally true that the object itself is a constituent of one’s thought itself, the mental particular,’ says Jeshion (p. 85), yet that is precisely what defenders of de re intentionality are committed to (see McDowell 1986, for instance). Other properties associated with singular thought, non-descriptiveness and directness are also dismissed without much – or only gestures toward – argument. This is a bit puzzling, since once we get rid of the acquaintance requirement (and perhaps object-involvement) maintaining a clear distinction between singular and descriptive thought would
seem all the more natural as a distinction between tracking an object of thought ‘directly’ or as individuated by the role it plays (individuated by a description), a difference that becomes significant for instance when tracking the objects through counterfactual situations or over time, and perhaps to mark a distinction between whether the identity of the object of thought is determined by factors external to the thinker’s mind. Without the acquaintance requirement, whether a thought is a singular thought can be defined purely in terms of its normative and functional role, which would also be straightforwardly reflected in the semantic and syntactic properties of sentences expressing those thought. Counterexamples to a sharp, formally defined distinction usually rely precisely on the lack of a proper epistemic grounding for certain thoughts (and sentences) with an apparently singular form. (Jeshion mentions referentially used description as a worry for maintaining the distinction, but it is at least prima facie plausible to think that a referentially used description is a means for handily naming an object individuated by description (or demonstration) but thought about non-descriptively.) Moreover, rejecting a sharp distinction between descriptive and singular thought would tend to weaken her own arguments against the acquaintance requirement – thoughts expressed by sentences containing descriptive names, for instance, will be evidence against the acquaintance requirement on singular thought only on the assumption that they are, indeed, genuinely singular thoughts. Of course, Jeshion has written about these issues elsewhere, and although the discussion in the current essay is interesting and thought-provoking, one would need to consult those other works to get a full sense of the force of her arguments.

In “Intersubjective Intentional Identity” Peter Pagin discusses the problem of intentional identity in the context of Geach sentences (intentional identity is also discussed by Stacie Friend). His solution draws on his and Kathrin Glüer’s development of relational modality (see Glüer & Pagin 2006; 2008), which is also the topic of their joint contribution “Vulcan Might Have Existed, and Neptune Not: On the Semantics of Empty Names”, which opens part II of the book, Accounts of Empty Representations. The latter article develops their own switcher semantics for proper names to deal with empty names in a truth-theoretic framework. The basic idea is that proper names are associated with two different intensions, a standard possibilist intension that picks out in each world the unique satisfier of descriptive information associated with the name, and an actualist intension that picks out the satisfier of that information in the actual world. Modal operators then switch the evaluation from the possibilist to the actualist intension. The result is an interesting, essentially two-dimensionalist solution to the problem of empty names flexible enough to respect a variety of prima facie conflicting intuitions about such cases. (Note that few two-dimensional systems have dealt with empty names in
detail.) That said, the article relies heavily on their previous work, and to those unfamiliar with that work certain moves, such as the introduction of different truth-predicates, may seem *ad hoc*. They are also committed to the controversial idea of treating empty names as picking out possible individuals (see for instance Briggs Wright’s article in this volume).

In “Content Relativism and the Problem of Empty Names” Frederick Kroon mounts a powerful defense of the descriptive-proxy account of empty names – that is, a *causal-descriptivist* view adapted to empty names – in particular against the so-called variation problem (that there may be considerable variation in descriptions agents associate with the name) by invoking *content relativism*, (roughly) that what is said by an utterance $u$ in a context may vary between the circumstances from which $u$ is interpreted. François Recanati’s contribution (“Empty Singular Terms in the Mental File Framework”) is based on his earlier work on mental files (cf. Recanati 2012) but introduces some more nuance to deal with empty names, in particular a meta-representational function that some mental files have that allow their owners to represent how other subjects think about objects rather than the objects themselves; the result bears some affinities with Frege’s reference-shifting account of indirect discourse. Ken Taylor (“The Things we Do with Empty Names: Objectual Representations, Non-Veridical Language Games, and Truth Similitude”) discusses three distinctions – between objective and objectual representations (which is similar to Recanati’s distinction between thought-vehicles and thought contents), between veridical and non-veridical language games, and between truth and truth-similitude – that together allow him to offer a sophisticated and interesting account of how sentences that fail to express determinate propositions may still carry cognitive significance and be ‘correctly assertable’. That I do not discuss the details of the articles by Kroon, Recanati and Taylor should not be taken to indicate that I found them anything but rich, compelling and interesting; they are, however, based on ideas that these authors have defended in detail elsewhere, and it is sometimes difficult to evaluate them independently of this background.

One of the most original and thought-provoking contributions to the collection is Imogen Dickie’s “A Practical Solution to the Problem of Empty Singular Thought”. Assuming that singular thoughts are genuinely singular (not descriptive) there is a tension between the claims that i) empty singular beliefs are not about objects; ii) for there to be a fact of the matter about what it would take for the singular thought to be true, there must be an object for it to be about; iii) empty beliefs are (often) justified; and iv) there is justification only if there is truth-conditional content. Dickie defends the rather novel idea of rejecting iv). Although she provides some arguments against rejecting ii), she does not discuss in detail the
more obvious option of denying iii). Many Russellians would presumably reject iii) (indeed, many of them, such as Taylor above, deny that there even *is* a singular belief involved in empty cases) but argue that, in empty cases, the agent may entertain related descriptive beliefs that are, in fact, justified and genuinely truth-conditional. However, Dickie’s suggestion is worth taking seriously; in the article it is only developed in detail for demonstrative thoughts guided by the representational needs of the agent, and further work is needed to extend it to other singular thoughts (those expressed by proper names or other uses of demonstratives).

To develop her argument, Dickie draws on Anscombe’s distinction between speculative and practical knowledge (see Anscombe 1957). In particular, she rejects the classical assumption that the sort of relation with objects that is required for singular thoughts is *theoretically oriented* rather than *practically oriented*. She suggests, very roughly, that perceptual demonstrative thoughts fill a basic cognitive (practical) need and are justified in a way that tends toward securing that the demonstrative element refers to a thing outside the mind (I will have to refer the reader to the article itself for the empirically informed details). Empty singular thoughts, then, are justified insofar as they are formed through processes that reliably secure reference to a mind-independent reference, even if the particular demonstrative thought happens to fail to do so because the world is uncooperative in that particular instance, and even if the resulting thought lacks genuinely truth-conditional content.

Two related worries that Dickie does not address should be mentioned, however. Dickie explicitly assumes that empty, singular, demonstrative beliefs *are* justified, and attempts to develop an account of how they can be justified. It is unclear to me, however, whether such beliefs really are the kinds of things that *can* be justified. Empty, singular, demonstrative beliefs may be formed by processes that reliably result in true beliefs, but a belief being justified is a matter of it being *likely to be true* given the available evidence or reliability of processes by which it was formed, which an empty singular belief with no truth-conditional content cannot be (Dickie rather explicitly commits herself to this conclusion on p. 237). Now, this worry may perhaps assume a notion of *truth-lielihood* that is too externalist; perhaps a response could be that these beliefs *seem*, to the agent, to be likely to be true and that this is enough to make them justified. But surely, from an internalist point of view, the belief that the agent thinks is likely to be true is not the empty singular belief but some other, truth-conditional and perhaps descriptive belief also formed on the basis of the perceptual experience (since the empty belief isn’t truth-conditional, the agent cannot be thinking that *it* is likely to be true). To bring that point home, consider another, related worry with Dickie’s account: She provides no criteria for distinguishing empty, singular thoughts. Indeed, one suspects that,
on pain of equipping them with descriptive content, there can be no such distinction. But then all empty, singular thoughts are identical, and if one empty, singular belief is justified by being formed in a reliable manner, then all are. Surely, though, the agent herself can think that the empty singular beliefs she expresses by ‘that, is $F$’ and ‘that, is $F$’, respectively, where the corresponding demonstrative beliefs are formed in different circumstances, are different beliefs. And then it seems that the beliefs that are available to the agent for her own cognitive processes or networks of justification are not the singular beliefs themselves, but (perhaps) some descriptively enhanced proxies. And if the singular beliefs do not play any role in the agent’s own cognitive economy, why does it matter whether they are justified? These worries may, however, merely show that there is work left to do; Dickie’s account is intriguing and deserves further attention.

The third section, *Existence and Non-Existence*, concerns the question of what we mean when we assert or deny that something exists. In “What is Existence?” Nathan Salmon offers a typically lucid explanation for why ‘existence’ should be considered an ordinary predicate, contrary to the view famously espoused by Kant and Russell. Greg Ray, in “The Problem of Negative Existentials Inadvertently Solved”, provides a neat solution to the problem of negative existentials like ‘Pegasus does not exist’ in a truth-theoretic framework. Indeed, the solution falls out of his axioms with such apparent inevitability that Ray is led to wonder why it has been overlooked. The answer is surely that he offers what is essentially a form of wide-scope descriptivist interpretation of names rather than a Millian or traditional descriptivist account, but the straightforward solution to the problem of negative existentials that follows is a potential argument for treating names this way. Ray also shows why wide-scope descriptivism is a natural position in a truth-theoretic framework given natural formulations of the axioms associated with names.

The final section, *Fiction*, deals with an assortment of issues concerning fictional discourse, including the notion of *truth in fiction* and the ontological status of fictional characters: Realists claim that fictional characters exist – they are part of the ‘furniture of the world’, though they are, of course, abstract objects rather than real wizards or hobbits or detectives – whereas irrealists claim that the universe contains no such entities. Both views claim some basis in common sense: The realist can make sense of typical literary criticism by deeming for instance ‘some fictional characters are better known than others’ to be straightforwardly and literally true, but arguably struggles to get ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’ come out true, as it intuitively should. In “Fictional Realism and Negative Existentials”, Tatjana von Solodkoff endeavors to show how denials of existence in ordinary discourse should be analyzed to ensure that such claims
receive the correct truth-value. To do so, she elaborates on a suggestion by Amie Thomasson (1999) to the effect that ‘a does not exist’ should be interpreted as conveying the claim that a is not a K, where i) K is a conversationally salient kind and ii) a is fictionally characterized as being a K in conversationally salient fiction (p. 337). The task, then, is to provide an apposite value for ‘K’, and von Solodkoff provides a thoughtful and compelling argument for interpreting ‘K’ as (roughly) concrete thing.

In “Fictional Worlds and Fiction Operators” Mark Sainsbury argues against a particular kind of realist alternative, David Lewis’s possibilist account of fiction (see Lewis 1978). Instead of focusing on the familiar indeterminacy problems that arise when fictional characters are treated as possible objects, Sainsbury argues that Lewis’s account is beset by a variety of other problems, perhaps in particular the worry that in order to identify the possible worlds that give us the truth-conditions for the fiction one will first have to determine what the content is, which threatens to give rise to a vicious circularity – at least if Lewis’s account is intended to have a particular kind of explanatory power that, I might add, I am not sure Lewis really intended it to have. It is worth noting, though Sainsbury does not, that it seems possible to raise parallel concerns for possible-world semantics for ordinary discourse in general.

Kripke’s (2011) objection to treating fictional characters as possible objects has been influential: There is at most one Sherlock Holmes (uniqueness), but on a possibilist interpretation there will be a multitude of different possible objects that satisfy the descriptions associated with Holmes in the stories and no satisfactory means for specifying which of these is the referent of ‘Holmes’ (multiplicity and arbitrariness). (Notice that non-possibilist realists may face similar challenges.) One may, of course, wonder how forceful this objection is if one follows Jeshion (this volume) and denies that reference presupposes a special epistemic access to the referent: Why not say that the referent of ‘Holmes’ is the possible object Holmes, who is not, and could not be, identical to any actual object – even if we do not have any non-arbitrary means for distinguishing between the different candidates that satisfy the descriptions associated with him – and that ‘truth according to the Holmes stories’ is defined in terms of worlds in which those stories are told as known facts about him? Perhaps it is a worry that we aren’t appropriately causally linked to such referents, but those who reject the acquaintance requirement will presumably have to adopt a fairly liberal view of causal links as a source of reference fixing to begin with. Now, we would not be able to identify them by distinguishing them from worlds where otherwise identical stories are told as known fact about persons that are not Holmes, of course, and would accordingly need to stipulate the worlds we are interested in when evaluating sentences for
truth-according-to-the-Holmes-stories. But that is presumably how we should think about modal talk about individuals in general: To determine whether ‘Aristotle could have failed to teach Alexander’ is true, we don’t search the space of possible worlds to discover one where an identifiable Aristotle fails to have that property. Rather, we stipulate that we are talking about Aristotle and (roughly) determine whether he can be part of a world where he doesn’t have that property; similarly with Holmes.

That response does, in fairness, assume a rather radical anti-acquaintance view. Briggs Wright, in “Many, But Almost, Holmes?”, considers a less radical response by noting similarities between Kripke’s argument and Peter Unger’s problem of the many (cf. Unger 1980), which can roughly be illustrated as follows (cf. Lewis 1993): A cloud is an aggregate of droplets. At the outskirts the density of the droplets gradually falls off, with the consequence that it is impossible to tell where the boundaries of the cloud actually are. As a consequence, many different aggregates of droplets are equally good candidates to be the cloud, and we seem unable to say that the cloud is one particular aggregate rather than another. But if all these aggregates count as clouds we have many clouds; and there is just one. Wright explores whether standard solutions to the problem of the many can be used to salvage possibilism from the multiplicity and arbitrariness problems, ultimately concluding that such strategies fail.

There is one response I wonder whether Wright is a bit too quick to dismiss, however. According to supervaluationism, ‘there is but one cloud’ is super-true since, despite the multitude of potential candidate clouds, the sentence is ‘true under all ways of making the unmade semantic decisions’ (Lewis 1993, 31). Similarly, one might suggest, ‘there is just one Sherlock Holmes’ is super-true, since no matter what we decide on matters not specified in the Holmes-stories, the sentence will ostensibly come out true. Wright’s worry is that although the move will superficially circumvent the tension between uniqueness, multiplicity and arbitrariness, it does so at the cost of what a rather paradoxical-looking result: Although the object-language sentence ‘there is just one Sherlock Holmes’ is true, ‘when we examine the meta-theory for that language, we find, paradoxically, that there are many things, each of which qualifies as [Sherlock Holmes] on some interpretation of the language’ (p. 299). The result may not formally be a paradox, but seems to be in tension with ordinary conceptions of uniqueness since assertions of uniqueness will be ‘ultimately made true by the existence of many things.’ And although the worry may perhaps be circumvented in the case of the problem of the many, the common strategies, such as invoking Lewis’s notion of almost-identity, are unavailable in the fiction case.
I agree that the result may seem strange. But then, there is something strange about uniqueness intuitions about fictional characters in the first place. In her interesting contribution on intentional identity in an irrealist framework, “Notions of Nothing”, Stacie Friend discusses and evaluates various ways to account for the feeling that different thoughts expressed by sentences involving, say, ‘Santa’ may be about the same thing even though ‘Santa’ does not refer, different agents may associate different descriptions with Santa, and the name may have gained traction in a linguistic community without the associated information having any clearly discernible, single origin. One of her points is that in some contexts, such as when a child says that ‘Santa will come tonight’ and a different child that ‘Father Christmas will come tonight’, we feel compelled to say that they are talking about the same thing; yet in other contexts, such as when a historian talks about how Father Christmas came to be associated with Santa, they seem to be represented as distinct due to the distinct origins of the myths. Her irrealist account manages to make sense of these variations in judgment; a realist account, however, including Lewis’s possibilism, may have more trouble resolving these apparently conflicting intuitions.

But what do these considerations do to the uniqueness intuition that drives Kripke’s challenge to Lewis? Consider the unmade semantic decisions regarding Sherlock Holmes. Now, the Sherlock Holmes fictional universe did not end its expansion with Conan Doyle. Holmes has made numerous later appearances – think for instance of the recent TV series set in modern-day London – where many decisions left unmade by Conan Doyle have been made. Different later expansions (and overlook the popular but rather artificial notion of a canon often guarded with some fervor by fans of the original stories) take the Holmes stories in different directions, and will often make incompatible semantic decisions regarding elements left unspecified in the original stories. What happens with our intuition that we are still talking about Holmes, or that these more recent contributions concern the same character as Conan Doyle’s original stories? It seems that our intuitions about identity or uniqueness start to become shaky and, even more obviously, to context dependent.

In a possibilist framework these incompatible semantic decisions must be reflected by different worlds where different possible people play the role of Holmes. And these possible people must then have been different Holmes candidates all along, even when Conan Doyle wrote his original stories (it’s not like Lewis could be a creationist about fictional characters). So the possibilist must deny that Kripke’s uniqueness intuition should be accounted for by there being a single referent for Holmes in the first place, and our (and Friend’s) discussion suggests that such intuitions ought to be somewhat shaky, no matter one’s stance on the ontology
of fictional characters. The supervaluationist move gives Lewis (and possibly other realists) a means to explain why our judgment that ‘there is a unique Holmes’ may nonetheless count as true in some contexts: Even if there are several truth-makers for the sentence, no matter how the semantic decisions that remain unmade relative to some salient class of properties (which is, of course, context dependent) are decided, the sentence ‘there is a unique Holmes’ may still be super-true and hence assertable. (In other contexts, with a different class of properties, it may not be.) Whether this line of response will ultimately be successful is a matter of debate, of course, but it seems to me a potentially promising explanation for why we seem to harbor uniqueness intuitions even though there obviously (and not only in a possibilist framework) isn’t one, unique thing that is Sherlock Holmes.

As should be clear the contributions to Empty Representations provide ample food for thought, and given that the contributions offer a multitude of intuitively compelling arguments going in very different directions it should be unnecessary to say that it hardly provides the final word on any of the issues discussed. Yet for anyone with an interest in fiction, non-existence, the semantics of empty names, or mental representation in general, it should remain an indispensable reference book in a rapidly developing field for some time to come.

Fredrik Haraldsen
fredrikhar@yahoo.no

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