ABSTRACT: My aim in this paper is to provide a series of arguments against the conception of emotional truth. If we accept the idea that emotions are eligible for being truth-apt, then we are conceding to the view that emotions are capable of having epistemic warrant. Many contemporary writers regard this kind of warrant as the concept of appropriateness or fittingness that is taken to be analogous to truth in the emotional realm (e.g. D’Arms – Jacobson 2000a, Nussbaum 2001, de Sousa 2002, Morton 2002, Goldie 2004). Yet, if we allow an analogy between appropriateness and truth, it would seem to allow that emotions are capable of being true or false. However, I argue against the concept of truth in the emotional realm, for there are some emotions that cannot be reduced to propositional attitudes which are eligible for being truth-apt, unlike beliefs, thoughts, and judgments. I shall demonstrate these cases in terms of recalcitrant emotions. Especially, I argue that some emotions are not eligible for being truth-apt by utilizing the notion of ‘direction of fit’. I argue that emotions have neither directions of fit, since emotion is only embedded in belief or desire. Finally, I conclude that appropriateness of emotions differs from truth or satisfaction by demonstrating that the norms of belief/desire differ from norms of emotion. Hence, I argue, it is a mistake to give an account of all these, namely, belief, desire and emotion in terms of rationality.

1. Belief/desire and emotion: a Humean functionalism

In explaining emotion, there are three kinds of strong view, which reduce emotion to feeling, evaluative judgment/belief or desire respectively. In this paper I shall argue against only the latter two types: a conception of emotion which attempts to view it essentially in cognitive terms, in particular in terms of belief and desire. The first position I want to discuss in this section is a Humean functionalism, according to which emotion is reducible to desire. In order to illuminate this, in what follows, I shall utilize the concept of ‘direction of fit’. The concept of direction of fit is often attributed to Anscombe, for example by Platts (see Anscombe 1957; see also Platts 1979, 256).

In Anscombe’s story, there are two men, a man going shopping with a shopping list, and a private detective who tries to write down what the man buys. Anscombe contrasts a mistake in the performance of someone buying from a shopping list, with a mistake in a record which a detective is keeping of the shopping purchased (cf. Anscombe 1957). Then she asks “What is the difference between the man’s shopping list and the detective’s list?” Her answer is as follows:

It is precisely this: if the list and the things that the man actually buys do not agree, and if this and this alone constitutes a mistake, then the mistake is not in the list but in the man’s performance… whereas if the detective’s record and what the man actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is in the record. (Anscombe 1957, 56)

In this passage, Anscombe suggests that the difference between belief and desire is similar to that between the detective’s list and the shopping list. As Danto remarks, the shopper may make a mistake by putting in the basket something that is not on the list – beer when the list says ‘beef’; the detective may make a mistake in writing ‘beef’ when the basket contains beer. The shopper corrects the mistake by replacing the beer with beef; the detective by writing ‘beer’ instead of ‘beef’ (see Danto 1999, 56). This way of contrasting beliefs and desires in terms of ‘direction of fit’ is, as Platts in Platts (1979, 257) rightly claims, highly metaphorical, but many critics believe that the metaphor is very useful in illuminating the role of beliefs and desires in ex-

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1 L. L. Humberston suggests that it originate with J. L. Austin; see Humberston (1992).
plaining action, especially, reasons for action (see, e.g., Smith 1994, chap. 4; see also Searle 2001). According to this idea, desire is aimed at some end, whereas belief plays a role in achieving that end. This is what Smith calls teleological explanation of action, according to which an agent’s reasons are explained by the agent’s attempt to achieve some purpose or goal. Smith argues that this is so because desires have ‘world-to-mind’ direction of fit.\(^2\)

What then is ‘world-to-mind’ direction of fit? Smith believes that ‘having a motivating reason just is, \textit{inter alia}, having a goal’ and ‘the having a goal is being in a state with the direction of fit of desire’ (Smith 1994, 116). But the trouble with this account is that it faces a circularity problem. For in order to explain having a motivational reason, it appeals to the idea of ‘having a goal’. Then having a goal is defined as ‘being in a state with which the world must fit’. Now in order to explain the concept of direction of fit, one appeals to ‘having a goal’. So the argument seems to be circular. In order to avoid this difficulty, Smith appeals to a functional account of direction of fit, dropping the idea of goals or purposes.\(^3\) He writes:

For the difference between beliefs and desires in terms of directions of fit can be seen to amount to a difference in the functional roles of belief and desire. Very roughly, and simplifying somewhat, it amounts, \textit{inter alia}, to a difference in the counterfactual dependence of a belief that \(p\) and a desire that \(p\) on a perception with the content that not \(p\): a belief that \(p\) tends to go out of existence in the presence of a perception with the content that not \(p\), whereas a desire that \(p\) tends to endure, disposing the subject in that state to bring it about that \(p\). (Smith 1994, 115)

There have been detailed criticisms of Smith’s account.\(^4\) However, in this paper I focus on some difficulties arising from applying this formulation to

\(^2\) Smith discusses this in his earlier article; see Smith (1987, 36-61). In this paper I focus on his later discussion – see Smith (1994).

\(^3\) The circularity problem has been pointed out by Schueler (1991) and Zangwill (1998). In order to avoid the circularity problem, Humberston (1992) has appealed to second-order background intentions.

\(^4\) The criticism comes from Schueler (1991); Humberston (1992); Zangwill (1998); Sobel – Copp (2001); Dunn (2004). Schueler’s and Humberston’s target of criticism has been Smith’s former discussion in Smith (1987), whereas recent writers focus on his later version – see Smith (1994). I too focus on his later discussion.
emotions. Although Platts glosses Anscombe’s view as that only desire is ‘a prime exemplar’ of those states having world-to-mind direction of fit, Smith is invested in thinking that the account does cover emotions, since he says that states that include having a goal will count as desires on his broad construal (cf. Smith 1994, 117).

2. Emotions and direction of fit

Having established a view of emotion, namely, a Humean functionalism, according to which emotion can be reducible to desire, in what follows, I shall demonstrate that such view is implausible in explaining the intentionality of emotion by applying the concept of direction of fit to emotion.

It might be thought that hoping that $p$ counts as a desire for Smith and is an emotional state. If so, one might say, hope will have to have, with desire, a world-to-mind direction of fit. The reason why hope, like desire, could have world-to-mind direction of fit is that ‘he hopes the team wins but he doesn’t want them to’ is contradictory. Another reason that hope could have the same direction of fit as desire, one might argue, is because hopes aim at satisfaction rather than at truth. If my hope fails to ‘fit’ the world, that is not any defect in my hope but in the world. However, the trouble is that if we take hope as having world-to-mind direction of fit like desires, it cannot cover some kinds of hope close to cognitive states. For example, if I know that it is raining, then I can’t hope that the road is not wet, though I can wish it were not. When we hope, we also believe that it is possible that something we can do will ‘make it more likely that this hope (or other pro-attitude) gets realized’. We cannot have a hope or desire that cannot possibly be satisfied, unless we are committed to irrationality. If this is right, then according to Smith’s functional account of direction of fit, ‘all hopes will have, like beliefs, a mind-to-world direction of fit,’ since ‘I can’t hope that $p$ once I discover that $\neg p$’ (as argued by Schueler 1991, 279-280). If this is the case, we can say that hope that $p$, like beliefs, tends to go out of existence when we perceive that not $p$.

But the problem with seeing hope as having a mind-to-world direction of fit like belief is shown by cases of ‘recalcitrant’ belief. We can compare the recalcitrant mental state with optic illusions of the Mueller-Lyre lines: the Mueller-Lyre lines continue to appear to be of different lengths while they are known to be equal lengths. In this respect, many people try to develop
this idea to show how, at times, our beliefs, feelings and actions seem to behave with a mind of their own despite our best efforts in trying to control them. This is because, S. Döring argues, the emotional content ‘resembles the content of sense-perception in that both kinds of representational content need not be revised in the light of belief and better knowledge’ (Döring 2003, 223). She attempts to show this using an analogy emotion with optic illusion of the Mueller-Lyre lines as follows: just as our perception that the two lines differ in length persists in the face of our belief that the lines are the same length, so emotions may persist even though we have relevant and countervailing knowledge. Thus, we can say that a person can have a sense-perception or can feel emotion that $p$, and at the same time believe that $\neg p$. However, this is not the case in believing that $p$. If this is true, it follows that an emotion, like a sense perception, is not an attitude that can be considered as true or false as such. The point that Döring makes here is that in such cases of sense-perceptions and emotions we are able to be in a contradictory or ambivalent state, while in the case of belief, this is impossible.

Having elaborated on the analogy between emotions and sense-perceptions, now I want to argue against a cognitive conception of emotion which attempts to view it essentially in terms of belief. K. Walton says that ‘it is impossible to have the emotions without accompanying appropriate belief’. He writes:

> It seems a principle of common sense, one which ought not to be abandoned if there is any reasonable alternative, that fear must be accompanied by, or must involve, a belief that one is in danger. Charles does not believe that he is in danger; so he is not afraid. (Walton 1979, 6-7)

Given this, cognitivist, for example Kendall Walton, might require that if emotion is accompanied by a belief, and the belief has a direction of fit, namely, a mind-to-world direction of fit, then in some sense the emotion has that as well.\(^5\) Now if we apply this idea to Smith’s above formulation, we can

\(^5\) There is a strong version of cognitivism that attempts to view emotion as essentially thought or belief. The question whether the theory of emotion should count emotion as cognitive or not is the question whether cognitive elements, such as belief and judgment, are conceptually necessary or not for having emotion. Robert Solomon has a preference for ‘judgment’ rather than ‘thought’ as the label for that cognitive element. Jerome Neu has argued that ‘thoughts’ rather than judgments are appropriate
gloss it in functional terms as follows: an emotion that \( p \) is a mental state that tends to go out of existence in the presence of a perception with the content that not \( p \). If I believe that there is nothing to be afraid of in the presence of a perception with content that not \( p \) (e.g., seeing a rabbit is not harmful), then I should not fear it. If I do, it follows that it is a mistake to fear \( p \) when not \( p \), and the fear should be abandoned. But it is possible that fear persists, even when I consciously believe that the rabbit is harmless. If emotions imply, like Solomon and Nussbaum say, evaluative belief, we would have to be said to hold inconsistent beliefs as follows: an evaluative belief (fear) tends to \textit{endure} in the presence of perception that not \( p \) (the rabbit is harmless). If this is true, is it a mistake, and should it be abandoned? But in actual life we have those emotions; consider the case of phobia. The recalcitrant emotion of groups, as Susan James points out, are even harder to dismiss. For example, as Susan James puts it, a man as a member of the American Republican party may fear Islamic fundamentalism and holding the unchanging belief that fundamentalists are dangerous, despite evidence to the contrary (see James 2003, 228). If a strong view which reduces emotion to belief were right, it could be said that the man or woman, who does not believe that the rabbit is particularly dangerous, cannot be afraid of it, since according to the view, the relevant belief is a necessary element of the emotion. However, the strong cognitivism cannot explain the above cases which are examples of emotional recalcitrance. Hence it follows that emotional recalcitrance gets strong cognitivism into trouble.

Let’s apply recalcitrance to the case of hope which is supposed to have mind-to-world direction of fit, like belief. I might still hope, for example, that my team will win even though all the evidence is to the contrary. The Labours genuinely hope they will win the next election. Should the Labours give up their hope that they will win? I’m afraid, the answer is no, because if they did, they would be sure not to win. This raises difficult issues about ra-
tionality, which are beyond the scope of this paper. The point of this objection is to ask whether the cognitive element involved in the emotions is necessarily a state of belief. Indeed, cognitive theorists do not always claim that the cognitive element, which is essential to the emotions, should be ‘belief.’ Belief, among the many cognitive attitudes, is somehow a ‘very strong’ kind of attitude, for belief itself is necessarily connected with evidential rationality or justification. I do not have a belief when I have no or insufficient relevant evidence. In other words, if cognitivists claim that the cognitive element, which is essential to the emotions, is belief, there is a risk of ruling out a number of ‘irrational emotions.’ In this respect, cognitivists substitute ‘judgment’, ‘evaluation’, ‘appraisal,’ ‘apprehension’, or simply ‘construal’ for the belief. In rejecting the crudely cognitivist approach by assessing whether emotions have the kinds of directions of fit found in belief and desire respectively, I hold the cognitive aspect of emotion to be construal rather than belief – the latter is ‘cognitively penetrable’ unlike the former and unlike emotion.

Another difficulty with Smith’s functionalist account of the ‘direction of fit’ concerns the latter part of the formulation of desire: ‘a desire that \( p \) tends to endure, disposing the subject in that state to bring it about that \( p \).’ Suppose that you read about what Caligula did and became angry at the injustice of it all. The propositional content of your emotion, in this case, might be that Caligula is an awful person. But seeing Caligula as an awful person does not by itself provide an end for action, and it won’t dispose you to move to act, since in this case there is nothing you can do in order to change the world in such a way that Caligula no longer appears awful to you. I think what he did, ought not to have happened, but realise that I cannot do anything about it. Let’s apply this idea to another example; my hoping my team will win. If, as Smith argues, an emotion can be reduced to a merely functional state [that is

6 By the rationality of emotion, I mean the appropriateness or fittingness, while I take the rationality of belief/desire to be the truth/satisfaction, respectively. In this paper I shall only focus on the problem of the rationality of emotion, that is, the appropriateness.

7 I owe this terminology to Peter Goldie. I think ‘cognitive penetrability’ and ‘cognitive impenetrability’ are helpful to explain our emotional experience. Our emotional experiences are cognitively penetrable only if they can be affected by our beliefs. On the other hand, our emotions are cognitively impenetrable when they are not affected by our persistent beliefs. Goldie uses the terminology ‘cognitive impenetrability’ as the same meaning as ‘recalcitrance.’ See Goldie (2000, 74-78).
a desire] that disposes the subject toward action, this might involve a desire
to put it right. How then does my emotion – hope – move me towards action?
I may not do anything to put it right. Rather, my desire involves an attitude
toward (a pro-attitude) the winning: I want my team ought to win, but realise
that I cannot do anything about it. If this is right, Smith’s view, according to
which emotion can be reducible to desire, gets into trouble.

Now one might argue that the latter part of Smith’s formulation – ‘dispos-
ing the subject in that state to bring it about that p’ – has another difficulty
when we apply it to the case of hope about the past. Imagine a case of hope
about the past: I hope that I did not behave idiotically at last night’s party. In
this case, although my hope tends to endure when I know that I behaved idi-
otically, it won’t dispose me to bring it about that I behaved charmingly. For
I can do nothing now to make it the case. If I regret my behaviour, in this
case, it may dispose me to bring it about that p; I may try to apologize to the
host and to avoid the people who I met at the party. But in the case of my
hope that I behaved charmingly, I won’t be disposed to make that which
I hope for the case, even though my hope does not tend to go out of exis-
tence. Hence in this case we cannot say that hope has the same direction of fit
as desire. In response to this kind of objection, Smith might say that these can
be looked upon as (future directed) hopes about what will turn out about the
past. If this is so, then Smith’s test still seems to work in this case.

I have demonstrated so far that a direction of fit account cannot deal with
emotion, for example, hope. The best way to handle hopes on a direction of
fit view would be to say that they involve having a desire for p plus the belief
that it is still possible that p. In general, I have attempted to show, using
Smith’s analysis that it is implausible that all emotions have the same direc-
tion of fit. A fear is inappropriate if the mind doesn’t fit the world, and a hope
is wrong if the world doesn’t fit the mind. For some emotions, we strive to
bring about their objects and, for others, we try to avoid their objects. In what
follows, I shall use the idea of recalcitrant emotions to show why emotions
have neither mind-to-world, nor have world-to-mind direction of fit. I shall
discuss cases of pride and jealousy which will provide vivid illustration of
this.8

8 I am not trying to discuss jealousy and pride in general. I have picked out in-
stances of a kind that are likely to be rated as counter examples to the view that emo-
tions have either mind-to-world (belief) or world-to-mind (desire) direction of fit.
3. Emotional recalcitrance and personal perspective

One might say that emotions may have either, mind-to-world or world-to-mind direction of fit, due to their involving either belief or desire. There are cases in which emotions sometimes have belief-like directions of fit. For example, ‘pride’ sometimes does not involve desire but belief. My pride at my daughter’s achievements depends on the belief, evaluable as true or false, that she has had them. When I am proud of my beautiful house it is because of my belief that the object is mine. This is ‘cognitively penetrable.’ In being proud of my beautiful house, I first of all must believe that it is valuable; secondly, in order for the feeling to play a role I must believe the house to be in some way connected with me. G. Taylor calls those two beliefs ‘explanatory’ and ‘identificatory’ belief, respectively (cf. Taylor 1985, 27). The ‘explanatory’ beliefs just explain the relation between the valuable things and the person, whereas ‘identificatory’ belief refers to something ‘closely’ related to the person who feels pride. Thus, according to Taylor, ‘a person may hold the requisite explanatory beliefs and yet not feel proud.’ ‘She may regard her beautiful house as a most desirable possession but may not regard this as reflecting on her own worth’ (Taylor 1985, 34). Thus in order to feel pride there must be indentificatory belief that ‘the agent regards the desirable as something she herself has brought about.’ That is, she must regard the information given by explanatory beliefs as her worth. But if we accept this view we cannot explain the following case: in the case of the triumph of the team which I support, pride may involve ‘explanatory belief,’ but not involve ‘identificatory belief,’ since I cannot regard the team’s victory as one that I myself brought about. Thus in my view, the pride in the triumph of the team does not derive from belief but from my trying to think of the team’s victory as mine. In trying to think of the team’s victory as mine, there is no ‘fit’ or ‘directionality’, since trying to thinking of X as Y is subject to one’s will. This is one of the difference between ‘thinking of X as Y’ and ‘belief’, since as Goldie notes, ‘believing at will is, as is generally accepted, impossible; one cannot directly try to believe something; at best one can indirectly (albeit irrationally) try to come to believe that thing by, for example, partly oneself in an environment where one is likely to do so’ (Goldie 2000, 72). If this is so, we can say that the pride in the triumph of the team is derived from my attitude of thinking.

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9 This is, according to Taylor, a sufficient condition for pride.
X as if Y. If this is true, in this case, we can say that pride does not have belief-like direction of fit.

My pride, one might argue, presupposes a desire that my daughter has achievements, a desire with satisfaction-conditions and the world-to-mind direction of fit. But that pride does not itself have satisfaction conditions, for it does not itself set goals for action. We could say that pride sometimes involves mind-to-world (belief), sometimes world-to-mind (desire), or sometimes neither directions of fit. It follows that it is difficult to say that emotions have either direction of fit. The reason why emotions sometimes have neither direction of fit is because we have the personal point of view when we experience emotion. We have different standards of fittingness when we experience emotion. Hence the appropriateness of the emotions can be stated from the agent’s perspective.

If we take jealousy as having the same direction of fit as desire, that is, world-to-mind direction of fit, then it could be said that jealousy aims at satisfaction. What then is satisfaction of jealousy? For example, I might just wish my rival ill or dead. I may choose the way in which I confront my rival: a fight or to work hard. If I have low-esteem, I may be depressed or self-destructive. But this emotional reaction cannot give me ultimate satisfaction. One might say that the ultimate satisfaction of one’s desire involved in jealousy extinguishes that desire. One way to terminate the desire might be to get rid of a belief that the rival is superior to the agent. If this were true, then one might argue that jealousy has the same direction of fit as belief, for the desire involved in jealousy rests on belief. In what follows I want to show why we cannot say that jealousy has belief-like direction of fit.

4. The appropriateness of emotion

If we take emotions as having a belief-like direction of fit, we cannot explain kinds of malicious envy, or jealousy, for these cases are sometimes ‘cognitively impenetrable’. Suppose that Kate and Lucy have been friends and they assess themselves by their success in some competition. They apply

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10 Taylor, for example, argues that jealousy is unjustified, since this emotion must include a false or unjustified belief. See Taylor (1975, 401-402); see also Ben-Ze’ev (1990, 506).
for a job at the same place. But Lucy is accepted and Kate fails in the final interview. So Kate is jealous of Lucy’s success. In being jealous of Lucy, Kate thinks of Lucy as an enemy to her self-esteem. So despite their friendship, Kate wishes Lucy is ill. Kate wants Lucy to be absent from the interview due to the illness. This is because, Taylor would say, Kate’s jealousy involves false belief, and is morally wrong belief that rests on irrationality and cannot be justified. Now the presumption of this kind of strong cognitivist’s inference, it seems to me, is that there is an analogy between our emotional response and the world, and a true belief and the world. According to them, the former relation can be described as ‘fittingness’, whereas the latter one is maintained by truth. Then the cognitivists argue that these attitudes are both rational. Since they take both to be rational, they argue that emotion can be justified or criticized. Furthermore they claim that justification or criticism of the emotions is always committed to morality or prudence. Taylor claims that ‘an emotional reaction is unjustified if it rests on irrationally mistaken beliefs or when it is disproportionate to a given situation’ (Taylor 1975, 393). But this is, we can say, what some call a ‘moralistic fallacy’ (see D’Arms – Jacobson 2000a, 73-74). ‘The moralistic fallacy,’ according to D’Arms and Jacobson, is ‘simply to infer, from the claim that it would be morally objectionable to feel F toward X, that therefore F is not a fitting response to X.’ The reason why this inference is fallacious, as they say, is that ‘an emotion can be fitting despite being wrong to feel’. If this is right, the emotions’ appropriateness or inappropriateness can be said to depend not on the belief which is true or false, but on person’s narrative: the situations, his or her other emotions, his moods and his character. When you laugh at an offensive joke, the funniness of the joke might be understood by you in the light of your delighted mood after a delightful day, or in the light of your general disposition to be cheerful. In order to understand the standard fittingness of emotion, let us consider the norm of emotion.

According to de Sousa (1987, 116), an emotion is directed at a ‘target’. For example, being afraid of a snake implies that you are thinking of it as dangerous. If this is right, it can be said that an emotion has an intentional content that is evaluative. In order to lend support to this idea that emotions imply evaluations of their targets, de Sousa goes on to argue that each emotion-type has a so-called ‘formal object’ (corresponding to truth as the formal

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11 R. Roberts presents a similar case to mine. See Roberts (1991).
object of belief). Now in order for the formal object to be the possible target of an emotion, the subject must see the object as having a certain property; otherwise the emotion would not be intelligible. For example, your fear of the snake is only intelligible if there is some feature of it – looking fearful, in this case – which explains why you see it as fearsome. If you were saying that you are afraid of the snake while at the same time denying that there is anything fearsome about it, it would appear to be nonsense. Hence in order for your fear to be intelligible in this case, it is said that the property which has to be ascribed to an emotion’s target is the emotion’s formal object.

The term ‘formal object’ is derived from medieval philosophy and has been applied to emotions by Anthony Kenny. According to Kenny, the formal object of a state is the object under that description which must apply to it if it is possible to be in this state with respect to it (cf. Kenny 1963, 189). According to him, when we describe the formal object of emotion, the description refers to belief, that is, one has to believe that something is dangerous in order to feel fear. Recently, however, it is commonly believed that the formal object of an emotion is a property. Hence, de Sousa holds that ‘the formal object of fear – the norm defined for its own appropriateness – is the Dangerous’ (de Sousa 2002, 251).

The formal object of emotion view in much recent times has been defended by those endorsing a perceptual account of emotions (see de Sousa 2002; 2004; Prinz 2004a; 2004b; Döring 2003; Tappolet 2005). According to this view, an emotion like fear has correctness conditions that are similar to the correctness conditions of perceptual states. Fear is correct or appropriate in so far as its object is really dangerous, in that this is what makes fear correct or appropriate. In his recent discussion, de Sousa claims that emotional truth is concerned with the correctness of the emotional evaluation, and holds that it refers not to semantic satisfaction but to success (cf. de Sousa 2004, 72). In order to lend support to this idea, de Sousa makes a further distinction between emotion with a propositional object and emotion with a direct object. He formulates the former and the latter as follows: ‘E (p) is satisfied iff p is true, [while] E (p) is successful if p actually fits E’s formal object’ (de Sousa 2004, 72). For example, the formal object of fear is the property of being dangerous. A rabbit-phobic person’s fear of rabbits is satisfied if rabbits exist but it is not successful if rabbits are not dangerous. On the other hand, if someone is afraid of aliens, his or her emotion is not satisfied if there are no such aliens. However, it may be successful, since aliens could be dangerous.
if they existed. If this is so, emotional truth can be said to be whether the particular emotional object fits the relevant formal object.\textsuperscript{12}

Now if de Sousa’s argument so far were right, one might raise a question, namely, how do we evaluate the correctness of emotional evaluations? Faced with this question, de Sousa introduces his axiological hypothesis of emotions as perceptions of value. According to him, we can understand what values are only in virtue of our emotional responses. De Sousa calls his view ‘axiological holism’ for ‘it stipulates that we do not apprehend value in discrete units but only in the light of a complex of factors that transcend individual experience’ (de Sousa 2002, 255). Among these factors are biological facts, social norms, and ‘paradigm scenarios’ of individual biography. Yet none of them alone constitutes the norm for emotional truth. ‘[I]nstead it is the totality of all these factors – biological facts, social, personal, and more – that may properly be confronted with one another in the hope of arriving at something like reflective equilibrium’ (de Sousa 2004, 74). Hence, when we apply this holism to our case of jealousy, the evaluation of a person’s disposition to be jealous can be made relative to that person’s narrative: the situations, his or her other emotions, his moods and his character.

Let’s return to our jealousy case: Kate is jealous of Lucy’s achievement. I may say that Kate’s jealousy is inappropriate, since Lucy made more of an effort, and deserved her success, while Kate did nothing. If my evaluation were right, I could say that it is morally wrong for Kate to be jealous of Lucy. Although my judgment is right, it cannot be right to assess the appropriateness of Kate’s jealousy morally, since jealousy does not represent its object as bad or unjust. In my view, jealousy is comparable to the following cases: the snake is not dangerous and at the same time I fear it; we believe that the Mueller-Lyre lines continue to appear to be of different lengths while they are known to be of equal lengths. As I have said before, this implies that emotion, like sense-perception can present in the face of relevant and countervailing knowledge. In this respect, I argue that emotion which do not van-

\textsuperscript{12} Recently Mikko Salmela presents an argument for de Sousa’s account of emotional truth by arguing that emotions have cognitive content as digitalized evaluative perceptions of the particular object of emotion, in terms of the relevant formal property. Salmela develops this idea by arguing that an emotion is an actual fit between the particular and the formal objects of emotion, and the emotion’s propositional content is semantically satisfied, or the target of the emotion exists. See Salmela (2006).
ish in the face of better knowledge is recalcitrant emotion. This is because to some extent our emotions and emotional responses are passive, and cannot be controlled. There are several senses of being unable to control an emotion: 1) being unable to helping feeling it. (e.g., feeling sorry for a burglar); 2) being unable to help expressing it (e.g., the witness in court bursting into tears); 3) being afraid of a grass snake, despite believing that it poses no danger. The third case is one of recalcitrant emotion, which is the emotion over which the agents have no control, even though they believe that $p$. In a similar vein, we can call jealousy recalcitrant emotion.

Although one might doubt that the jealousy is always recalcitrant, we can say that Kate’s case is recalcitrant in the sense that her emotion and emotional response are passive and cannot be controlled in the face of relevant and countervailing knowledge. This is because the subject’s attitude toward those involved in jealousy is very complex and the desire in which jealousy is involved depends on all kinds of things: the circumstances, character-traits and moods that the person has.

We have seen so far that we cannot say that jealousy has either a belief-like or a desire-like direction of fit. When we say that X is jealous of Y over Z, it may involve desire, belief and perhaps affective elements (feeling). If jealousy has an affective element (feeling), what is it? Suppose that when Kate feels jealousy of Lucy, she may have feeling of weight in the stomach, becomes very nervous, or severely depressed. In my view, all these reductions are inadequate, since emotions are too complex to be identified with one of them. I call such crude views into question by applying the concept of direction of fit to emotions and by presenting recalcitrant emotion – for example, pride or jealousy – that illuminate the phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance. It can be said that this kind of emotional recalcitrance is derived from forcefulness of feeling. Those emotions tend to get out of control, due to the passivity of feeling. We can say that it is appropriate to call jealousy a passion. In this respect, we can say that the felt emotion is appropriate in the sense in which it is experienced in one way or another.

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13 In support of my view that emotions are not easily reducible to belief, desire or feeling and we cannot say that they have either directions of fit, I choose pride and jealousy which are tricky of saying whether they have one of directions of fit.
5. Conclusion

In this paper I have rejected the idea that there is a correspondence between our emotions and the world. If we accept the view that emotions correspond to the world, then we are conceding to the view that emotions are capable of having epistemic warrant. Many contemporary writers regard this kind of warrant as the concept of appropriateness or fittingness that is taken to be analogous to truth in the emotional realm (see, e.g., Goldie 2000; D’Arms – Jacobson 2000a; Nussbaum 2001). Yet, if we allow an analogy between appropriateness and truth, it would seem to allow that emotions are capable of being true or false. However, many philosophers have circumvented the concept of truth in the emotional realm, for there are some emotions that cannot be reduced to propositional attitudes which are eligible for being truth-apt, unlike beliefs, thoughts, and judgments. I have demonstrated so far these cases in terms of, for example, recalcitrant emotions, phobia, pride and jealousy. Especially, I have shown these cases by utilizing the notion of ‘direction of fit’. I have demonstrated the relation between direction of fit or correspondence and appropriateness. I have argued that correspondence would not be an asymmetrical whereas direction of fit is an asymmetrical relation between mind and world. I have shown that direction of fit means something like one is appropriateness given the other, which is asymmetrical. Hence it is more than correspondence.

I have presented a series of arguments against a crude view of emotions, namely, a Humean functionalism. My reason for rejecting the crude view rests on a kind of holism, since as Goldie (2000, 235) notes, ‘our emotions, moods, and character traits, broadly conceived, can interweave, overlap, and mutually affect each other.’ Hence, when we apply this holism to our case of jealousy, the evaluation of a person’s disposition to be jealous can be made relative to that person’s narrative: the situations, his or her other emotions, his moods and his character. In evaluating a person’s emotion, the person’s character and mood may play an important role. When you laugh at an offensive joke, the funniness of the joke might be understood by you in the light of

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14 In this respect many contemporary emotion theorists tend to be committed themselves to the claim that emotions are able to be true or false, when they say such things as the appropriate emotions ‘enable us to get things right’ (see Goldie 2004, 99).
your delighted mood after a delightful day, or in the light of your general disposition to be cheerful. If this is right, the emotions’ appropriateness or inappropriateness can be said to depend not on the belief which is true or false, but on a construal depends on personal perspective.

We have specifically seen that Smith’s descriptive account of direction of fit fails to explain mental states other than belief and desire, especially, emotions. Furthermore, Smith’s descriptive account cannot explain whether an emotion is fitting, for this is a normative question. When we believe p, our attitude is regulated by epistemic norms. On the other hand, I have argued that emotions’ fittingness or unfittingness depends neither on the belief which is true or false, nor on the desire which is satisfied or frustrated. Instead, I have argued that emotions’ fittingness or unfittingness depends on the construal which depends on personal perspective. Hence, I argue, it is a mistake to give an account of all these, namely, belief, desire and emotion in terms of rationality.

Acknowledgment

I am very grateful to Andy Hamilton and Nick Zangwill for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I owe a special debt to Peter Goldie for invaluable suggestions.

This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2014S1A5B8063466).

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