

An Argument for Authorial Creation¹

ZSÓFIA ZVOLENSZKY

Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös University
Múzeum krt. 4/i. H-1518 Budapest, Hungary
zvolenszky@elte.hu

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ABSTRACT: Artifactualism about fictional characters, positing Harry Potter as an abstract artifact created by J. K. Rowling, has been criticized on the grounds that the idea of creating such objects is mysterious and problematic. In the light of such qualms, it is worth homing in on an argument in favor of artifactualism, showing that it is the best way to include the likes of Harry Potter in our ontology precisely because it incorporates authorial creation. To that end, I will be exploring Kripke's fleeting remarks in the Addenda to his "Naming and Necessity" lectures about expressions like 'unicorn' and 'Harry Potter'. Elsewhere, Kripke motivates artifactualism by suggesting that incorporating authorial creation (as artifactualism does) is a move that is intuitive and natural; but beyond this, he doesn't provide any *arguments* in favor of such a move. My purpose in this paper is to construct such an argument based on considerations about Kripke's general view about proper names, in particular, his seminal causal-historical chain account of reference determination, and its consequences for fictional names as well as nonfictional names without bearers such as 'Vulcan'.

KEYWORDS: Abstract artifacts – Kripke – proper names – realism about fictional characters – causal-historical chain theory of reference determination – semantics of fictional discourse.

¹ Shorter predecessors of this paper are Zvolenszky (2012, Section 2; 2014).

1. Introduction

Artifactualism about fictional characters (*artifactualism*, for short) positing Harry Potter as an abstract artifact created by J. K. Rowling, takes (1) at face value:

- (1) Harry Potter was created by J. K. Rowling.

Like other forms of *realism* about fictional characters, artifactualism posits an ontology that includes the likes of Harry Potter. But realism is not our only option; we could also accept an irrealist analysis of (1) that doesn't take it at face value: "J. K. Rowling wrote a body of fiction in which Harry Potter is a specific character". For the purposes of this paper, I set aside the irrealist alternative and focus on artifactualism and its major realist rivals none of which take (1) at face value. Does the fact that artifactualism – singularly among realists views – incorporates authorial creation constitute an advantage or a disadvantage?

An advantage, say I. In this paper, I will argue that if we accept a certain widely held theory about proper names proposed by Saul Kripke (1972/1980) – to wit, that their reference is determined by a causal-historical chain of uses leading back to the introduction of the name – then we have reason to choose artifactualism over its major realist rivals *precisely because it incorporates authorial creation*.

Meanwhile, several philosophers have had serious qualms about authorial creation and taking (1) at face value. Takashi Yagisawa (2001, 154) argues that the most influential creationist views (by John Searle and Peter van Inwagen) "are ultimately unsuccessful in establishing creationism"; more generally, he claims that no view on which fictional characters exist can do justice to our intuition that a claim like "Harry Potter doesn't exist" is true and is entailed by the true "Harry Potter is a fictional character".

Stuart Brock sets out to

...explain why creationism about fictional characters [the view that fictional characters exist by being created by their author(s)] is an abject failure. It suffers from the same problem as theological creationism: the purported explanation is more mysterious than the data it seeks to explain. (Brock 2010, 338)

Brock's charge in a nutshell: creationism fails to provide a satisfactory account of the spatial and temporal dimensions of fictional characters, for example, their moment of creation. Brock (2010, 340-342) also complains that beyond the intuitive appeal of taking (1) at face value, arguments in favor of incorporating authorial creation in theories about the metaphysics of fictional characters are "almost completely lacking".² In the light of such doubts and paucity of motivation, it is worth homing in on an argument in favor of artifactualism (a form of creationism), showing that it is the best form of realism one could adopt. The goal of this paper is to expound such an argument.

1.1. Authorial creation and theories of fictional characters

First, let's take stock of the various realist positions. We may, along with Mark Sainsbury (2010, 44-114), distinguish three realist alternatives about fictional characters: there really are such things just as there are ordinary concrete objects occupying space and time; but unlike those ordinary objects like cups, saucers and the Big Ben, ...

- fictional characters *don't exist*, according to *Meinongianism* about fictional characters;³
- fictional characters *are not actual* but merely possible, according to *non-actualism*;⁴ and

² More precisely, Brock remarks that "arguments in support of the fundamental thesis are almost completely lacking", where by 'fundamental thesis', he means the following: "Fictional characters, to the extent that there are any, are genuinely created by the authors of the works in which their names (or designating descriptions) first appear" (Brock 2010, 340, 342).

³ For brevity's sake, I'll suppress the qualification 'about fictional characters' and will simply talk of realism, irrealism, Meinongianism, nonactualism, artifactualism, Platonism. Whenever these labels appear unqualified, they are shorthand for theories about fictional characters. Parsons (1980) is a contemporary proponent of Alexius Meinong's (1904) eponymous theory.

⁴ Lewis (1978) put forth such a view. This position is sometimes called possibilism about fictional characters. See also Kripke's earlier (1963) view about Sherlock Holmes. Importantly: for nonactualism to provide a distinctive alternative, it has to commit to a Lewisian (1986) metaphysics of possible worlds: modal realism (also called extreme realism), argues Sainsbury (2010, 74, 222, fn. 8).

- fictional characters *are not concrete* but abstract, created by the activities of authors according to *artifactualism*.⁵

How might the various forms of realism handle (1)? On this point, artifactualism appears to show a clear edge relative to its two rivals. A negligible point of advantage is that according to neither rival theories is Potter *created* – going from nonexistent to existent. According to the Meinongian, Potter isn't created – brought into existence – because he doesn't exist (he just is). And according to the nonactualist, Potter had existed all along as a merely possible object and continues to exist as a merely possible object after the novels are written. According to Sainsbury (2010, 61-63, 82-85), the real advantage of artifactualism concerns its response to the so-called *selection problem*: upon introducing the name 'Harry Potter' in her novel, how does J. K. Rowling manage to select one rather than another among the countless candidate objects? According to Meinongianism, there are countless nonexistent candidates; according to nonactualism, there are countless merely possible, nonactual candidates.⁶ Sainsbury (2010, 63) doesn't see "how a Meinongian can offer any sensible account of how an author's or reader's thoughts are supposed to engage with one rather than another nonexistent entity".

⁵ Kripke (1973/2013), Searle (1979), van Inwagen (1977), Fine (1982), Schiffer (1996), Salmon (1998), Thomasson (1999) are prominent proponents of artifactualism who hold that authors' creative process of writing novels, stories, etc. creates fictional characters. This position is sometimes called creationism about fictional characters.

There is a position in logical space for holding that fictional characters are abstract but exist timelessly, and authors don't create but discover them – we might call such a view Platonism about fictional characters. Zalta's (1983) unorthodox neo-*Meinongian* proposal as well as Wolterstorff's (1980) theory can be considered instances of such an account. The only kind of abstract-object theory I will consider in this paper is artifactualism, given the overwhelming popularity and attention that this position has been enjoying (compared to Platonism), as well as the advantages that I think it has over rival theories (Platonism included) precisely because it treats fictional characters as human-created objects. The arguments expounded here carry over to Platonism also, but I will relegate discussion of that to footnotes.

⁶ Ultimately, Sainsbury (2010) rejects artifactualism in favor of irrealism. For a response strategy that the artifactualist can adopt to fend off Sainsbury's criticism, see Zvolenszky (2013, an earlier version of which appears in 2012).

We are about to see that a far more decisive objection than the selection problem emerges against the Meinongian once we consider the difficulties that the *nonactualist* encounters when it comes to a different set of problems that Kripke (1972/1980) raised.

1.2. Naming and Necessity on fictional characters

Throughout this paper, I am accepting Saul Kripke's (1972/1980) proposal about causal-historical chains determining the reference of proper names, exploring what follows from it: that artifactualism has an advantage relative to its major realist rivals.

The core of Kripke's position (from the second lecture of *Naming and Necessity*) about what does and doesn't determine the reference of proper names like 'J. K. Rowling' and 'London' (which refer to concrete objects) can be summarized with the following two claims:

- *Qualitative fit is neither necessary nor sufficient for being the referent of a name.* Suppose individual speakers who competently use a name *N* associate various descriptions with *N*. Kripke's claim: to be the referent of *N*, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that the referent be the unique individual fitting the associated descriptions (or fitting the weighted majority of the descriptions). Call this the *qualitative-fit claim*.
- *A causal-historical connection is necessary for reference.* Competent *N* users refer to an object *o* by using *N* only if there is a causal-historical chain of uses of *N* in their linguistic community leading back to the introduction of *N* as a name for *o*. Call this the *historical connection requirement*.⁷

What does Kripke say about fictional names that don't refer to concrete objects? In the "Addenda" to his "Naming and Necessity" lectures, Kripke

⁷ I'm not including here the corresponding sufficiency claim: that a causal-historical chain of uses leading back to an object being given the name is *sufficient* for it to be the name's bearer. In the light of considerations about 'Santa Claus', and 'Napoleon' introduced as a name for a pet (and later, on, also examples like 'Madagascar') indicate that much more elaboration and complexity lies ahead before we get a *sufficient* condition for being the referent of a name. And the fact that Kripke (1972/1980, 93, 96-97) was pointing out such examples makes it clear that he was aware of the additional complexity required while he was delivering the lectures, so Evans' (1973) charge that Kripke's sufficiency claim is unwarranted is itself unwarranted.

(1972/1980, 156-157) motivates two theses for expressions like ‘unicorn’ and ‘Harry Potter’:

- The *metaphysical thesis*: There is no basis for counting any *merely possible* object as Harry Potter, Sherlock Holmes, a unicorn, etc.
- The *epistemological thesis*: There is no basis for counting any *actual* object as Harry Potter, Sherlock Holmes, a unicorn, etc.

In the metaphysical thesis, Kripke’s target seems to be the nonactualist (given that he is talking about merely possible entities, the nonactualist’s candidates for fictional characters). At the end of the paper, we will see, however, that both theses bear on Meinongianism also. Along the way, we will also see (in Section 2) that the two arguments are at root intimately connected.

Elsewhere (see Kripke 1973/2011, 1973/2013), Kripke motivates artifactualism by suggesting that incorporating authorial creation (as artifactualism does) is a move that is intuitive and natural; but beyond this, he doesn’t provide any *arguments* in favor of such a move.⁸ My purpose in this

⁸ The following are telling passages from Kripke in which authorial creation and artifactualism receive motivation from intuition as well as a recurring analogy with how people’s activities create nations (this is the only kind of motivation for artifactualism that we find in these two works of Kripke’s in which he is focusing specifically on fictional names and other names that lack a concrete referent):

On my view, to write a novel is, ordinarily, to create several fictional characters, as Twain, by writing *Huckleberry Finn*, brought both a novel and a fictional character into being. It is not that fictional characters exist in one sense but not in another. The fictional character Huckleberry Finn definitely exists, just as the novel does: I would withdraw the statement only if my impression that there was any real novel was mistaken. Thus, their existence is not like that of numbers, abstract entities which are said to necessarily exist, independently of empirical facts. ... *A fictional character, then, is an abstract entity. It exists in virtue of more concrete activities of telling stories, writing plays, writing novels, and so on, under criteria which I won’t try to state precisely, but which should have their own obvious intuitive character. It is an abstract entity which exists in virtue of more concrete activities the same way that a nation is an abstract entity which exists in virtue of concrete relations between people.* A particular statement about a nation might be analyzable out in virtue of a more complicated one about the activities of people, or it might not: it might be hard, or maybe, because of problems of open texture, impossible to do so. But, at any rate, the statement about the nation is true in virtue of, and solely in virtue of, the activities of

paper (in Section 3) is to construct such an argument based on considerations about Kripke's general view about the reference of proper names.

2. The intertwining background of the two Kripkean theses

Behind Kripke's metaphysical thesis is what we might call the *insufficient-specificity problem*.⁹ The Harry Potter novels specify many details about Harry; but they also leave a lot of other details unspecified, for example, which of various parental cells Harry came from. Due to such lack of specificity in the novels, we have no basis for deciding between two distinct merely possible candidates (they originate from distinct zygotes, say) that are just like Harry is described in the novels, which of them is Harry Potter. (The insufficient specificity problem is different from the selection problem, which (among other things) is about how authors select from countless candidates the one they *set out* to write about.)

The epistemological thesis turns out to generate an even deeper problem for the nonactualist, one that we shall see (at the end of the paper) affects the Meinongian also. Behind the epistemological thesis is what we might call the *coincidental-resemblance problem*, which Kripke discusses in connection with the mythical species of unicorn:

the people. [footnote omitted] I hold the same thing to be true of fictional characters. (Kripke 1973/2013, 72-73, emphasis added)

It is important to see that fictional characters so called are not shadowy possible people. The question of their existence is a question about the actual world. It depends on whether certain works have actually been written, certain stories in fiction have actually been told. *The fictional character can be regarded as an abstract entity which exists in virtue of the activities of human beings, in the same way that nations are abstract entities which exist in virtue of the activities of human beings and their interrelations.* [footnote omitted] A nation exists if certain conditions are true about human beings and their relations; it may not be reducible to them because we cannot spell them out exactly (or, perhaps, without circularity). Similarly, a fictional character exists if human beings have done certain things, namely, created certain works of fiction and the characters in them. (Kripke 1973/2011, 63, emphasis added)

⁹ Kaplan also emphasizes insufficient specificity as an obstacle to naming nonexistent (see Kaplan 1973, 506; 1989, 609).

...the mere discovery of animals with the properties attributed to unicorns in the myth would be no means to show that these were the animals the myth was about: perhaps the myth was spun out of whole cloth and the fact that animals with the same appearance actually existed was mere coincidence. In that case, we cannot say that the unicorns of the myth really existed; we must also establish a historical connection that shows that the myth is *about* these animals. (Kripke 1972/1980, 157, emphasis in the original)

Kripke is making two points here: even if we find animals qualitatively like the unicorns of the myth, that wouldn't justify counting them as unicorns given (i) the lack of historical connection between the newly found species and the use of the expression 'unicorn'; and given that (ii) the unicorn myth was "spun out of whole cloth", not created in the right way, to make the term apply to the newly found species. The upshot of (i) and (ii): we would have no more than mere qualitative coincidence between unicorns as described in the myth and the actual species discovered. And for a proper name, reference takes more than coincidental resemblance, so we don't have any candidate actual objects to count as unicorns.¹⁰

Notice that the idea that coincidental resemblance is a *problematic, insufficient* basis for reference simply echoes one half of Kripke's views about what does and doesn't determine the reference of proper names like 'J. K. Rowling': the qualitative fit claim. Meanwhile, (i), about historical unconnectedness being a problem, echoes the other half of Kripke's claim; the historical connection requirement. We see then that two of the three interconnected problems underlying the epistemological thesis directly rely on Kripke's general claims about proper name reference.

In the case of the expression 'unicorn', the coincidental-resemblance problem thus arises as a result of two distinct problems: (i) *historical unconnectedness* and (ii) *unsuited mode of introduction*. Pure myth-making mode and pure fiction-writing mode both give rise to expressions that aren't introduced in the right way to refer to actual objects.

Notice that so far, the two Kripkean theses, as I formulated them, were about Sherlock Holmes and unicorns, not the *reference of expressions* like 'Sherlock Holmes' and 'unicorn', with which (i) and (ii) are concerned. There is a crucial difference to be drawn here (see Braun 2005): even if one

¹⁰ Kaplan quotes Harry Deutsch: "reference is no coincidence" (Kaplan 1989, 608).

agrees with the artifactualist that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle created the abstract artifact that is Sherlock Holmes, from that it does not follow that *any* uses of the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ *refer* to that artifact. Indeed, influential artifactualists like Kripke, Searle, Thomasson and van Inwagen agree (against Salmon 1998) that only *certain* instances of discourse about fiction contain names that refer to abstract artifacts: for example, creation sentences like (1) and sentences like (2) below feature proper names as referring to abstract artifacts, but the sentences created during authors’ fiction-making activity (call these instances of *textual discourse*¹¹) involve no such reference.

- (2) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character.

Then a weaker general claim that all forms of artifactualism are committed to is this: On at least some uses – uses like (1) and (2), call these the *artifactualists’ focal uses, which exemplify what we might call metatextual discourse*¹² – fictional names refer to abstract artifacts, and whenever fictional names refer to something, they refer to abstract artifacts. Parallel commitments can be constructed for the Meinongian as well as the nonactualist, respectively: on at least some uses, namely, the artifactualists’ focal uses, fictional names refer to Meinongian objects, and whenever fictional names refer to something, they refer to Meinongian objects; also, on at least some uses, namely, the artifactualists’ focal uses, fictional names refer to merely possible objects, and whenever fictional names refer to something, they re-

¹¹ Bonomi (1999/2008)’s label, also favored by García-Carpintero (2014). Thomasson (2003) labels this ‘fictionalizing discourse’.

Notice that artifactualists (including Thomasson, van Inwagen and Kripke) are under no pressure then to say that Rowling, in the context of her fiction-making activities, aimed to use the name ‘Harry Potter’ to *refer* to an abstract artifact, and aimed to get her readers to interpret her in this way. Why? Because these artifactualists invoke the abstract artifact Harry Potter as a referent of ‘Harry Potter’ in the focal uses like (1) and (2) only.

¹² Bonomi (1999/2008)’s label for sentences like (1) and (2), see also García-Carpintero (2014). Thomasson (2003) uses the label ‘external discourse’. Salmon’s (1998) label ‘meta-fictional discourse’ corresponds to a broader category that includes instances of metatextual discourse as well as examples like “According to the short stories, Sherlock Holmes is a detective”. Kroon – Voltolini (2011) label the former external metafictional discourse, and the latter, internal metafictional discourse.

fer to merely possible objects. These general formulations suffice to facilitate moving between discussion of fictional characters like Sherlock Holmes (and mythical species like unicorn) and the reference of expressions like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ (and ‘unicorn’) on focal uses.¹³

The notion of a myth warrants another brief detour as there is a crucial variation in what various philosophers take myths to be. Should we, in the context of Kripke’s exposition, draw a distinction between mythical and fictional labels, like ‘unicorn’ and ‘Holmes’, respectively? I think we shouldn’t. In particular, there is one commonly drawn distinction between myths and fictions that is inapplicable to Kripke’s discussion. Let’s clarify that distinction and why it is about a notion of myth other than Kripke’s. With respect to modes of introduction, it is natural to expect the *intentions and beliefs* of language users to be highly relevant to determining the mode in which they introduce expressions of their language. On this point, it is customary to note a key difference between myth and fiction:

The difference between authors and myth-makers is one of propositional attitude: authors *make-believe* their works of fiction, whereas myth-makers do not make-believe their myths; rather, they genuinely *believe* their myths. (Caplan 2004, 334, emphasis in the original)¹⁴

According to Ben Caplan (and also David Braun, Nathan Salmon and Jeffrey Goodman), myth-makers believe their myths, and these philosophers’ paradigm of a myth-maker is an astronomer putting forth a failed hypothesis about the existence of a celestial object that doesn’t exist. The astronomer *believes* that the hypothetical object exists and inadvertently creates a myth even though her intention had been to describe reality. Plausibly, Caplan’s formulation does not then leave room for the possibility that myth-making is a process in which a myth is *spun out of whole cloth* (as Kripke wrote). Why not? Because spinning out of whole cloth means “to

¹³ Of course, Meinongians and nonactualists tend to (and unlike the artifactualist, easily can) provide a uniform account of the reference of fictional names, committing to universal claims about *all* uses of fictional names rather than the existential claims formulated here. But it’s worth bearing in mind that any Meinongian (and nonactualist) committing to the universal claim is committed to this weaker one. So if I can show (as I aim to) that the weaker formulation is problematic, I thereby have raised a problem for the stronger formulation also.

¹⁴ See also Salmon (1998); Braun (2005), Goodman (2014).

fabricate”, “to invent with no basis in fact”; “to create complete fiction”. And activities like fabricating are intentionally done, not by accident, and one cannot therefore *believe* what one’s fabricating (one could at best *make-believe* it). In short, on Kripke’s conception of a myth (*pace* Caplan), a myth-maker *need not* believe what her myth claims.¹⁵ Cases in which she doesn’t believe them are ones in which the labels in the myth are introduced in a way that is unsuited for the label to apply to any actual, concrete objects. This makes Kripke’s notion of a myth crucially unlike that of Caplan’s and other philosophers’.¹⁶ The difference between the two conceptions of myth in a nutshell: *on the Caplanian notion of myth, for mythical expressions, (ii), the unsuited mode of introduction problem simply doesn’t arise; but it does arise for the Kripkean notion of myth* (in connection with the term ‘unicorn’, for example). In the context of this paper, to keep the terminology straight, I will stick with Kripke’s notion of myth, and will not use ‘myth’ in the Caplanian sense. In particular, I won’t regard names of hypothetical objects in astronomy (discussed in Section 3) as mythical names. This completes the detour.

Right after the passage about unicorns, Kripke (1972/1980, 157-158) repeats the same point with respect to ‘Sherlock Holmes’ also: “it is theoretically possible though in practice fantastically unlikely, that Doyle was writing pure fiction with only coincidental resemblance to [an] actual man”. A crucial consideration emerges from these fleeting remarks about unicorns and Sherlock Holmes: given (ii) the way the myth/fiction was

¹⁵ Plausibly, Kaplan (1989, 609) shares Kripke’s conception of a myth, see the quote in Footnote 17 from Kaplan, who mentions the possibility of *pure myth* and pure fiction.

¹⁶ This difference is one that is often unrecognized and the Caplanian notion of myth is attributed to Kripke (see for example Goodman 2014, Braun 2012). See Zvolenszky (2015, footnote 8) and Braun (2015) commenting on Kripke’s 2013 preface (Kripke 1973/2013, x) in which he makes quite clear that the notion of myth he had intended in the 1970s was unlike the Caplanian one and like the one I’m attributing to him here: he did not take myths to include failed scientific theories.

I did not intend to apply the notion [that fictional and mythical characters are abstract objects whose existence depends on the existence or non-existence of various fictional or mythological works] to ‘Vulcan’, ‘phlogiston’ or other vacuous theoretical names of a more recent vintage, which are ‘mythological’ objects only in a highly extended and perhaps even metaphorical sense of ‘mythological’. (Kripke 1973/2013, x)

created, and (i) the fact that we encounter historical unconnectedness, the result is that we find no more than coincidental resemblance to actual objects.

The unsuited-mode problem would arise even if we had at hand a myth or a novel specifying mythical beings/characters completely, down to the last bit of information about sock color and origin (it would be mind-numbing to read such a novel).¹⁷ So even in special cases of names from complete fictions in which the metaphysical thesis is circumvented, the epistemological thesis would still present problems. In this way, the scope of the epistemological thesis is broader than that of its metaphysical counterpart. (Given the focus of this paper, in what follows, I will concentrate on characters from fiction, setting myths and mythical beings to the side; the points I make about the various problems can be generalized to names from myths also.)

Both the metaphysical and the epistemological theses and all the problems considered so far have taken it for granted that the candidate objects to count as Harry Potter are *concrete, spatiotemporal objects*. Notice that the artifactualist is claiming precisely that the name “Harry Potter” refers to an actual object, an actual *abstract* object. This seems, at first glance, to contradict the epistemological thesis, but it really doesn’t, once we make explicit that both theses claim that it is *concrete* objects that are unsuited candidates as referents for expressions like ‘Harry Potter’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes’. It is therefore well to keep the ‘concrete’ qualification in mind. For example, for (ii) we get: the fiction-writing mode in which the expression ‘Harry Potter’ had been introduced into the language is unsuited for the name to

¹⁷ Kaplan (1989, 609) makes this point:

Insufficient specificity seems to be Kripke’s qualm in *Naming and Necessity* regarding the merely possible species Unicorn and a merely possible referent for ‘Sherlock Holmes’ [the metaphysical thesis]. However, his discussion of what he calls “the epistemological thesis” (that the discovery that there were animals with all the features attributed to Unicorns in the myth does not establish that there were Unicorns) suggests an entirely different argument, namely that *the way in which these particular names arose* (from pure myth and pure fiction) makes it impossible for *them* to name merely possible entities. This argument is independent of the degree of specificity in the myth or in the fiction. (Kaplan 1989, 609)

refer to an actual concrete, spatiotemporal object.¹⁸ For (i) we get: actual, concrete, spatiotemporal objects as potential referents for the name are historically unconnected to the introduction and subsequent use of 'Harry Potter'.

It's crucial to note that in the context of fictional names, of the two problems (i) and (ii), unsuited mode of introduction is the more fundamental one, explaining historical unconnectedness *of the relevant sort*. Given that (ii) Rowling's intention was to create a *fictional character* rather than refer to a flesh-and-blood person with introducing the name 'Harry Potter', (i) 'Harry Potter' was never historically linked (in the relevant way) to an actual orphaned boy wearing glasses, with a Z-shaped scar on his forehead, growing up in suburban England learning wizardry in a boarding school, and so on, and the name cannot refer to any actual concrete boy with spatiotemporal dimensions.

By the *relevant sort* of historical connection, I mean something quite specific: the kind of connection that fixes to whom or to what the name refers. For example, in writing *Robinson Crusoe*, Daniel Defoe incorporated into his story various details from the adventures of an actual castaway, Alexander Selkirk. So there is a causal-historical link between Selkirk and the novel's protagonist Robinson Crusoe: the former inspired the latter. But because Defoe's intention was to write about a fictional character, the his-

¹⁸ In this respect, the mode of introducing proper names in the context of writing a work of fiction varies: Rowling introduced the name 'Harry Potter' intending it to refer to fictional characters; by contrast, she introduced 'London' in her first novel as a name of an already existing city. The unsuited mode of introduction problem arises in the former case, but not in the latter.

Someone might argue that proper names featured in fictional works never refer to actual objects: 'Napoleon' in *War and Peace* refers to a fictional surrogate of the historical figure, an abstract artifact (Voltolini 2013 proposes such a view). I won't explore such views here except for noting two points. First, such views are difficult to argue for as they are plausibly committed to fictional surrogates for the referents of all proper names even in the case of slightly fictionalized biographies or documentary genres (Voltolini is silent on this issue). Second, such views are affected by the claims I am making in this paper: the unsuited mode of introduction problem arises for such views, except it affects not just *some* proper names introduced in the context of fictional works (like 'Harry Potter'), but all names introduced in the context of fiction writing, including 'London' in the Potter novels and 'Napoleon' in *War and Peace*. I thank two anonymous reviewers for key observations on this matter.

torical connection between Selkirk and Crusoe's character is not of the relevant, reference-fixing sort.¹⁹ So we can say in connection with the name 'Robinson Crusoe' also: lack of a historical connection (of the relevant sort) is due to the unsuited mode of introducing the proper name.

The historical unconnectedness problem and the unsuited-mode problem can be extended to concrete, spatiotemporal objects of all sorts, merely possible ones included; this way, we get an even more general formulation:

the historical unconnectedness problem generalized: all concrete, spatiotemporal objects – whether they be actual or merely possible – bear no historical connection (of the relevant, reference-fixing sort) to the introduction and subsequent use of fictional names;

the unsuited-mode problem generalized: the fiction-writing mode of introducing proper names into the language is unsuited for them to have as their reference concrete, spatiotemporal objects, whether they be actual or merely possible.

It is well to generalize in the same way the coincidental-resemblance problem also:

The coincidental-resemblance problem generalized: there is no more than mere qualitative coincidence between concrete, spatiotemporal objects (whether they be actual or merely possible) and fictional characters as described in works of fiction.

Therefore (in the light of the generalization to merely possible objects), as we dig deeper, the problems behind the epistemological thesis turn out to target nonactualism.

As before, in the case of 'Harry Potter', the generalized unsuited-mode problem and the generalized historical connection problem underlie the generalized coincidental-resemblance problem.

And all three problems are in the background of the metaphysical thesis also: the generalized unsuited-mode problem provides the following *additional* reason for holding the metaphysical thesis: (independently of wheth-

¹⁹ I am claiming then that there is a key difference between Tolstoy's writing about Napoleon in the context of *War and Peace* (in which case his intention is to refer to a historical figure with the name) and Defoe's writing about Robinson (in which case his intention is to refer to a made-up figure with the name). See the previous footnote.

er the character of Harry Potter is fully specified in the novels) what grounds do we have at all for choosing, within a counterfactual scenario, between two distinct merely possible concrete, spatiotemporal objects that are qualitatively indistinguishable from the Harry of the novels which to count as Harry Potter when, given J. K. Rowling's fiction-writing mode of introducing 'Harry Potter', it would be a matter of sheer coincidental resemblance for the name to refer to either of those candidate objects? *With respect to names from fiction, the unsuited-mode problem (and in its wake, the coincidental resemblance problem) therefore raises a key issue underlying both the metaphysical and the epistemological theses discussed by Kripke;* this is a striking detail to bring to the surface given that Kripke mentions the unsuited-mode problem in passing only (saying no more than the two half-sentences quoted above), devoting far more attention to the metaphysical thesis. The upshot is then: in connection with fictional names and concrete candidates as their referents (actual as well as merely possible), the most fundamental problem underlying both the epistemological and the metaphysical theses is the generalized version of the unsuited mode of introduction problem.

3. An argument based on the historical unconnectedness problem

Just how bizarre the idea of reference based on coincidental resemblance is – the conception of reference for 'Harry Potter' to which the nonactualist is committed – can be brought out based on considerations about *nonfictional* names that fail to refer. The French astronomer Le Verrier put forth a hypothesis about the existence of an intra-Mercurial planet which he named 'Vulcan', to explain perturbations in the orbit of Mercury. There were various independent sightings mistakenly believed to be of Vulcan before enthusiasm dwindled; by 1916, Einstein's general theory of relativity confirmed that the perturbations were produced by the gravitational field of the Sun; there was no intra-Mercurial planet at all; the Vulcan-hypothesis was refuted; 'Vulcan' turned out not to refer to anything.

What about a counterfactual situation in which the Vulcan-hypothesis is a success story? Imagine a counterfactual scenario with the laws of physics slightly different, and there being an intra-Mercurial planet affecting the orbit of Mercury; Le Verrier puts forth his hypothesis; there are sightings

converging on the planet, which comes to be called ‘Vulcan’, the name featured in Le Verrier’s prior hypothesis. But compared to *our* use of the name ‘Vulcan’, in the counterfactual circumstance, ‘Vulcan’ for the counterfactual planet is introduced and used in a markedly different way. It is preposterous to think that in coining the name in the actual world, Le Verrier managed to name *that counterfactual object even though his naming attempt failed in the actual world*. ‘Vulcan’ might have been a success story just as ‘London’ might have been introduced as a name for a river instead of a city; but all that is irrelevant to how and whether these strings, as parts of *our* language, were introduced and subsequently used (see Kripke 1972/1980, 77, 102–103, 109, especially, fn. 51; also 1971, 145). Le Verrier strove to name an actual concrete, spatiotemporal object; due to his failure to do so, he didn’t *by coincidence* name a nonactual concrete, spatiotemporal object (as the nonactualist would have it); doing so was no part of his intention. So ‘Vulcan’ doesn’t refer to any concrete objects in any counterfactual situations. Kaplan (1973, 506–508) makes this point eloquently with respect to a mythical name like ‘Pegasus’.²⁰

²⁰ Kaplan (1973, 506–508) writes as follows:

Suppose we start out by acknowledging that the Pegasus-myth is FICTION. Still it is, in a sense, possible. Should we not take ‘Pegasus’ to denote what it denotes in the world of the myth? We must be very careful now. ...

The myth is possible in the sense that there is a possible world in which it is truthfully told. Furthermore, there are such worlds in which the language, with the exception of the proper names in question, is semantically and syntactically identical with our own. Let us call such possible worlds of the myth ‘*M* worlds’. In each *M* world, ‘Pegasus’ will have originated in a dubbing of a winged horse. The Friend of Fiction, who would not have anyone believe the myth..., but yet talks of Pegasus, pretends to be in an *M* world and speaks its language.

But beware the confusion of our language with theirs! If *w* is an *M* world, then their name ‘Pegasus’ will denote something with respect to *w*, and our description ‘the *x* such that *x* is called “Pegasus”’ will denote the same thing with respect to *w*, but our name ‘Pegasus’ will still denote nothing with respect to *w*. Also, in different *M* worlds, different possible individuals may have been dubbed ‘Pegasus’; to put it another way, our description ‘the *x* such that *x* is called “Pegasus”’ may denote different possible individuals with respect to different *M* worlds.

I do not object to the inhabitants of one of the *M* worlds remarking that their name ‘Pegasus’ denotes something with respect to our world that does not exist in our world. But I reserve the right to retort that our name ‘Pegasus’ does not even denote with respect to their world.

But what is far more interesting is that the point holds for ‘Vulcan’! The reason why this is interesting is because one of the problems that precludes ‘Pegasus’ from referring to a concrete object (actual or possible) is one that is specific to fictional (and mythical) names: the unsuited mode of introduction problem. That problem doesn’t arise for ‘Vulcan’, only the historical unconnectedness problem does. What we see then in the case of ‘Vulcan’ is that the two core Kripkean claims (the historical-chain requirement and the qualitative-fit claim) are being applied straightforwardly, and being further generalized (in the light of the generalized versions of the historical unconnectedness and the coincidental resemblance problems), extending the core Kripkean claims not just to *actual* concrete objects but also to *merely possible* concrete objects. In effect, unfolding in front of us is the generalization of the qualitative-fit claim and the historical-chain requirement to concrete objects of all sorts, actual as well as merely possible.

We can say the following about the name ‘Vulcan’ in our language, as well as other proper names intended for concrete objects or for fictional characters: *if it cannot make it here, it won’t make it anywhere*. If the name doesn’t manage to refer to a concrete, spatiotemporal object here, in the actual world, it doesn’t refer to such an object in other possible worlds either. Elsewhere (Zvolenszky 2007), I call this the *inverse-Sinatra principle for proper names*.^{21, 22} Notice that this principle, unlike the two core Kripkean claims, goes beyond imposing constraints on the referents of proper names in the actual world, constraining also their referents in merely possible worlds. So it is well to generalize, in the light of the inverse-Sinatra principle, the qualitative fit claim and the historical-chain requirement to characterize the core tenets of a Kripkean stance:

²¹ Even an irrealist about fictional characters can, based on the considerations about Vulcan and unicorns above, accept the inverse-Sinatra principle. The principle commits her to the following: fictional names do not refer to anything in the actual world or any possible world. And this is something irrealists already accept.

²² Frank Sinatra sang about New York City: “If I can make it there, I’ll make it anywhere”. In the inverse-Sinatra principle (to keep it parallel with the song), I use the modal auxiliary ‘can’, by which I mean (as the song’s ‘can’ does) ‘is able to’; I don’t mean metaphysical possibility. Thanks to Nathan Wildman for prompting me to clarify this.

- In the case of reference to concrete individuals (actual as well as merely possible) qualitative fit is neither necessary nor sufficient for being the referent of a name. Call this the *generalized qualitative-fit claim*.
- A causal-historical connection is necessary for a name to refer to a concrete object (actual or merely possible). Call this the *generalized historical connection requirement*.²³

The inverse-Sinatra principle is quite general, covering names like ‘Vulcan’, ‘Pegasus’, and ‘Harry Potter’. And the reason why these names don’t make it anywhere given that they cannot make it here (in the actual world), is because nonactual concrete objects are, at best, coincidentally similar to Vulcan, Pegasus and Harry Potter, as these are described in various bodies of text. We thus have a nonfictional variant of the coincidental resemblance problem. Notice that the inverse-Sinatra principle is a name-based counterpart of the metaphysical thesis that is generalized to cover, besides fictional characters, nonfictional objects like Vulcan also. Crucially, however, the justification for the principle is very different from Kripke’s (who we saw was focusing on the insufficient specificity problem underlying the metaphysical thesis). It is the generalized core Kripkean claims that justify the inverse-Sinatra principle.

Notice that ‘Vulcan’ and ‘Harry Potter’ differ in one crucial detail: the unsuited-mode problem doesn’t extend to a nonfictional name like ‘Vulcan’. Le Verrier’s intention had been to introduce ‘Vulcan’ for a concrete, spatiotemporal object; so a historical connection, if there had been one,

²³ Kripke (1972/1980) did supply a further thesis that, together with the two core claims, yields the generalized versions of the two core claims for proper names that refer to concrete objects. That thesis is a well known one, about proper names being rigid designators: according to one formulation, a rigid designator r is such that if it refers to an object o in the actual world, then it refers to o in every world in which o exists, and in worlds in which o doesn’t exist, r doesn’t refer to an object other than o . But notice that the claim that proper names are rigid designators leaves open whether a proper name without an actual concrete referent does or doesn’t refer to a concrete object in a merely possible world. It is the inverse-Sinatra principle that supplies the needed constraint for names like ‘Harry Potter’ and ‘Vulcan’: no concrete object to refer to here (in the actual world) means no concrete object to refer to in other possible worlds either. In this way, the rigid designation thesis about proper names and the inverse-Sinatra principle are two facets of an overarching theory about the reference of proper names across possible worlds.

linking uses of the name to an actual concrete object, could have served to fix the reference of 'Vulcan', circumventing coincidental-resemblance-related qualms. For a name like 'Vulcan', a historical connection can be secured in the actual world only – there is absolutely no historical connection between *our* use of 'Vulcan' and a merely possible concrete, spatiotemporal object. And in the absence of an actual historical connection, qualms about coincidental resemblance do arise, leading to the metaphysical thesis about the hypothetical object Vulcan, quite independently of whether or not the specification of Vulcan had been complete: we have no basis for counting any merely possible concrete object as Vulcan. (Notice that here, as before, my argument leading to the metaphysical thesis for Vulcan was crucially linked to considerations about coincidental resemblance and historical unconnectedness, which were originally identified behind the other thesis – the epistemological one. With respect to 'Vulcan', too, we see that the two theses are intimately connected.) The upshot is then: in connection with names of hypothetical objects that don't exist (like 'Vulcan') the most fundamental problem underlying both the epistemological and the metaphysical theses is the generalized version of the historical unconnectedness problem.

The foregoing observation about 'Vulcan' allows us to highlight a general point of advantage for the artifactualist position over both Meinongianism and nonactualism. This then translates into an argument for favoring artifactualism over its major realist rivals.

According to artifactualism, Harry Potter is an actual object that hasn't always existed. And the fact that he is an *actual* artifact makes room for a certain kind of causal-historical dependence on the physical world: in the 1990s, J. K. Rowling's creative activities bring it about that Potter is an *actual* abstract object.²⁴ The sort of dependence in place allows Harry Potter

²⁴ We might ask: how can we even make sense of a causal-historical chain between concreta and abstracta? I have considered this issue elsewhere. First, note that Kripke assumes the existence of causal-historical chains linking people and the names of numbers like π (see Kripke 1972/1980, 115-116, footnote 58; Kaplan 1989, 607-608, footnote 101); and numbers are the quintessential candidates for abstract objects; but it is unclear if this makes for a causal-historical chain linking the *abstracta* and the names (see Footnote 27). There is a second, more promising response: it seems overwhelmingly natural to assume that expressions like 'soccer', 'marriage', 'The Magic Flute', 'The Constitution of the United States' denote *abstract artifacts* (see Thomasson 1999;

qua abstract artifact to be the kind of referent for Rowling's name 'Harry Potter' with respect to which issues having to do with historical unconnectedness and, in turn, coincidental resemblance, and, in turn, the epistemological thesis, do not arise.²⁵ (Notice that before, we noted that for names of fictional characters, no historical connection to concrete, spatiotemporal objects is of the relevant, reference-fixing sort. Meanwhile, the point made here is that for the artifactualist, a historical connection to an *actual abstract artifact* is precisely what fixes the reference of 'Harry Potter'.)

We have already seen that the unsuited mode of introduction problem prevented concrete objects (actual as well as merely possible ones) from being the right sort of candidates to be referents of 'Harry Potter'. What about abstract, author-created artifacts as such candidates? For such objects, the unsuited mode of introduction problem does not arise (in this, the situation is analogous to the one in which merely possible concrete objects are considered as candidates for being the referents of 'Vulcan'). What about the historical unconnectedness problem? The point I was making in the previous paragraph is that that problem is also avoided. So the option of 'Harry Potter' referring to an abstract, author-created artifact does not face *any* of the problems behind the metaphysical and epistemological theses. And the argument emerging is that of the realist alternatives considered, artifactualism is the only view that readily manages to escape all the problems associated with the metaphysical and epistemological theses.

By contrast, alternative realist accounts that make Harry Potter a concrete object whose existence does not causally depend on us either because

Zvolenszky 2012, 2013, 2015); the burden of proof is on those who want to claim that these social and cultural objects are *not* abstract artifacts. And once we admit as abstract objects social and cultural artifacts, we already have to secure the possibility of a causal-historical chain for names introduced into our language for these objects. This possibility can then be extended to names of fictional characters also.

²⁵ Of course, having said this much leaves unspecified the nature of the character Harry Potter's dependence on authorial activity, the circumstances of and constraints on creating fictional characters; these are issues that Thomasson (1999), an artifactualist, explores at length. To formulate a complete artifactualist account, such details have to be filled in. My purpose in this paper has been more modest than that: I aim to show that certain challenges having to do with historical unconnectedness create difficulties for major realist theories about fictional characters but not for artifactualism.

the object is nonexistent (according to Meinongianism) or because it is nonactual (according to nonactualism), face a challenge. First, these theorists have to explain why those objects are candidates of the right ontological status to count as the referents of 'Harry Potter'. As we have already seen, on this point, the nonactualist founders already (stumbling on the unsuited mode of introduction problem).²⁶ The Meinongian can get past this hurdle: he may suggest that his nonexistents are objects of thought and hence have just the right sort of ontological status to be suitable targets of authors' intended reference. But on the next hurdle the Meinongian stumbles: if his nonexistent objects are of a suitable sort as objects of fiction-writing, what historical connection is there to account for Rowling's 'Harry Potter' referring to one of countless nonexistent candidate objects (each equally faithful to the way Potter is depicted in the novels but varying in details left unspecified – about sock color, etc.)? The Meinongian cannot provide such a historical connection: causal-historical connection between his timelessly nonexistent objects and actual concreta (like authors) is extremely problematic, downright unintelligible even. And because of historical unconnectedness, the Meinongian is confronted with qualms about having to work with no more than coincidental resemblance between Harry Potter as specified in the novels, and various qualitatively similar but nonidentical Meinongian nonexistents. And, on the one hand, coincidental resemblance does not suffice for reference (in the light of the historical unconnectedness problem), according to the epistemological thesis; and, on the other hand, with insufficiently specified characters like Harry Potter,

²⁶ One version of nonactualism that is worth exploring further in this connection is markedly different from Lewis's: Priest's (2005) (im)possibilism. According to Priest, Rowling, in writing her novels, intends a particular individual that is (i) nonactual, (ii) not created by Rowling, and that (iii) realizes the Harry Potter novels in some other possible worlds. A radical feature of Priest's proposal (making it very different from Lewis's) lies in (iv) his commitment to impossible worlds and impossible objects (to account for impossible fiction). Whether Priest's view can get past the first hurdle (the unsuited mode of introduction problem) and the second one (the historical unconnectedness problem that confronts the Meinongian) is subject to debate (Priest argues that his view clears both hurdles, Kroon – Voltolini (2011), for example, raise doubts on both counts); but what is clear is that the hurdles stand tall before Priest's version of nonactualism but not in front of artifactualism, given the latter's unique combination of two features for fictional characters: their being actual and human-created.

coincidental resemblance leaves room for the metaphysical thesis and the insufficient specificity problem to arise.²⁷

²⁷ This line of argument brings to the fore why the only abstract-object theory contender we considered for fictional characters was artifactualism: it is the only view according to which Harry Potter is created and hence historically linked to goings on in the actual world. Platonism, a theory according to which Harry Potter is a *timelessly existing* abstract object (akin to numbers, sets), would, like Meinongianism and nonactualism, run into problems with historical unconnectedness and hence coincidental resemblance, and, in their wake, the metaphysical and epistemological theses. For an attempt to combine the advantages of artifactualism and Meinongianism in a Platonist framework, see Zalta (2000; 2006).

One might then wonder: what about a Platonist about *numbers*, who thinks such objects are abstract timeless existents? In the light of the foregoing arguments, how is it that we can make room for proper names referring to such objects, a name like π , for example? A promising reply: reference to abstract timeless existents is possible but exactly as difficult as reference to merely possible objects is. The merely possible object in question has to be fully specified, in other words, has to escape the insufficient specificity objection (behind the metaphysical thesis). This is probably why Kaplan claims that “ever-unactualized possibilities are extraordinarily difficult to dub” (Kaplan 1973, 505), while leaving it open that unactualized possibilities are *possible* to dub.

Imagine a lectern-kit that never gets assembled. We decide to give the name ‘Woody’ to the merely possible lectern that would have resulted from assembling the parts by following the instructions in the kit. It would seem unwarranted to deny the possibility of dubbing a nonexistent in this way. To make things even smoother, let us imagine that no parts (not even screws) can be interchanged for others in assembling the lectern – each component has a unique intended spot, and Woody is the lectern that would result from placing all parts where they belong. With such degree of specificity, we can introduce the name ‘Woody’ to refer to a merely possible object. See Kaplan (1989, 607–608; 1973, 517, n19). Also, Salmon (1981, 39, n41) reports Kaplan’s and Kripke’s willingness (in lectures and conversation) to allow the introduction of the name ‘Noman’ to name “the person who would have developed from the union of this sperm and that egg, had they been united”.

Now, full specification for numbers is not problematic: one can give a definition that uniquely fits them and specify that a name like π is to refer to the unique object fitting the definition: is the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter. The position I am outlining is that names of numbers as Platonic objects refer to whatever fits the definition associated with the name. So in this very special case, reference is based on qualitative fit. But it would take further argument to justify an analogous claim for *created* abstracta like the artifactualist’s Vulcan and Harry Potter. I doubt such an argument can be made plausible (though I won’t argue for this here), and accordingly, I also doubt that insufficient specificity is the main reason why ‘Vulcan’ and ‘Harry Potter’ are

In connection with nonfictional empty names like ‘Vulcan’, we have found that of the three problems underlying the epistemological thesis (as well as the metaphysical one), two can be extended to ‘Vulcan’ also: the historical unconnectedness problem, and, in its wake, the coincidental resemblance problem. Indeed, it’s well to recognize that this pair of problems provides a key pair of tests for referring to actual, concrete objects – about the presence of a historical connection, and about a relation that goes beyond coincidental resemblance – that applies to *all* proper names. ‘Vulcan’ and ‘Harry Potter’ fail the pair of tests while a nonempty name like ‘J. K. Rowling’ passes it. With a causal-historical connection in place between Rowling and uses of the name ‘J. K. Rowling’, there is more than qualitative resemblance linking the person and the name.

In addition, we have found that the results are the same for the pair of tests construed as testing reference to Meinongian objects. There is no historical connection (and hence no more than coincidental resemblance) to link ‘Vulcan’ and ‘Harry Potter’ to such objects. Crucially, once the candidate referent for a name like ‘Harry Potter’ is construed as an abstract artifact created by the activities of Rowling, a historical connection between creator and the created object *is* secured after all. Hence, ‘Harry Potter’ (on some occasions of use) referring to an abstract artifact is an option that escapes the historical unconnectedness problem.²⁸

names for which the inverse-Sinatra principle holds. I thank Karen Lewis for discussion on this.

²⁸ Notice that we have arrived at this result without incurring any commitment about the metaphysics of hypothetical objects that are posited by failed scientific theories (including Vulcan). This is an important strategic feat for an artifactualist about fictional characters given that one of the most influential arguments for her view (that sentences like (1) and ‘Harry Potter is an abstract artifact’ involve reference to an abstract artifact Harry Potter) is widely thought to carry over to names like ‘Vulcan’ also (see Caplan 2004, Braun 2005, Goodman 2014), yet Goodman argues that there is an objection specifically targeting artifactualism about the likes of Vulcan. This, by *modus tollens*, threatens to undermine the influential argument for artifactualism about fictional characters. But not the argument I presented in this paper.

4. The argument in the light of the causal-historical chain theory

Once fleshed out, Kripke's (1972/1980) fleeting remarks about fictional characters can be summarized as follows: qualitative resemblance is insufficient to determine the reference of a proper name; a causal-historical connection between names and their referents is necessary to determine to whom or to what proper names refer. This is eloquently discussed by Keith Donnellan, who, in parallel with Kripke, also formulated the proposal that the reference of proper names is determined by causal-historical chains of use (Donnellan's paper was published in 1970, shortly after Kripke delivered his *Naming and Necessity* lectures):

Suppose that Aristotle and Herodotus were ... making up the story [about Thales] ... Suppose further, however, that fortuitously their descriptions fitted uniquely someone they had never heard about and who was not referred to by any authors known to us. Such a person, even if he was the only ancient to hold that all is water, to fall in a well while contemplating the stars, etc., is not 'our' Thales. (Donnellan 1970, 352)

Notice that Donnellan, like Kripke, is claiming that coincidental resemblance alone (in the absence of a historical connection) is insufficient for reference when the story is "made up".²⁹

For names of actual concrete objects like 'J. K. Rowling' and 'London', a parallel overarching lesson transparently emerges from the second lecture of *Naming and Necessity*: a name like 'Gödel' refers to a person only if he is the one being named at the end of the causal-historical chain of uses leading back to the introduction of 'Gödel'; qualitative resemblance is not enough to make a person Gödel (cf. Kripke 1972/1980, 91). It is considerably less transparent that, once we unpack and develop Kripke's fleeting remarks about the names of fictional characters, we arrive at the very same

²⁹ In other words, Donnellan is noting the problem of historical unconnectedness arising for names featured in stories that are spun out of whole cloth. In the same paper, he also formulated, in parallel with Kripke, the causal-historical chain picture of reference determination for proper names. For a similar idea, see also Kaplan's early proposal that the genealogy of a proper name is what determines who a proper name is of. (Kaplan 1967, 197-200); he credits Kripke for the idea: "The ... principle for determining who it is that a given proper name, as it is used by some speaker, names, was first brought to my attention by Saul Kripke" (Kaplan 1967, 213, fn. 24).

lesson, but a generalized version of it: concerning not just actual-world reference but reference in merely possible worlds also. And in this way (as highlighted by the inverse-Sinatra principle I proposed), we arrive at a generalized version of the two core Kripkean claims (about qualitative fit being neither necessary nor sufficient for reference and a historical connection being necessary for reference) that applies to the whole spectrum of proper names, whether they have or lack a bearer. And on this basis emerges a pro-artifactualism argument (one that Kripke did not formulate): of the forms of realism considered, artifactualism is the only one that can heed the generalized lesson at hand. Artifactualism heeds this lesson precisely because (unlike alternative views) it incorporates authorial creation.³⁰

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³⁰ This paper has benefited from comments by participants at the conference *Realism within Phenomenology and within Analytic Philosophy* held at Kaposvár University (Hungary) in January 2012, as well as the conference *Modal Metaphysics: Issues on the (Im)Possible II* held at the Slovak Academy of Sciences in October 2014, and a departmental colloquium at the University of Aberdeen. Special thanks are due to Tibor Bárány, Zsolt Bátori, Anthony Dardis, Zsolt Kapelner, Miklós Márton, András Simonyi, Adám Tuboly, Zoltán Vecsey and two anonymous referees for *Organon F* for many thoughtful and incisive suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. This research has been supported by Grant No. K-109456 entitled “Integrative Argumentation Studies”, and Grant No. K-109638 entitled “Connections Between Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology Within the Philosophy of Mind”, both received from the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA).

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