

*From the early history of philosophy there exist conflicting sets of philosophical doctrines – realism and antirealism. Each of these is not a single thesis but rather a diverse family of positions. Realism typically insists on the independence of an item  $X$  from our conceptual apparatus, language or scientific theories, whereas antirealism affirms  $X$ 's dependence. These conflicting positions had been discussed in many of the areas of philosophy (e.g. metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of mathematics, etc.) and they persist in philosophy hitherto. Knowing the history of philosophical thought, one can even think that the dispute cannot be resolved. It has been occasionally asserted that the realism/antirealism dispute is a kind of Kantian antinomy with the consequence that being a realist or an antirealist can be therefore seen more as a matter of decision (not of solvability). The question of the nature and plausibility of realism/anti-realism is so controversial that no brief account of it will satisfy all those with a stake in the debates between realists and antirealists (see Miller 2012).*

*This special issue (there are three articles, two discussion papers and one review) intends to offer several insights into the selected domains of realism/antirealism debate. All these texts are the outputs of the grant project On What There Is: Varieties of Realism (2011-2014) which takes place at the Catholic University in Ružomberok (Slovakia).*

*Ladislav Koreň's paper on underdetermination, scepticism and realism articulates and compares the structure, presuppositions and implications of two famous sceptical arguments to elucidate whether a possibly appealing diagnosis of one case can successfully carry over to the other. In his paper, Ján Hrkút explores the role which aspectualism plays in answering the question – what the aesthetic judgments are related to? Standard answers embrace either realistic or antirealistic standpoint. But what is the role of aspectualism? The third article of this special issue deals with Ladislav Kvasz's version of instrumental realism. It aims to show that Kvasz's version fails in elucidating the ontological status of instruments. Moreover, the first of two discussion papers investigates the way how Kvasz's instrumental realism provides justification for belief in realism about mathematical entities and whether this way of justification is sufficient for instrumental realism to be considered a form of realism. In the second discussion paper, in response to Lukáš Bielík's views, Eugen Zelenák develops what he believes to be a more adequate reading of Goodman's new riddle of induction. Finally, the review essay analyzes Peter Icke's book on Frank Ankersmit, whose theory of history contains both antirealistic (narrativist) and more realistic threads.*

*I would like to express my gratitude to those who contributed to the preparation of this special issue. First of all, I would like to thank Marián Zoubar, Lukáš Bielik and all anonymous referees for the excellent work they have done in the editorial process of this issue. I would also like to thank the authors for their admirable contribution in elucidating some aspects and in answering some fundamental questions of the realism/antirealism debate. Last, I would like to express the immense gratitude to the John Templeton Foundation for all its generous support.*

*I hope that that this issue of *Organon F* will address an academic readership that is open to how the notion of realism/antirealism is approached in diverse disciplines of philosophy.*

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### **References**

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