

Against Normative Judgement Internalism

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ABSTRACT: Normative judgement internalism claims that *enkrasia* is an ideal of rational agency that poses a necessary link between making a normative judgement, and forming an intention to act according to that judgement. Against this view, I argue that *enkrasia* does not require the formation of new intentional states; instead, it requires that the agent's intentions do not contravene her normative judgements. The main argument for considering that an intention ought to follow from a normative judgement is the claim that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. I will argue that this account is mistaken: practical reasoning aims at justifying certain actions or intentions, and thus its conclusion is a normative judgement. Defenders of NJI might argue, though, that intentions ought to follow from our normative judgements, because of certain requirements affecting not only practical reasoning, but rational agency. I argue that this conception of *enkrasia* is too demanding. *Enkrasia*, I suggest, is better understood as a restriction over our intentions: they ought not enter into conflict with our judgements.

KEYWORDS: *Akrasia* – *enkrasia* – normative judgements – normative requirements – practical reasoning.

Introduction

Akrasia is one amongst various rationality failures an agent can commit. The very possibility of irrationality posits the existence of certain “gaps” (Searle 2001), or “breaks” (Hinchman 2009), in the transition between the steps of rational agency. At least two gaps have been identified. The first of

them lies between the agent's deliberation and her choice. To make a choice means to make the decision to act. In this sense, judgement and choice are two distinct kinds of decisions. Judging that we should ϕ is equal to deciding that we should ϕ ; choosing to ϕ is deciding to ϕ , this is, forming the intention to ϕ (Holton 2009). The second gap in rational agency takes place between the agent's intention to perform an action in the future – this is, her choice to act – and the actual performance of the action. This gap allows for a different kind of irrationality: the agent intends to ϕ , but intentionally does not- ϕ . Following this distinction between the two kinds of gaps, Holton argues for two different kinds of irrationality: 'akrasia' and 'weakness of will'; similarly, Hinchman distinguishes between 'incontinence' and 'weakness'. Rationality governs agency through requiring an appropriate relation between reasons, judgements, intentions and actions. Particularly, enkrasia governs the first of the two gaps: it states that rationality requires that the agent's judgements and her intentions stand in an appropriate relation.

Traditionally, akrasia has been conceived as the failure to do, or at least to intend to do, what one judges one ought to do, all things considered:

[for traditional conceptions] an agent who decisively judges it best to A is thereby rationally committed to A-ing, in the sense that (as long as the judgment is retained) the uncompelled, intentional performance of any action that he believes to be incompatible with his A-ing would open him to the charge of irrationality. (Mele 1995, 71)

Akrasia constitutes a violation of certain rational requirements, i.e. the norms of rationality governing agency; particularly, akrasia is the violation of enkrasia. This requirement states that, in order to be rational, an agent's normative judgements and intentions must stand in an appropriate relation. The question, then, is what the best way to formulate this appropriateness would be – what exactly rationality requires from us.

1. Enkrasia and Normative Judgement Internalism

According to Hinchman (2009), there are three different species of internalism; two of them correspond to the first gap of rational agency – between normative judgements and intentions – and the last one corresponds to the second gap – between intentions and actions:

We might call ‘judgment internalism’ the thesis that your all-things-considered judgment about what you should do bears an internal relation to your choice or intention to act accordingly. And we might call ‘volitional internalism’ the thesis that your choice or intention bears an internal relation to such a judgment. To call these relations ‘internal’ is to say that they’re in some sense necessary or non-empirical [...] ‘Resolve internalism’ [is] the thesis that intending, resolving or otherwise willing to ϕ bears an internal relation to actually ϕ -ing (or at least attempting to). (Hinchman 2009, 396)

Let us postpone the third requirement (‘resolve’) for the moment, and focus on the first and second requirements. Judgement internalism states that an agent ought to intend to do what she judges best. It is therefore irrational to judge that one ought to ϕ and, at the same time, not to intend to ϕ . Volitional internalism, on the other hand, states that the agent’s intention to ϕ ought to stand in an appropriate relation to her judgements about whether she ought to ϕ . These two kinds of internalism refer to two different links in the first gap, ‘forwards’ and ‘backwards’ (Hinchman 2009, 424). The difference between them is often neglected; in fact, intending to ϕ while believing that one ought not to ϕ constitutes a violation of both these kinds of requirements. Although Hinchman does not further develop this double distinction, I believe he pinpoints a relevant feature of the first gap in rationality: that rational agency is not necessarily a one way process, and therefore rationality ought to cover both the forwards and the backwards process. We frequently revise our intentions, not only in the light of new information, but also to check whether they interfere with our other plans. Also, we receive advice, and we are given new reasons we had not considered before. In fact, changing our minds is also subject to the requirements of rationality. Let us now focus on judgement internalism.

Normative judgement internalism¹ (NJI) postulates an internal link between a normative judgement and its subsequent intention: “Necessarily, if one judges anything of the form ‘I ought to ϕ ’, then one also has a general disposition to intend to do whatever one judges that one ought to do” (Wedgwood 2007, 28). Following NJI, rationality requires one not to be

¹ The label ‘normative’ does not add any significant constraint to ‘judgement internalism’, given that only all-things-considered practical judgements are necessarily connected with intentions. I have chosen to employ the terminology used by Wedgwood (2007) because I will focus on his formulation of the requirement.

akratic in the traditional sense pointed out above: “that you not judge, all things considered, that you ought to ϕ while failing to choose or intend to ϕ ” (Hinchman 2012, 1).

Much of the recent debate on rational requirements has focused on the logical relation between the antecedent (‘I ought to ϕ ’) and the consequent (‘I intend to ϕ ’). In broad terms, there are two opposing alternatives: wide-scope and narrow-scope formulations.² The distinction goes as follows:

Enkrasia (Narrow-scope):

If you believe that you ought to ϕ , then you are rationally required to intend to ϕ .

Enkrasia (Wide-scope):

Rationality requires that [if you believe that you ought to ϕ , then you intend to ϕ].

The difference between narrow and wide-scope enkrasia lies in the possibilities that an agent has available when she finds herself in a situation of irrationality. Suppose that an agent realises that she believes she ought to ϕ , and nevertheless she does not intend to ϕ . Following narrow-scope enkrasia, she is required to intend to ϕ . However, from a wide-scope perspective, the agent has a choice: she can either form the intention to ϕ , or revise (and ultimately, abandon) her judgement that she ought to ϕ . In both scenarios, the agent is considered to be in an irrational state when she judges she ought to ϕ while not intending to ϕ . The narrow-scope formulation of enkrasia is a process-requirement:³ it tells the agent what to do in order to avoid irrationality – namely, to form the intention to do what she judges best.⁴ Conversely, wide-scope enkrasia is a state-requirement: it only

² This debate has generated a growing amount of articles; the beginning of the discussion can be found in Broome (1999; see also 2007); this discussion has been continued by Kolodny (2005), Setiya (2007), Brunero (2010), Way (2010) and Hinchman (2012), amongst others.

³ Rationality may be regarded as a state-requirement or as a process-requirement (Kolodny 2005). While state-requirements are requirements over the agent’s actual attitudes, which are required to be consistent, process-requirements demand a certain response from the agent, a change in her attitudes.

⁴ However, as Lord (2011) points out, exiting from the requirement – i.e. making it no longer apply to us through denying the antecedent – is not a form of complying with it, but it does not violate it either. Therefore it is also possible, under a narrow-scope

demands avoiding incoherence, either through the formation of an intention, or through the denial that one ought to ϕ . Wide and narrow formulations mainly differ in the possibility of detaching the conclusion. What is important for our purpose is that, under both of these formulations, it is irrational not to intend to ϕ while judging one ought to ϕ ; thus, my critique to NJI applies to both narrow and wide-scope formulations.

I will now examine two different arguments supporting NJI over alternative conceptions of the enkratic requirement. First, it has been argued that enkrasia governs the transition from certain premises (reasons or normative judgements) to a practical conclusion (an intention): this is what practical reasoning consists in. Against this, I will argue in the next Section that the conclusion of practical reasoning is not an intention, but a normative judgement. The second argument for NJI aims to overcome this challenge, and will be explored in Section 3. Even if the conclusion of practical reasoning is not an intention, it could be argued, the enkratic requirement as defined by NJI may still be an appropriate formulation of the relation between judgements and intentions, insofar as a violation of enkrasia commonly leads to be considered irrational. Against this argument, I will suggest some examples in which the enkratic requirement is not fulfilled, and nonetheless the agent's irrationality is not straightforward. In Section 4, I suggest that volitional internalism can overcome the challenges to NJI presented in this paper, while preserving a normative relation between judgements and intentions.

2. The argument from practical reasoning

Practical reasoning contrasts with theoretical reasoning in the following way: while the former is directed towards action, the latter aims to elucidate how the facts stand. This general remark has led a majority of philosophers to claim that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention.⁵

requirement, to change one's mind about what one ought to do in order to avoid irrationality.

⁵ Some philosophers argue for a stronger claim: that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action (Dancy 2004; Tenenbaum 2007), or either a decision or an action (Alvarez 2010). However, defendants of this view would also accept that intention is involved at some point in the process: they refer to an *intentional* action. See Streumer (2010) for an overview of the problem.

Practical reasoning, according to Broome (2001), can be either instrumental or normative. Instrumental reasoning consists of an inference on behalf of an agent, in which she takes her intentions and beliefs as premises, and reaches a certain intention as the conclusion of this reasoning process (Broome 2001, 176):

- Premise 1: (I) I am going to leave the next buoy to starboard.
 Premise 2: (B) In order to leave the next buoy to starboard, I must tack,
 Conclusion: (I) I shall tack.

This example represents a piece of instrumental practical reasoning. Normative reasoning, on the other hand, involves normative judgements as premises (Broome 2001, 181):

- Premise 1: (B) I ought to tack.
 Conclusion: (I) I shall tack.

In both cases, the agent would conclude her practical reasoning with the formation of an intention; instrumental reasoning involves other intentions and beliefs, while normative reasoning also includes an all-things-considered normative judgement. Instrumental reasoning may include normative judgements, but they are conditional on the agent's goals: if the agent does no longer intend to leave the next buoy to starboard, then she ought not to tack. On the contrary, normative judgements depend on the agent's reasons, which would be independent of her intentions.

This is the strong thesis of NJI: normative judgements ought to motivate; or, to put it differently, using Broome's terminology, rationality requires that, if an agent believes that she ought to φ , all things considered, then that agent is motivated to φ (which is a prerequisite to intending to φ). This motivation can, of course, enter into conflict with other motivations the agent has. NJI states that normative judgements should, at least, have some motivational force. According to the stronger version of this thesis, that is, that normative judgements should motivate the agent more than whatever other motivations she has, *akrasia* would be rendered impossible.⁶

⁶ For a discussion on the stronger version of NJI, see Wedgwood (2007, 26).

What about second and third-person beliefs and normative judgements? Broome argues that reasoning about what another person will do constitutes theoretical reasoning, because its conclusion is a belief (Broome 2001, 177):

- Premise 1: (B) Leslie will leave the next buoy to starboard.
 Premise 2: (B) In order to leave the next buoy to starboard, Leslie must tack.
 Conclusion: (B) Leslie will tack.

I fully agree with Broome that this example illustrates a case of theoretical reasoning, taking two premises as evidence for believing that Leslie will, in fact, tack. Now, let us turn to normative reasoning: is it theoretical as well? If I believe that Leslie has a normative reason to tack, and judge that, all things considered, Leslie ought to tack, is my reasoning theoretical? My aim is to show that it is not: reasoning about what others ought to do is a form of practical reasoning, just as much as reasoning about what I ought to do is. However, third-person reasoning does not conclude in an intention – I cannot intend you to do something.⁷ Therefore, I will suggest, the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative practical judgement.

2.1. Second and third-person practical reasoning

We frequently give and ask for advice, express our opinions about what someone else should do, and criticise others for not behaving as they ought to. Imagine, for instance, that a father advises his son: “Son, you should study law rather than philosophy: it is much better paid.” The reasoning this father has done regarding his son’s academic future is similar to the one he would have done when assessing whether to study philosophy himself. However, it could be argued that reasoning about what someone else should do is in fact theoretical, and not practical. For example, Álvarez (2010) states that “practical reasoning presupposes a goal in the person who engages in the reasoning, which is precisely the thing wanted and what gives the point of the reasoning and of the action to which the reasoning leads” (Álvarez, 2010, 367). Thus, following Álvarez, practical reasoning serves a practical goal of the agent: an agent wants to ϕ , reasons in order to

⁷ I can intend to persuade, coerce, suggest, etc. you to perform an action, but I cannot intend to perform your action as you.

know what she ought to do in order to attain φ (let us suppose that she believes she ought to χ), and concludes her reasoning with the formation of an intention to χ . Hence, she identifies practical reasoning with instrumental reasoning, although the process may include normative judgements as premises as well.

Two objections can be raised against the claim that practical reasoning is necessarily prompted by a need to choose the path of action that will lead the agent to the achievement of her goal. The first of them is suggested by Álvarez herself: “[practical reasoning is driven by the agent’s goal] Unless [...] one is just reflecting on how practical reasoning works, or reasoning on someone else’s behalf, as a detective might when trying to guess how someone might have acted” (Álvarez 2010, 367). So, there are (at least) two exceptions: exploratory reasoning⁸ and second-person reasoning. These two cases are not prompted by the goals the agent is trying to achieve through reasoning; in order to accommodate these two exceptional cases, further clarification on why they are categorised as practical reasoning is needed. Second, it could be argued that theoretical reasoning is also prompted by the agent’s goals. We may have the goal to know how things stand just because we want to find out the truth, or because we need certain information in order to make a decision. And yet having this goal does not make a certain reasoning practical. Intuitively, first and second-person practical reasoning share common features that could justify considering both kinds of reasoning to be practical – but, what would these features be?

Offering a comprehensive theory about the differences between theoretical and practical reasoning would largely exceed the scope of this paper, and this task is not needed in order to argue for the claim that reasoning about what oneself or others should do is a form of practical reasoning. It suffices to show that first and second personal reasoning share a common feature, which I take to be the feature that makes reasoning practical in the first place.

Let us start by pointing out a common assumption regarding practical reasoning: it is directed towards action. By engaging in practical reasoning, we aim to know what actions are justified or required, what goals are wor-

⁸ Exploratory reasoning refers to reasoning whose conclusion needs not to be believed by the agent. Audi (2006, 92) briefly addresses this kind of reasoning, but I will not analyse exploratory practical reasoning here. Second- and third-person practical reasoning could be included in this category.

thy, and what the best way to achieve them is, amongst others. Practical reasoning takes practical reasons as premises. Different agents with access to different reasons may reach a different conclusion. In a very general and broad sense, a reason is the answer to the question “why?”, or what “counts in favour of” doing, believing, or feeling something (Scanlon 1998, 17 ff.). The problem of the ontology of reasons is one of the central points of disagreement in the philosophy of action, so I will not present here all its controversial aspects.⁹ However, I believe there are good arguments for the thesis that reasons are facts, but facts are not reasons by themselves: the agent must believe that the fact that she uses as a reason is the case,¹⁰ and she must be willing to use this fact in a practical inference.¹¹ This means that reasons used in practical reasoning are perspective-dependent: they are reasons for the reasoner.

Both first and third-person practical reasoning use reasons as premises; so does theoretical reasoning. However, practical reasons differ from theoretical reasons in that the former are reasons because of some motivational disposition of the agent, while, in the latter case, accepting something as evidence does not require the agent to be motivated to accept it, as Audi (2006) has argued. A practical judgement states what ought to be done. It is the answer to a practical question. And, Audi argues, making these kinds of judgements is distinctive of practical reasoning. Practical judgements aim to solve a practical problem, guiding the agent’s actions. However, this seems to pose a problem for the claim that I am trying to defend: that practical reasoning is not necessarily first-personal. Audi acknowledges that there are differences and similarities between first- and second- (or third-) personal practical reasoning, but does not provide an analysis of what they would amount to.

A straightforward similarity between first and second or third-personal practical reasoning is that they all conclude in a practical judgement, which differs from a mere prediction about what oneself, or others, will do. Several facts can be used as evidence of an agent’s future behaviour: her past behavioural tendencies, what we know about her motivations, or what we

⁹ See, for a comprehensive overview, Everson (2009).

¹⁰ Is it then possible that there are reasons for an agent that the agent is not aware of? The answer to this question does not affect our concern in this paper: the enkratic requirement is a subjective requirement of rationality, so I leave this question open.

¹¹ I am here following Schroeder (2008).

know about the world. I can predict that my sister will be late today because she is always late, or because I know that the train in which she is coming is late. A practical judgement, on the other hand, states what an agent ought to do. In the case of first-personal reasoning, I employ certain facts as normative reasons because I feel motivated, with variable strengths, to comply with the norms from which these reasons gain their normative status. For example, I could judge that the fact I will be late to an appointment unless I take a taxi is a reason for me to take a taxi as long as I find punctuality valuable. Were I indifferent to being late, I could not use it as a normative reason. The main obstacle to my argument is the following: How are values and motivations expressed in second and third-personal practical reasoning?

There are two main differences between first and second or third-personal practical reasoning (Andreou 2006). First, the amount of information available to each agent differs – not only the information about the world, but also about the other agent’s motivations. Second, even if the information were shared, the evaluation mechanisms used to assess the reasons for and against a particular goal or action may differ. Suppose that an agent seeks advice. Judgements about what the advisee ought to do can be derived either from the adviser’s reasons and standards, or from those attributed by the adviser to the advisee – what is commonly known as ‘putting oneself in the other’s shoes’. In both cases, the adviser has to engage in practical deliberation in order to assess what the advisee ought to do. Second and third-personal practical reasoning can take the form of either normative or instrumental reasoning. While normative reasoning examines the normative reasons for a certain action, instrumental reasoning takes an end as given, and aims to find out the best means to achieve it.

Thus, motivations and values do play a role in second or third-personal practical reasoning. They may not play the same causal role in the production of an action, but they play a fundamental role in assessing what facts are used as reasons in a practical inference: this is a distinctive feature of practical, as opposed to theoretical, reasoning.

3. The argument from rational agency

Even if the conclusion of practical reasoning were a normative judgement, it could be argued, it does not follow that NJI is false. What follows

is that *enkrasia* is not a rational requirement governing practical reasoning, because its conclusion is not an intention. But it may well be the case that *enkrasia* is a requirement over rational agency. NJI defends that rationality requires an agent to form an intention to ϕ whenever she judges that she ought to ϕ ; even if her reasoning were correct and complete, she would still be considered irrational if she lacked the intention to ϕ .

However, there are cases in which requiring an agent to form an intention is too demanding as a condition for rationality. We sometimes deliberate on whether we should do something in particular; and the answer can be positive, as well as negative. If I wonder now whether I should ϕ , and I conclude that I ought not to, requiring me to form the corresponding intention not to ϕ seems too strong as a condition for rationality. The distinction between the absence of intention and the presence of a negative intention is often overlooked (cf. Kolodny 2005). Suppose that I am visiting the Prado Museum, and while standing in front of *Las Meninas*, a paper by Sam Shpall comes to my mind. His paper analyses the agential commitments derived from the belief “I ought to spit on *Las Meninas*” (Shpall 2011). I deliberate on my reasons to spit on *Las Meninas*, and I find that I do not have any – in fact, I have many reasons not to spit on that painting. Given my reasons, I judge that I ought not to spit on *Las Meninas*. I can avoid irrationality by merely not intending to do what I believe I ought not to do.

It could be argued that abstaining from doing something is also an action, and therefore there is a practical link between my judgement that I ought not to spit on *Las Meninas* and my not spitting on them, which would be an action. Some clarification is needed at this point. The concept of omission is problematic. On its widest conception, every absence of action is an omission, and the number of things we do not do is countless. There are different ways, though, to narrow down the set of omissions that count as actions, such as taking into account the agent’s intentions (Clarke 2010), or her degree of reason-responsiveness and self-control (Fischer 1997). These criteria serve different purposes, such as attributing responsibility to an agent for not doing something, or analysing the conditions under which omissions are indeed actions. Let us focus on intentional omissions, for the matter discussed here is whether a negative intention (an intention not to do something) ought to follow from a negative normative judgement. My omission to spit on *Las Meninas* may be intentional or unintentional. Suppose that it is unintentional: I do not have any intention to

spit on that painting, nor any intention not to spit on it. I had previously judged that I ought not to spit on *Las Meninas*, and the lack of any intentional state whose content is to avoid or omit spitting on it does not constitute a violation of a rational requirement, apparently. Intentions to perform something that we do not usually need to intend to do are similar in what concerns enkrasia, as Wedgwood argues; we do not need to form an intention to breathe in order to do so, and therefore it is not irrational not to form an intention to breathe, even if we judge we ought to breathe (cf. Wedgwood 2007, 30). It follows that I do not need to form an intention not to spit on *Las Meninas* in order to avoid irrationality: before wondering whether I should do so, I had no previous intention to perform that action. But let us suppose that I actually had that intention. I then ask myself whether I ought to spit on the art work, and conclude that I ought not to. Intuitively, dropping my previous intention suffices in order to avoid irrationality.

It may be argued that NJI can accommodate these exceptions. Wedgwood discusses the possibility of being rational without forming an intention. He argues that NJI only applies to first-person normative judgements whose content (φ) is something “of the appropriate sort”, which means that “ φ -ing must be a course of action that is ‘manifestly dependent on intention’, in a situation ‘with no relevant uncertainty’” (Wedgwood 2007, 81). Hence, normative judgements of the appropriate sort meet two requirements. On the one hand, the agent must know that her intention to φ makes a difference to the chances of her φ -ing. Furthermore, the agent must know that she will φ if and only if she intends to (Wedgwood 2007, 30). Not intending to φ while knowing that only by intending to φ will one φ , Wedgwood argues, counts as willingly failing to φ , and this is why the agent who does not form the intention is akratic: she is willingly failing to do what she believes she ought to do.¹² Concerning the second condition for appropriateness, it states that the agent must be sure about what her best option is. If the agent knows that she ought to do either φ or χ , but she does not know which one she ought to do, then there is ‘relevant uncertainty’. In this situation, the agent is not rationally required to intend to do neither φ nor χ . Similarly, if the agent judges, all things considered, that

¹² However, Wedgwood’s conclusion is problematic. It is not necessarily true that, lacking the intention to φ , one is willingly not φ -ing. I will discuss this problem in the next section.

she ought to ϕ , but she is unsure about her judgement, then her judgement is not of the appropriate sort.

The criteria for inappropriateness could be broadened in order to accommodate normative judgements concerning what agents other than one-self ought to do, or what we ought to do given certain hypothetical circumstances, which would be a case of exploratory reasoning. If the criteria for appropriateness are narrowed, the challenges I have presented to NJI disappear. However, the concept of “appropriateness” concerning judgements is quite problematic, and hence the strategy to defend NJI is controversial, at the very least. First, the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate judgements ought to be based on a common feature that either all appropriate or all inappropriate judgements share. Because of this feature, appropriate judgements would be subject to a certain rationality norm (enkrasia, as defined by NJI), while inappropriate judgements would not be subject to that rationality norm.¹³ In order to explain its capability to interfere with a rational requirement, this common feature (either to appropriate or to inappropriate judgements) should somehow be related to the enkratic requirement.

Second, Wedgwood’s criteria for appropriateness are themselves problematic. The first requirement states that the course of action must be ‘manifestly dependent on intention’, which means that the agent must believe that she will ϕ if and only if she intends to ϕ . However, it is not clear whether one’s intention necessarily makes an objective significant difference, or, on the contrary, whether an agent whose beliefs concerning success are wrong is also making a judgement “of the appropriate sort”. Furthermore, it would be necessary to quantify, or at least specify to a higher degree, what a “significant difference” amounts to. Training to be a professional athlete makes a difference in the chances of success, but the chances are objectively very low; thus, even if an agent believes she ought to become an athlete, rationality (following Wedgwood) would not require her to form an intention to achieve that goal. On the other hand, the certainty requirement needs further clarification. What level of certainty, self-confidence or trust is needed in order to meet this requirement? Suppose that I now judge that I ought to ϕ , and at the same time, I know that I am likely to change my mind in the future: do I meet the certainty requirement?

¹³ They might be subject to *other* requirements, although this possibility has not been explored in the literature.

In sum, I think that Wedgwood's strategy needs further development in order to provide a satisfactory explanation of why, under certain circumstances, rationality does not require the agent to form an intention. I will now suggest a different interpretation of the enkratic requirement that allows us to accommodate a broader scope of judgements.

4. Volitional internalism: enkrasia as a restriction

Judgement internalism is one of the two kinds of normative bridges in the first gap of rational agency pointed out by Hinchman (2009). The second bridge would be volitional internalism, which states that our intentions bear an internal relation to our normative judgements. Not intending to ϕ while believing that one ought to ϕ conflicts with judgement internalism, but it does not contravene volitional internalism; holding an intention to ϕ while believing that one ought not to ϕ conflicts with volitional internalism, and also contravenes judgement internalism. This asymmetry is often neglected, or explicitly rejected: as pointed out in the previous Section, Wedgwood claims that an agent who knows that only by intending to ϕ she will ϕ and, at the same time, does not intend to ϕ , is willingly failing to ϕ . However, the relation between the absence of intention to ϕ and the voluntary failure to ϕ is not straightforward. In this Section, I argue that the absence of intention does not necessarily lead to acting against one's best judgement, and that the enkratic requirement is better understood as a restriction over our intentional states.

Although akrasia has traditionally been defined as lacking the intention to ϕ while believing that one ought to ϕ , there is an alternative formulation of akrasia that is based on the irrationality of contravening volitional internalism. Under this view, akrasia would be defined as acting against one's best judgement, that is, intentionally ϕ -ing, while judging that one ought not to ϕ (Audi 1993; Gilead 1999; Mele 1995; Tenenbaum 2010). The reason why akrasia is possible is that the evaluation of our normative reasons for ϕ -ing may not be in line with our motivation to ϕ :

[A]ttributing an action-guiding function to evaluative judgements [...] does not commit one to supposing that the judgements are themselves logically or causally sufficient for the presence of corresponding intentions. [...] There is no motivational magic in the thought content 'My A-ing would be best'. (Mele 1995, 25)

Normative judgements can provide rational guidance even when they lack sufficient motivational force (Audi 2006, 81; Railton 2006). This is not to say that normative judgements are completely independent of our motivations. As argued above, our values and motivations are necessarily connected to what we take to be a practical reason. However, many factors may intervene in the motivational strength of a normative judgement: variations in our motivation across inter-temporal agency,¹⁴ conflicts between first- and second-order desires¹⁵ or depletion of self-control,¹⁶ to name a few.

An agent may judge either that she ought to ϕ ($BO\phi$), or that she ought not to ϕ ($BO\neg\phi$). Akrasia is the result of a conflict between her judgements and her actual intentions. Given that an agent can intend to do something ($I\phi$), not to do something ($I\neg\phi$), or she can lack the relevant intentional state ($\neg I\phi \wedge \neg I\neg\phi$), the following combinations may obtain:

	$I\phi$	Enkrasia		$I\phi$	Akrasia
$BO\phi$	$I\neg\phi$	Akrasia	$BO\neg\phi$	$I\neg\phi$	Enkrasia
	$(\neg I\phi \wedge \neg I\neg\phi)$?		$(\neg I\phi \wedge \neg I\neg\phi)$?

Table 1: Combinations of judgements and intentions

There are four uncontroversial cases: two of akrasia, and two of enkrasia – either the agent’s intentions are in line (enkrasia) or contradict (akrasia) the agent’s normative judgement. Akrasia would consist in intentionally ϕ -ing, or holding an intention to ϕ , while believing that one ought not to ϕ . Conversely, an agent would also display akrasia if she intends not to ϕ , or intentionally does not ϕ , while believing that she ought to ϕ . The rational requirement that is violated by akrasia can be formulated as follows:

¹⁴ For instance, we can predict that we will be glad we did something, as the title of Harman’s article suggests (2009), even if we do not feel a present motivation to do it.

¹⁵ A second-order desire is a desire to have a desire (“I wish I cared more about my health”). Following Frankfurt (1971), second-order desires guide first-order desires; they also control the formation of intentions.

¹⁶ The process of exhaustion of willpower has been called “ego depletion” (Baumeister – Vohs – Tice 2007).

Enkrasia:

Rationality requires that you do not [intentionally not φ if you believe that you ought to φ].¹⁷

If akrasia consists in intentionally acting against one's best judgement, the following question arises: Why is it irrational to *intend to act* against our judgements? Suppose that I believe I ought not to φ ; nonetheless, I intend to φ . However, I finally drop my intention, and therefore I am not acting against my judgement. Does not merely holding an intention to φ make me irrational, in the light of my normative beliefs? The answer to that question is affirmative. However, the explanation of why this is so requires us to introduce a different rational requirement, governing the second break in rational agency, the gap in the transition from intentions to actions. Following Hinchman (2009), resolve internalism states that our intentions bear an internal relation to our actions. The resolve requirement may be formulated as follows:

Resolve:

Rationality requires that [if you intend to φ , then you intentionally φ].¹⁸

Resolve, then, is a process-requirement. It states that our intentions ought to have volitional control over our actions: intending to φ commits us to φ -ing. Intentions, as opposite to normative judgements, ought to be motivationally sufficient to initiate action.

¹⁷ This is a wide-scope and positive formulation of enkrasia. If the normative judgement is negative, the wide-scope formulation would go as follows:

Enkrasia (wide-): Rationality requires that you do not [intend to φ if you believe that you ought not to φ].

Enkrasia could also be formulated as being narrow-scoped:

Enkrasia (narrow+): If you believe that you ought to φ , then rationality requires that you do not [intend not to φ].

Enkrasia (narrow-): If you believe that you ought not to φ , then rationality requires that you do not [intend to φ].

Discussing here the scope of rational requirements would exceed the scope of this work; my aim is just to show that the approach to enkrasia I am defending here might, in principle, be formulated in different ways.

¹⁸ Again, this formulation is wide-scoped; but a narrow-scoped reformulation would also be compatible with the argument presented here.

Through the resolve requirement, we may explain why intending to ϕ while believing that one ought not to ϕ is akratic. Suppose I believe I ought not to ϕ . Because of *enkrasia*, it is prohibited for me to intentionally ϕ . However, I intend to ϕ . Then, rationality requires that I ϕ intentionally, because of the resolve requirement – otherwise, I would be weak-willed (Holton 2009). Rationality would then be requiring me to intentionally ϕ and, at the same time, prohibiting me to do so. Both *enkrasia* and resolve regulate intentions: the former is a backwards process (from intentions to normative judgements, in the form of a restriction) and the latter is a forwards process (from intentions to action, in the form of a positive requirement). Therefore, holding an intention to do something that contravenes our judgements is also a form of *akrasia*.

Thus, the *enkratic* requirement is rather a prohibition: we ought to avoid intending to do anything that contravenes our normative judgements. Not intending to do what we believe we ought to do is not necessarily irrational. This claim may seem quite counterintuitive, so let us illustrate it with a few examples.

First, let us bring back our example above concerning Las Meninas. I believe I ought not to spit on it. And yet I do not have any intention not to spit on it, nor any intention to do so. However, I am not contravening my normative judgement: simply by not doing it I am complying with that judgement, i.e. I am not acting against it. Similarly, I do not need to intend not to lie every time I speak, even if I believe I ought not to lie. I agree that judgements to perform something we were going to do regardless of our intentions are uncommon.

So, let us imagine a different scenario. I deliberate about the relation that my sister and I have. I conclude, all things considered, that I ought to meet her more often. However, I know I will organise my agenda tomorrow, so I prefer to wait until then in order to choose when to meet her. I have not formed the intention to meet her, and I do not think I am being akratic (nor that my reasoning is not complete). It may be argued, though, that I have indeed made a choice, and thus formed an intention, to meet my sister: all I have to do is to plan how to do it. However, an intention is a mental state that exerts volitional control over our mental states and our behaviour (Bratman 2009). It is not merely a wish, or a desire, or a belief about what I will do. In this example, I do not form an intention [to meet my sister at some point]; rather, I have suspended choice, which does not necessarily violate *enkrasia*.

Let us imagine a third scenario. I believe I ought to meet my sister by the end of this week. The week ends and I have not decided whether to meet my sister or not – that is, I have not formed any intention. However, I have been doing many things that are incompatible with meeting my sister, and I am aware of this incompatibility. In this case, I would consider that I am being akratic. The reason is that I am intentionally not doing something I believe I ought to do. Therefore, I am acting against my all-things-considered judgement.

Lastly, let us imagine the following variation of the last scenario. On Monday, I believe I ought to meet my sister by the end of the week, but I have not formed the subsequent intention. On Saturday, I realise that the end of the week is near, and then decide to meet my sister that day. Am I being irrational from Monday to Saturday? No, because I have not acted against my best judgement.

I have tried to show through these examples that it is possible to judge that we ought to do something and, at the same time, not intending to do it, without violating a rationality requirement. Granted, if the normative judgement that the agent makes has the form “I ought to φ now”, then there is no room for delaying her decision: either she acts upon her judgement, or she changes her mind about what she ought to do. NJI can only deal with this kind of normative judgements. Volitional internalism, on the contrary, can deal with a much wider range of judgements. Of course, many normative judgements have a deadline, so reaching that date and not having neither intended to φ nor having intentionally φ -ed counts as acting against one’s judgement that one ought to φ . Therefore, in many occasions, not intending to φ amounts to willingly failing to φ , as Wedgwood claims. However, there is not a *necessary* connection between the absence of intention and an intentional failure to act, and this is the reason why we cannot base a rationality requirement upon this contingent relation.

Thus, only one combination between intentions and judgements violates enkrasia, and is therefore akratic:

	$I\varphi$	Enkrasia-derived		$I\varphi$	Akrasia
	$I\neg\varphi$	Akrasia		$I\neg\varphi$	Enkrasia-derived
$B\varphi$	$\neg I\varphi$	Enkrasia-compatible	$B\neg\varphi$	$\neg I\varphi$	Enkrasia
	$\neg I\neg\varphi$	Enkrasia		$\neg I\neg\varphi$	Enkrasia-compatible

Table 2: Akrasia and three kinds of enkrasia

An akratic agent acts against her best judgement, or intends to do something that contravenes her judgement. Concerning *enkrasia*, I have made a threefold distinction: *enkrasia*, *enkrasia-derived*, and *enkrasia-compatible*. In fact, neither of these three combinations violates *enkrasia*; the distinction aims to highlight the different ways there are to comply with a negative requirement, i.e. a prohibition.

Firstly, an agent is *enkratic* as long as she does not intend to do something she believes she ought not to do, and vice versa: she does not intend not to do something she believes she ought to do. Thus, if we lack the intention to contravene our judgement, we are being *enkratic*.

Secondly, if an agent intends to ϕ , then rationality requires that she does not intend not to ϕ ; otherwise, she would have inconsistent intentions. Therefore, an agent who intends to ϕ and believes she ought to ϕ is not violating *enkrasia* – she is not acting against her better judgement. The label ‘*enkratic-derived*’ aims to stress that the rationality of acting according to one’s judgements is derived from complying with the *enkratic* requirement: if an agent is making a decision to act, and she believes she ought to ϕ , she is not permitted to intend not to ϕ , and thus she only has one choosable path: intending to ϕ .

Finally, an agent is in a state that is compatible with *enkrasia* (‘*enkrasia-compatible*’) if she does not intend to do something she believes she ought to do. It is compatible with *enkrasia* because we do not have enough information to know whether she is being *akratic*. As I have argued above, there are cases in which the absence of intention does not necessarily lead to willingly failing to do what one judges best. If the situation is such, then she is not violating *enkrasia*, and therefore she is not being *akratic*. Conversely, if her normative judgement would be contravened if she does not form an intention, as in the third example above, in which the judgement has a deadline for fulfilment, then she would violate *enkrasia*; as we do not know what kind of judgement the agent has made, her state is in principle compatible with *enkrasia*.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to argue that Normative Judgement Internalism cannot accommodate certain kinds of normative judgements, and that volitional internalism is an alternative view on the normative require-

ments of rationality that succeeds in accommodating these judgements. It is widely assumed that not intending to act necessarily amounts to willingly failing to act. Against this intuition, I have argued that, although frequent, the relation between the absence of intention and an intentional failure is not necessary, and therefore cannot be formulated as a normative requirement of rationality. Furthermore, volitional internalism does not rely on the assumption that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention, which I have argued to be wrong. The enkratic requirement formulated by volitional internalism gathers an important and often neglected thesis in the theories on rationality: that normative judgements do not need to cause an intentional state in order to provide rational guidance.

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